SOLON HIS FOLLIE,

OR

A POLITIQVE DISCOVRSE, TOVCHING THE Reformation of common-weales conquered, declined or corrupted.

BY RICHARD BEACON GENT. STVDENT OF GRAYES INNE, AND SOMETIMES her Maiesties Attorney of the province of *Mounster in Irelande.*

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Anno Domini, 1594.

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TO HER MOST SACRED MAIESTIE.

IF all the actes and monumentes of former ages, moſt mighty and renowned Queene, and Empreſſe, which might recommend this action of reformation vnto all poſterities, were committed to oblivion, yet the recordes and monumentes of your Maieſties moſt happy governement, may ſufficiently revive the ſame: where it is ſaide, that your Highnes hath atchieved vnto that which is moſt rightly tearmed the greateſt magnificence of a Prince, which doth not onely conſiſt in high bloud, hauty progenie, aboundance of private riches and ſubſtance, wherewith your Maieſtie is every way plentifully adorned, but it reſteth chiefely in populous and wel governed regions, & in beautiful Cities and Townes; al which being impaired in your Realme of Ireland, by the iniquitie of former times, nowe as well the one as the other, by your Maieſties moſt godly and careful courſe of governement, are recontinued, amended, and augmented. What more? Have you not reformed all exactions grievous

The act of attainder of Shane Oneile, Ann. 11. Elizab.

vnto that people? Have you not reformed that horrible and moſt deteſtable cuſtome of Coiney and Livery, that fretter of the peoples lives and ſubſtaunce, that Nurſe and teate which ſometimes gave ſucke and nutriment vnto all diſobedience, rebellions, enormities, vices and iniquities of that Realme, over foule and filthie heere to bee expreſſed? Have you not in place of ſorrow, famine, howling, and curſing, brought ioy, iolitie, plentie, and every where bleſſings of ſo gratious a Queene? Have you not reformed that daungerous cuſtome of Captaineſhippe, which by factions did diſmember the ſtate of Irelande? for all which if wee ſhould bee founde vnthankefull, yet the ſtatutes and recordes of that lande, would witnes the ſame againſt vs. Great is the honour which is due vnto Robert Fitz Stevens, which firſt opened the waie of Irelande to the Earle of Stranguile: and great is the honour due vnto the Earle, which opened the ſame vnto Henry the King: & great is the honor which is due vnto the King, which opened the way vnto Iohn his Sonne: greatly is he to bee praiſed, that firſt ſo boldlie began; and woorthy of greater praiſe is he, that after the beginning ſo nobly came to execute

Anno 11. Eliz. cap. 7. fo. 168.

cute the thing ſo well begun; but moſt of all he is to be praiſed, that ſhall perfect and finiſh the ſame; which praiſe by Gods divine prouidēce is light on your Maieſtie; for ſo the ſubiect of Irelande in the act of Attainder of Shane Oneile doeth liberallie confeſſe: therefore goe forwarde Brutus, for thy glory in reforming, is farre greater then the glory of Romulus in building and inſtituting of the citie of Rome. All nations with the Romaines ſhall honour your preſence, as another Timeſitheus, for reforming and reſtraining the Lyparians from their accuſtomed robberies and ſpoiles; all nations ſhall rightly honour you with the Ladies of Rome, which ſometimes offered their iewels to be ſolde for the furtherance of publike ſeruices; for huge be the charges already imployed by your Maieſtie, for bringing to paſſe ſo great things tending to the ſound & vniuerſall reformation of this your Realme of Ireland, as in the acte of ſubſidie more at large may appeare. What further honour now remaineth due vnto your Maieſtie, for the accompliſhing of ſo great & worthy actions, if not that which was ſometimes giuen vnto Ianus? for that you have chaunged the life of man which before your time was rude, cruell, and

Anno. 11. *Eliz.ab.*

Act of ſubſidie Ann. 11. *cap.* 1. *fol.* 148.

wilde, in Ireland, and brought it for the moſt part to be obedient, gentle, and civill, in ſuch ſort as we may truely ſay with the ſubiect of Irelande, this is the favour which your Maieſty hath found in the ſight of God to augment, ſtrengthen, and honour your imperiall crowne of Englande, by the thorough reformation of this your Realme of Ireland. All which conſidering with my ſelfe, I could not ſuffer ſo honourable actions to bee buried in oblivion, without leaving ſome ſpeciall remembrance to all poſterities, but have made this plat & counterfet, the which I here preſent vnto your Maieſties ſacred handes, in baſer coulours then princes doe vſually beholde, or ſo weighty matters may require: but I hope that your Maieſties accuſtomed clemency will impute this to Solon his follie and lunacie, which now for his boldnes craveth pardon, rather then commendation.

Your ſacred Maieſties

moſt humble and loyall ſubiect

RICHARD BEACON.

The Authour to the Reader.

ENTLE Reader, with the vnskilful archers of our times, I did first aime and shoote at the publique good and profit, according to the trust repoſed in me, and now as one that hath loſt his arrowe, and miſſed his marke, I have at al adventures diſcharged the ſecond time, to the ende that my ſecond labours may drawe home my firſt loſſes, if my hande be fortunate to pearce the ſecret partes of thy tender and kinde affections, and move in thee a friendly acceptaunce of theſe my rude labours; if not, looke no more for my returne to accompany the pleaſaunt fieldes, and meddowes, for henceforth I take vp my habitation amidſt the rockes and deſerts, where my arrowes may not pearce, nor the ſtrength of my bowe withſtand the bitter windes, and the harde and hoary froſtes, where I ſhall no more play the foole with *Solon* in the market-place, but the wilde man in the deſertes. But if thou ſhalt vouchſafe to recall ſo vnskilfull an archer againe into the fieldes, I may perhaps winne a bet, that ſhall pay for the loſſe of a rubber. Receive then, *Solon* his folly, not as a teſtimony of his skill, but rather of the goodwil he beareth vnto thee, and his country, whereof if thou ſhalt make acceptaunce, the ſame is thy honour, and not his: which with thy bounty and goodnes, haſt now overcome as well the giver, as the gift. But if thou ſhalt cenſure it by his owne proper woorth, he hath fore-tolde thee the valewe thereof, and before thy face hath now waighed the ſame in equall ballance, with *Solon* his follie, but not with his wiſedome.

SITH Circe at the instance of Vlysses hath once againe graunted vnto dumbe creatures liberty of speech, I may not but complaine, for that she hath brought vs from our former rest & silence, now to speake before that wise Vlysses, who havinge not tasted of the sweetenes and pleasure of this our solitary life, since which time Circe first chaunged vs Grecians into the habite of mute and dumbe creatures, may fortune to advance his wisedome, and to holde our former silence and rest as contemptible. And againe of the other side, we beeing long deprived of the vse and arte of subtill speaking, shall much discontent wise Vlysses, with our homely discourses. But O Circe, hath the love of Vlysses, and the cuntry of Greece, drawn thee vnto this indignation against vs, as with Epaminondas, naked and vnarmed, I must oppose my selfe against the scornes and reproches of al ages, as againſt a Grecian army? And with the fonde lover in Petrarke must thou of force make me a sorrowfull minister thereof? And with the silly birdes fast tied and bounde, must I represent the face of thy loving thoughts? Then what comfort remaineth, If I may not say with them, though here we remaine fast tyed and bounde, subiect to all scornes and reproches, and bereaved of our former liberty and delightes, yet this one Ioy resteth, that the Author of these our Calamities, is falne more deepely then our selves therin, in such sort as with vs he must tast the bitternesse of disdaine and contempt, with the which cõfort, I heere present my selfe vnto your most friendly viewe, hoping that this my naked and innocent simplicity shall have your leave if not your likinge.

In reformatam ornatiſsimi Beaconi Rempub: ſeu ſimulatam Solonis Inſaniam, Carmen.

INſidias fugiens, & latum cede tyrannum,
Brutus, nobilium gloria prima patrum,
Prudens deſipuit; quantum O fuit vtile Bruto
Deſipere, ingenio qui perituru erat.
Crede mihi gratus furor eſt, & amabilis error,
Vt teipſum ſerves negligere ingenium.
Inſignem ſimili fama eſt vſum arte Solonem,
Amiſſam patria dum Salamina petit.
Illum quippe furor, præcepſq; inſania mentis,
Effrenis rabies, & vagus error agunt:
Illi barba impexa, coma ſine lege fluentes,
Et loca ſola placent, & ſine teſte nemus.
Sic ambo inſani ſunt, ſed cum diſpare laude,
Hic furit, vt ſeipſum ſervet, & hic patriam.

Robertus Wright Bacc: Theol.

Viro verè politico, civiq́ue patriæ benevolentiſsimo, Richardo Beacono Salutem.

Qualis in Euboico Salamis fuit Inſula ponto,
Quâ freta vicinas interlabuntur Athenas:
Talis ad occiduum, pelagi propè marmora, Solem,
Agnovit (Regina) tuos Hyberniafaſces.
Cincta mari Salamis, cincta eſt Hybernia vtriſq́,
Ardua per medios conſurgunt mania fluctus.
Quàm bene munitum, fati haud ignara futuri
Compoſuit natura locum, tàm docta tueri
Si foret, & dubijs ſi conſulat Anglia rebus;
Non te Hiſpane ferox, populi prædator Eöi,
Dira per inſolitos minitantem prælia motus,
Non lectos iuvenes, non robora gentis Ibera,
Non volucrem in tumido ſalientem gurgite pinum,
Fluctus cum gemitu, ventoſq́, labore prementem,
Hàc primùm attonitus ſpectaverat Anglus in ora.
Nunc vbi quiſq́, ſibi ſapere, & ſuccurrere malit,
Quàm patria, videat q́, aquis ſecurus ocellis
Labentem, & valido tibicine ſuſtentandam,
Prona ruit tacito ſenſim reſpublica caſu.
At tibi pro meritis tantis, pro tam benè factis,
Proq́, hoc in patriam officio, pietate, fideq́,
Contingat (Beacone) decus poſt fata perenne.

Iohannes Budden Magiſt. Artium.

A BOOKE INTITVLED, SOLON

his follie and lunacie, made for the better reformation of common-weales, conquered, declined or corrupted, by R. B.

EPIMENIDES PHÆSTIAN. Wel met good Sir *Pisistratus*, in this holy place of the tẽple of *Venus*, where though the sacrifices bee finished, yet notwithstanding your devotion is highly to bee commended. *Pisistratus*. You also are happely well saluted right wise and famous *Epimenides*, and this devotion which you have friendly now commended, is but a duety first vnto the Gods, and next vnto my friendes, amongst whom I enumber you not the least. *Ep*: I am the least in power I must confesse, that is worthy of *Pisistratus*, but not in goodwill: but what matter of importaunce hath caused your arrivall so vnexpected vpon this coast and haven? *Pisistratus*. We leade heere a strong army by the commaundement of the councell of *Athens* vnto *Salamina*, for the better repossessing and reforming thereof. *Ep*: What? contrary to their former decrees and proclamations, which were so streight, and that vpon paine of death, that no Citizen of *Athens* should be so hardy, as once to mooue the question to the counsell of the Citie, for the repossessing and reforming of *Salamina*? *Pisistratus*. Yes verily: for when the *Athenians* did once beholde that their long and troublesome warres, the which they had now sustained against the *Megarians*, for the repossessing and reforming of *Salamina* did arise vnto them, not from the nature of the people, nor from the difficultie of that action, but rather that

they receiued all their aduertiſementes for the aduauncement of thoſe affaires, from ſuch as gaue counſel therein, more for their priuate profit then for the publicke good, but chiefely for that ſundry gouernoures there placed, were found either negligent, or ignorant in the managinge of publicke affaires, they willingly reuoked their publicke proclamations, and made choice of *Solon*, a moſt wiſe and expert gouernour for leading and conducting their armies, now heere landed for the repoſſeſsing and reforming of *Salamina*. *Ep*: But who perſwaded this firſt vnto the Counſell of *Athens*? *Piſiſtrat*: *Solon* that faithfull counſellour of *Athens*. *Ep*: But how durſt *Solon* the wiſe offende their publicke lawes and proclamations? *Piſiſtrat*: *Solon* holding it for an open ſhame the which woulde bee left vnto all poſterities, if the Citie of *Athens* ſhould not be able to repoſſeſſe and reforme *Salamina*, now commaunding the moſt partes of *Greece*, fained himſelfe to bee out of his wittes, and cauſed it to be giuen out that *Solon* was become a foole: and ſoone after on a day, cloathed with the habite, geſture, and countenaunce of a foole or man poſſeſſed with lunacy, hee ran ſodenly out of his houſe with a garland on his heade vnto the market place, where the people ſtreight ſwarmed like bees about him, and raiſing himſelfe vpon the ſtone where all proclamations were made, did ſo effectually perſwade the repoſſeſsing of *Salamina* vnto the people, as what with the weight of his reaſons, and the laud and praiſe every where ſpreade by his friendes of his proceeding therein, their former proclamations were reuoked, & the wars for the repoſſeſsing and reforming of *Salamina* with greater furie then before were followed, they giuing vnto *Solon* as I ſaide before, the leading of the army, and the whole managing of that action. *Ep*: After this manner did *Brutus* by a fained frency and lunacie, not onely reforme the mighty Citie of *Rome*, but wiſely acquited himſelfe thereby, of the ſuſpition and ielouſie of *Tarquine*, by the which manner of proceeding, hee delyuered as well the Citie of *Rome*, as his own perſon from perill & danger, ſo as this common prouerbe did firſt ariſe, *Simulare ſtultitiam nonnunquam ſapientis eſt*. But where remaineth *Solon* my deare and familiar friende, that I may ſalute him, and giue him the beſt comfort I maie, in this

worthy action of reformation? *Pisistrat.* Hee is newly landed with his vvhole army, and hath nowe for his better recreation withdrawne himselfe into a pleasaunt and solitary garden neare vnto the temple of *Venus*, where vnto if your leasure serve, I will readilie conduct you. *Ep.* I readily followe you. *Pisistratus.* Sir I goe before as the best guide, and not the best man, and beholde *Solon* in the most solitary place of the garden. *Solon.* Thrise welcome my deare and familiar friende *Epimenides*, beholde, this solitarie and pleasaunt place, as also the times, hath even newly conspired with my thoughtes and desires to impose a great and weighty labour vpon you. *Ep.* No labour may bee thought ever so greate as shall exceede the greatnesse of my goodwill I beare vnto *Solon*. But what may the same be? Tell it vnto me. *Solon.* As you have of late most friendly lent vnto mee, your faithfull councell, and best advise for the reformation of the Citie of *Athens*, greatly to the advancement of that estate, in like manner now I am earnestlie to entreate your most friendly advise for the better reformation of *Salamina*. *Ep.* This labour and travell. I must confesse is due vnto *Solon*, if there wanted not wisedome, which shoulde give strength for the performaunce thereof: but I have chosen at this time, for our olde familiarity and friendshippe, to give you iust cause rather to reprehende my skill, then to accuse any parte of that office and duety, which in the highest manner belongeth vnto *Solon*; so as when the faulte appeareth, you shall acknowledge the same to bee imposed by yourselfe, and not received by mee without your commandement. *Solon.* Then friendly *Epimenides*, before we enter into this large discourse for the reformation of *Salamina*, I will declare vnto you a dreame, which this last night amazed my thoughtes. *Ep.* I pray thee tell it vnto me. *Solon.* This night I seemed to beholde faire *Diana* with a beautiful Dove glistering like golde, placed vpon her shoulder, slyding and wavering every where, in such sorte, as it seemed to me to be in great ieopardy of falling, but forthwith mooved with compassion I stretched foorth my right hande, to better and reforme the place of her standing: wherewith I might beholde *Diana* with a sharpe and sowre countenaunce to threaten the losse of my handwhere-

at being amazed, I did awake out of my drouſie ſleepe. *Ep:* The people of *Salamina*, is the threatening *Diana*, hating all reformation: the golden Dove, is the pleaſaunt countrie of *Salamina*: the wavering of this Dove from place to place, is the frailty and mutability, wherevnto this countrie of *Salamina* hath ever beene ſubiect: the compaſsion which you have taken of this golden Dove, is the love you beare vnto *Salamina*: the moving of your body and hande, to ſuccour this golden Dove, is the ardent deſire now newly kindled in you for the reformation thereof: the loſſe of hande threatned by *Diana*, is the difficulties and dangers, which ſhall from time to time, oppoſe themſelves againſt you in this action of reformation. *Sol.* Deſcribe therefore vnto vs, firſt, what you intende by this word reformation, and then the difficulties and daungers that followe the ſame, and laſtly the waies and meanes, whereby we may readily eſchewe thoſe daungers and difficulties.

CAP.

CAP. 1.

OF THIS WORD REFORMATION, AND A generall deſcription thereof, and howe the ſame is *devided into two ſeverall parts and members.*

A REFORMATION of a declined common-weale, is nothing els but an happy reſtitution vnto his firſt perfection: this worde Reformation being thus deſcribed, may in like ſorte be devided into two parts and members: the one may bee termed an abſolute and a thorough reformation of the whole bodye of the common-weale, namely of the ancient lawes, cuſtomes, gouernementes and manners of the people: the other may be termed a reformation of particuler miſchiefes and inconveniences onely, which like vnto evill and ſuperfluous humors dailie ariſe to the annoyance and diſturbance of this politicke body. For like as in our naturall bodies, ſaith the Phiſitian, ſo in common weales there daily ariſeth that, *Quod curatione indiget, & niſi tollatur, inde morbos lethales parit.* This maner of reformation of particuler miſchiefes and accidents conſiſteth of two partes and members: the one by the profitable laws, which are framed to meete with ſuch miſchiefs and inconveniences, which doe or may ariſe to the annoyance of the common-weale: ſuch was the law called Σεισάχθεια, which pacified the poorer ſort of people called *Hectemarij*, then in armes againſt the rich and better ſorte of *Athens*: the other is the true diſcipline and execution of lawes ſo made and eſtabliſhed. This manner of reformation of particuler miſchiefes and inconveniences by good and profitable lawes, was mightily endevoured

by your ſelfe, when as the *Athenians* made choice of you as their generall reformer of their lawes and common-weale. For you did not change the whole ſtate thereof, but altered onely that which you thought by reaſon you might perſwade your Citizens vnto, or els by force you ought to compell them to accept; and framed your lawes to the ſubiect and matter, and not the matter & ſubiect vnto your lawes, as ſometimes *Lycurgus* did in his reformation of *Sparta*. *Sol*: You have ſaide the truth, for if I ſhould have attempted to turne vppe ſide downe the whole government, & to have changed the whole ſtate thereof, I might afterwardes never have beene able with that ſmal power and forces then granted vnto me, to ſettle and eſtabliſh the ſame againe. Againe, I did not thinke, but that *Athens* then declined, might well have beene reſtored by this kinde of reformation.

CAP. 2.

What common-weale may be reſtored vnto his firſt perfection by applying thereunto this manner of reformation.

EPI: No verily: for *Quæ primis inſtitutis omninò corrupta fuerit, ea nunquam in tales caſus incidet, propter quos novis legibus inſtitui queat.* For this cauſe the firſt inſtitution of *Athens* being meerly popular, corrupt, and vnperfit, coulde never after by any lawes made for the reformation thereof, be defended from the tyrannie of ſuch as did aſpire vnto the principalitie, or from the ruine firſt conceived in the corrupt inſtitution thereof. For notwithſtanding they eſtabliſhed many lawes for the reformation of the inſolencie of the noble men, as alſo to reſtraine the libertie of the people, *non eam tamen conſervare ſupra centeſſimum annum potuerunt*. But ſuch common weals as have their firſt inſtitution and foundation good, though not altogether perfit and complete, at any time declining from the firſt ſtate and perfection, may by this manner of reformation (made by profitable laws as occaſion ſhal them require) be not only reſtored to their firſt perfection, but the happie eſtate thereof may thereby be long continued and augmented: ſuch was the

common-wealth of *Rome*, whose first institution and foundation was so wel laid by *Romulus* & *Numa*, as that after by new laws made for the reformation thereof, as the necessity of that commonweale did require, the same was rendered long, happy, and prosperous, in somuch as it attained at the last an happy temper and forme of gouernement, compounded of three sortes and kindes of gouernement, namely the *Monarchia*, *Aristocratia*, and *Democratia*: so that wee maie conclude, that those common-weales which have their foundation good, though not perfit and complete, *ex ijs quæ subinde occurrunt, emendare & perfici queant ad exemplum Romæ*: for it is saide, *non prima illa Romanæ reip: institutio tantum a recta via aberrabat, vt perfici non posset*. Lastly such common-weales which in al the parts thereof are found corrupted and declined from their first institution, maie not by profitable lawes made and established as occasion shal them require, be reformed; whereof sometimes the Citie of *Rome* and nowe the state of *Salamina* may be vnto vs an example: sith neither the one after her finall declination, which did chiefely growe by a general corruption of manners in the people, could be reformed by the lawes against *Captainship*, against *Coyney*, and *Lyvery*, or against the vnlawefull custome of supporting and maintaining of rebels or any other new lawe whatsoever; not the other by their lawes *sumptuarij ambitus*, and such like, the reason whereof shall more at large appeare in this discourse following.

Sol: There remaineth nowe the discipline of lawes as the second parte and member of this particuler reformation not as yet consulted of.

CAP. 3.

Of a reformation made by the discipline of lawes.

Epi: This maner of reformation is nothing els but a feare to offende, bred in the hearts of the people by the true discipline of lawes, after which manner the Citie of *Rome* was sometimes reformed *per supplicium de Bruti filijs sumptum, pœnam Decemviris impositam, Spurij Mœlij cædes, & similia, post captam vrbem Manlij*

Torquati pænã de filio sumptã, eò quod pugnasset contra Imperatoris mandatum, Fabii Magistri equitũ accusationem a Papyrio cursore institutam, eò quòd prater Dictatoris imperiũ pugnam commisisset, Scipioni dẽ dictã, all which beeing most memorable and feareful examples, did admonishe all others of their duty and obedience vnto lawes and magistrates. *Sol*: Therefore wisely saith a learned writer, *In conservandis imperiis regnisq; faciendum est, vt antiqua leges & consuetudines in vsum reducantur, ex earum præscripto vitia puniantur*. After this maner by a severe discipline of lawes, did the *Lorde Gray* in times past, and now *Sir R. Bingehame*, mightily reforme and advance the government of *Salamina*, so as wee may truely say, by such governours must this nation be reformed. By this manner of reformation hath *France* in times past, mightily advanced their government, and especiallie the Citie of *Paris*, which alwaies hath most severely punished offendours. *Sol*: But what order of times in this reformation made by profitable lawes and discipline thereof is rightly observed? *Eps*: This manner of reformation is made after two sorts: either by lawes limiting the times certaine for this reformation; or accidentally thereunto led and provoked by occasions: for so the Citie of *Rome* after the overthrowe given by the power of the *Gaules* did reforme their common-weale and all disorders formerly by them committed. The *Athenians* also after the *Megarians* had recovered from them the Ile of *Salamina*, and the haven of *Nicæa*, reformed that common-weale. And not long after the sedition betwixt the people of the mountaines, the valleies, and sea coasts, did occasion a generall reformation to be made of our Citie and common-weale of *Athens*. Againe, the *Romaines* to give an ende of many contentions raised betwixt the senators & people, sent *Sp: Posth: Albus, A. Manlius*, and *Sulpitius Gamerinus*, as legates vnto *Athens*, that they might the better be enformed of the laws which you *Solon* had established for the reformation of *Athens*, that thereby as by a line, they might the better reforme the Citie of *Rome*; and further made choice of their *Decemviri* to perfit this their intended reformation by profitable lawes. *Sol*: Now you have declared to vs the reformation which is made accidentally: there remaineth nowe the other reformation, which is made by force

force of laws & at times certaine, wherin I would willingly vnderſtand the reaſon, that ſhould limit the times certaine of our reformation, and that by lawes certaine in that behalfe eſtabliſhed, ſith the accidents, and occurrants in al common-weales, which doe occaſion this reformation made by profitable laws, be in themſelves vncertaine, and accidentall. *Epi:* This manner of reformation made of particular accidentes at times certaine, and that alſo by lawes and ſtatutes certaine, eſtabliſhed in that behalfe, is founde more profitable then the other which is made accidentally. For lawes are required herein, *Ne opus ſit per vim peregrinam idem præſtare*, and time herein is alſo to be reſpected, *ne ſi impunita longo tempore cõcedatur, vſq; adeò augeãtur vitia, vt ſine periculo publico deinde nec puniri nec extirpari queant*; and for theſe cauſes eſpecially, the rulers and governours of *Florence* were accuſtomed to ſay, *Singulis quinquennijs redintegrare formam reip: oportere*, otherwiſe the diſcipline of law may not be wel preſerved. And therfore it is ſaid, that if *Roome*, *ſingulis decennijs, ſecundùm leges, aliquod magnum exemplum in delinquentes ſtatuiſſent, nunquam tanta morum corruptela potuiſſet ciuium animos occupare; ſed quia tandem rara eſſe cæpit, aucta eſt tantopere morum corruptela, vt remedium nullum adhiberi potuerit*. In like maner may we truely ſay, that ſo great a corruption could never have poſſeſſed the mindes of the people of *Salamina*, if there the exact diſcipline of lawes had in good time beene applied. *Sol:* Now ſith you have declared at large the order and time, which is rightly obſerved in this manner of reformation, proceede vnto the dangers and difficulties, which do vſually accompany the ſame.

CAP. 4.

The ſundrie difficulties and dangers that follow this maner of reformation.

EPI: The difficulties which herein ariſe, may lively appeare by the queſtion, which *Cæſar* propounded ſometimes vnto *Pompey*, and *Craſſus*, when he was Conſul, preferring them vnto the Senate, the law for diuiſion of landes, called *Agraria*, doe

you *Crassius* and *Pompey*, saith he, give your consents vnto the lawes which I have now propounded? They answered, yea; then he prayed them to stande by him, against those that threatened him with force of sworde to let him. It may appeare also by that action of *Pompey*, when as he filled the market-place with souldiers, and by open force established the lawes, which *Cæsar* made in the behalfe of the people. The same also was sometimes lively expressed in the person of *Lycurgus*, which for the better establishing of profitable lawes, gaged the losse of his eie; and you *Solon* the losse of your credite and reputation with the people of *Athens*; when as by the law Σεισάχθεια, otherwise called discharge, you incurred the generall displeasure and hate, as well of the poore as of the rich: all which sometimes you lively expressed after this maner.

Even those which erst did beare me friendly face,
And spake full faire where euer I them met:
Gan nowe beginne to locke full grimme of grace,
And were like foes in force against me set:
As if I had done them some spite, or scorne,
Or open wrong, which were not to be borne.

Sol: You have nowe revived the memory of my former sorrowes, the which I labour rather to forget. Proceede therefore vnto other difficulties, or rather tell me, why such dangers should arise and follow these actions, which are found so profitable for the common-weale. *Epi:* They arise, partly from the contrarietie of humours, and opinions, lodged in the brests even of the wisest; partly from the insolency of the multitude. *Sol:* It is most true: for *Cæsar*, *Crassius*, and *Pompey*, allowed the division of landes, and established the lawe *Agraria*; but *Calphurnius*, *Bibulus*, *Cato*, *Considius*, and other Senators reiected the same; the people allowed therof, but the nobility condemned it, and the ambition of *Cæsar*. In an other assembly also of the Senate of *Rome*, *Crassius*, *Appius*, and *Nepos*, prayed the Senate to prorogue the government of *Cæsar* for five yeare longer, and to deliver money vnto him out of the common treasure to pay his army; but others impugned the same, especially *Pham-*

nius. *Sol:* For theſe cauſes (be you remembred) I helde it a matter very difficult and dangerous, to deale betwixt the poore and the rich, whereunto I was required ſometimes by the City of *Athens*, fearing the covetouſneſſe of the one, and the arrogancy of the other; the poore deſiring, that the lande might againe be deuided; the rich alſo of the contrarie, that their bargaines and covenantes might a newe be confirmed. But what waies and meanes may be found that may avoide theſe difficulties and daungers?

CAP. 5.

The readie waies and meanes to avoide theſe difficulties and daungers.

Ep: Such Princes and governoures, which will avoide the difficulties and daungers, which commonly ariſe in eſtabliſhing of profitable lawes and ordinaunces; by reaſon of diverſitie of humours, opinions, and factions, they muſt of neceſſitie remove for a time, or otherwiſe imploy the leaders and heades of all ſuch factions, as may giue any waies impediment vnto their proceedings; imitating herein *Caeſar*, *Pompey*, and *Craſſus*, who purpoſely ſent *Cato* vnto *Cipres*, knowing aſſuredly, that he would otherwiſe give impediment vnto their lawes and proceedings, eſpecially for the proroging of *Caeſar* his governement, and allowance for his army; or otherwiſe with *Caeſar*, they ſhalbe forced to ſuppreſſe them by authoritie, and to put *Cato* to ſilence by imprisonment, the which may fortune to diſpleaſe as well the nobles, as the people. *Ep:* Or otherwiſe, we are to delude either faction by faire promiſes and ſweete wordes, the which ſubtletie you *Solon* ſometimes vſed (as *Phanias* the *Lesbian* writeth) when as you ſecretly promiſed the poore to devide the lande againe, and the rich alſo to confirme their covenantes and bargaines; when as you vſed theſe wordes and ſentences, namely that æquality did breede no ſtrife; by which æquivocation of wordes, you did winne as well the poore as the rich, vnto a reformation of diſorders; the one ſuppoſing, that all thinges ſhoulde bee meaſured according to the

quality of the men, and the other tooke it for their purpose, that you would measure thinges by the number, and by the poule only, whereby you did safely proceede, and mightily further your law called Σεισάχθεια, and did therein overcome all difficulties, by the which, the mighty sedition, which was then entertained betwixt the poore and the rich, was appeased. *Sol:* You saie truelie: and for the better iustifiyng of this manner of proceeding herein, you shall vnderstande, that in a publike magistrate, the same is rightlie tearmed pollicie, but in private persons, the same is not vniustly condemned by the name of deceite. *Ep:* We have remembred the same, not as condemners, but as approvers of the fact, and therefore needeleſſe you have iustified your selfe herein. *Sol:* Be it so: proceede then further vnto other difficulties and daungers, which arise herein from the insolencie of the multitude, whereof you made mention in this former treatise but did not at large discourse thereof. *Ep:* Many daungers and difficulties arise from the insolencie of the multitude, as I have saide, for that never with one consent of minde, they doe admit or obey any new lawes or ordinances, vntill they plainly vnderstande the same to bee necessarie; but the necessitie of lawes never appeareth without daunger to the common-weale, which often falleth to his last ruine, before the lawes can bee perfitly estabiished, which might support the same. The *Athenians* first received the evill and mischiefe, even into the bosome of that common-weale, before they sought to withstand the same by profitable lawes, yea they suffred the sedition, & vproares, betwixt the issue of *Megacles* & *Cylon*, still fighting & quarrelling, before they could be perswaded to chuse you *Solon*, as the reformer of there commonweale. *Sol:* You maie best witnesse the same, for they suffered the invasion of the *Megarians*, they lost the haven of *Nysea*, and the Ile of *Salamina*, before they sent vnto you *Epimenides* into *Creta*, by whose advise they then reformed there common-weale, greatlie to your laude and praise. *Ep:* But more greatly *Solon* to your commendations, were the mighty factions long entertained betwixt the people of the mountaines, vally, & sea coasts, quenched and pacified to the great good of *Athens*. *Sol:* they suffered the

factions betwixt the poore and the rich, so long to feſter in the bowels of the common-wealth, as the poorer ſort did riſe in armes with a purpoſe to chuſe vnto themſelves a captaine, and to ſubvert the whole ſtate of that common-weale, before they coulde be perſwaded to make a generall reformation of their lawes and common-weale: they ſuffred many vproares and braules, before they condemned the excommunicantes. The ſtate of *Florence* alſo may with their perill and danger witnes the ſame: which contended not to ſuppreſſe the corruptions in the *Aretines*, before they well neere taſted of their rebellions. In like manner, the *Athenians* could not be induced, either by my auctoritie, or els by the vehement perſwaſions which then I vſed, to withſtande the tyrannie of *Piſiſtratus*, before they endured the weight thereof ſo heavily, as they could neither caſt the ſame from their ſhoulders, neither yet endure the burden thereof. *Ep*: This did occaſion you ſometimes to write and ſpeake after this manner,

Eſch one of you ô men in private actes,
Can play the fox for ſlie and ſubtell craft:
But when you come fore in all your factes,
Then are you blinde, dull-witted and be daft, &c.

But if we ſuffer daungers and difficulties in the eſtabliſhing of good and profitable lawes, how much greater ſhall theſe daungers appeare vnto vs, when wee ſhall vſe and apply the ſharpe diſcipline of lawes? the ſame no doubt is great, and farre exceedeth the other; for at ſuch time as *Claudius* vvas accuſed, and indited of high treaſon, by one of the Tribunes of the people, and by others of the nobilitie and Senate, the rude multitude and people, did ſo boldlie and ſtoutly maintaine his vnlawfull factes, as the Iudges for feare durſt not proceede againſt him, vvhereby hee was diſcharged of his accuſations: after the like manner did they compaſſe the Senate houſe, & called for *Cæſar*, and willed the Senate to let him out at ſuch time, as he was to anſwere ſundrie accuſations laid againſt him. But what waies and meanes are now left vnto vs, whereby we may overcome theſe difficulties and daungers?

CAP. 6.

The severall waies and meanes to overcome all difficulties and daungers, which arise in this action of reformation, made by profitable lawes and the discipline thereof.

EPI: First we are to remove all occasions, which may move the people or beholders, to pittie or favour offendours. For when *Manlius Capitolinus* was sometimes accused as a mover of sedition in *Rome*, his case was no sooner pleaded, but the sight of the Capitoll troubled his accusers, and the Iudges also; when as pointing with his hand, he shewed the place vnto the Gods, and weeping tenderly, laide before them the remembrance of the hazarde of his life, in fighting for the common liberty and safetie of *Rome*, and in defending the Capitoll it selfe, and repulsing the Gaules; in such sort, as the Iudges moved with pittie, knew not what to doe, and therefore put over the hearing of his cause vnto another day, because the place of his so notable good service was ever still before their eies: wherfore wisely *Camillus* finding the cause of delay of Iustice, did make the place of Iudgement to be removed without the Citie into a place called the wood *Petelian*, from whence they coulde not see the Capitoll, where his accusers gave apparant evidente against him, and the Iudges considering all his wicked practises, conceived a iust cause to punish him as he had deserved, so as they gave sentence of death against him. Further no orator, or pleader of causes, is to be suffered to speake in the behalfe of offendors, either to move the Iudges to compassion, or to winne the offendors favour in the eie of the beholders. The mischefe which ariseth hereby, did sometimes appeare, when as *Cæsar* was suffered to speake in the behalfe of *Lentulus*, and *Cethegus*, companions of *Catiline* in his conspiracie, by whose eloquence the offendors had then beene delivered, or at the least not committed to the handes of the officers to be put to death, if the grauitie and authority of *Cato*, and vehemency of *Catulus*, had not dis-

swaded

ſwaded the contrary'. Laſtly, the more often princes ſhal acquaint their ſubiectes with the diſcipline of the lawe, the more great obedience ſhall the ſubiects yeelde, as well vnto lawes, as magiſtrates, and the leſſe difficultie and danger ſhall princes finde therin. For the right diſcipline of lawes, doeth admoniſhe men of their dutie, and doeth cauſe them to leade their lives agreeable to lawe, and from time to time doth ſuppreſſe the malice of the offendors. For proofe whereof, the *Romaines* ſo long as they vſed the iuſt and exact diſcipline of laws, they puniſhed the offendors without feare danger, ſedition, or mutiny; yea farther, when as they condemned *Camillus* vniuſtly, there was found no friend, no ſouldier, the number whereof were many and great, that durſt make any reſiſtance in his behalfe: for when as hee called vnto him his friendes and ſouldiers, which had ſerved vnder him in the warres, or that had taken charge with him, which were manie in number, he earneſtly beſought them, that they would not ſuffer him thus vilely to be condemned, through falſe and vniuſt accuſations laide againſt him, and to bee ſo ſcorned and defamed by his enemies: his friends having laide their heads togither, and conſulted therevpon, made him anſwere, how that for his iudgement they could not remedy it, but if he were condemned, they would al ioine togither with a very good will for the payment of his fine. But not long after, *Cum toto decennio nullum Romæ ſtatuebatur exemplum pœnæ delinquentium*, then could not the Senate examine *Ceſar* with their ſafetie, neither yet coulde the Iudges condemne *Clodius* without peril. *Sol:* Therefore in ſuch common-weales, where the manners of the people are altogether corrupted, for not applying in good time the diſcipline of lawes, it behoveth the Iudges, and ſuch as ſhall reuiue the force of auncient lawes by the exact diſcipline thereof, ſtrongly to be garded, according to the example of *Cicero* being accompanied with a ſtrong garde of luſtie men, when as Conſull he was to convict and execute *Lentulus*, and *Cethegus*, for their conſpiracies with *Catiline*. But *Ceſar* vnadviſedly refuſing a garde in ſuch caſes for the ſafetie of his perſon, did eſtſones with the loſſe of his life approve his follie. For *Brutus*, and others finding him naked in the Senate, without any ſtrength, or

garde did easilie execute their malice vpon him. *Ep.* In like maner, governours in cases of great extremities, for the avoiding of daungers and difficulties, may proceede against offendors, without observing the vsuall ceremonies of lawe. After this maner did *Cicero* proceede against *Lentulus*, and *Cethegus*, when as vpon proofe onely, in open Senate, without any lawful inditement or condemnation, he commanded their delivery into the handes of the officers to be put to death; for so much may be gathered out of *Cæsar* his Oration, who at that instant mightily inveyed against that maner of proceeding, saying, it was not lawfull, neither that the custome of *Rome* did beare it, to put men of such nobility to death, without lawful inditement or condemnation, but in cases of extremity. This severe course and maner of proceeding in cases of extremity, may not be deemed any part of tyranny, if either we wil give credite vnto the opinion of *Cæsar*, or vnto the fact of *Cicero*, and the Senate; or followe the custome of *Rome*, or deeme *Cato* to be milde and iust, who then being in the Senate, did vehemently perswade the same, and whose heart was so farre from crueltie, as beholding the dead bodies slaine in the campe of his enimies, in the last skirmishe betwixt *Pompey* and *Cæsar*, he covered his face and went away weeping. *Sol:* I call to remembraunce one *Sir R. Bingham* provinciall governour of *Salamina*, in my time a most valiant and honourable Knight, and withall a most wise and grave governour, being given to vnderstand of a generall rebellion, with an intention, not onely to overthrowe the state and governement, but also to make deliverance of principall rebels of the sect and nation of the *Burkes*, then in prison and safe gard, did forthwith deliver those traitors and rebels to be put to death, without lawfull inditement or condemnation. For seeing himselfe fallen into these extremities, that either he must spare the lives of open and manifest rebels to the damage of the common-weale, or execute them without lawfull inditement and other ceremonies, like a wise governour, two mischiefes offering themselves at once, made choice of the least, not beeing as then to learne that which *Cæsar* sometimes taught *Metellus*, *The times of warre and lawe are two thinges:* so as in this action and in all other partes of his governement, hee

hath

hath ſhewed himſelfe to bee the perſon, which *Archilocus* deſcribeth in theſe his verſes

He is both Champion ſtout of Mars *his warlike band,*
And of the Muſes eke, the artes doth vnderſtand.

EPI: It ſeemeth alſo convenient for the better avoiding of difficulties and dangers, that ſuch heads and leaders, as ſhall be found to give impediment vnto this maner of reformation, be committed to ſome ſafe-gard or priſon, and there detained; all which *Dionyſius* adviſed *Dion* ſometimes by his letters, wiſhing him thereby, not to ſet them at liberty, which hated him and the action which he had then vndertaken of reformation. *Sol:* If the Earle of *Deſmonde* late of *Salamina*, committed to ſafe-gard & priſon for his ſundry rebellions againſt the Citie of *Athens*: had there beene ſafely detained, the warres of *Salamina* had neither beene chargeable nor troubleſome vnto the Citie of *Athens*, and if *Iames Fitz. Morrice* in like maner being in ſafetie and cuſtody of officers to aunſwere all accuſations of high treaſon, had not beene ſet at large by the Iuſtices for the time beeing, he had not then waſted, burned and ſpoiled a great part of *Salamina*, neither had he put the Citie of *Athens* to ſo huge and mighty a charge, nor yet combined with the enemy to the great daunger of that eſtate. Therefore it is a chiefe ſuerty vnto Princes, and great furtherance vnto actions of importance, to commit to ſafe-gard and priſon, ſuch as may give impediment thereunto: for the which cauſe king *Fredericke* did no ſooner intend the warres againſt the *French*, but he apprehended and put in priſon the Prince of *Biſignã* and the County of *Molotte*, as friends vnto the *French*. But now ſith we have ſpoken at large of the firſt part and member of this reformation, let vs deſcend vnto the other, which you have tearmed a reformation abſolute and vniverſall.

hath shewed himself to bee the person, which *Archilocus* describeth in these his verses

He is both Champion stout of Mars his warlike band,
And of the Muses the, the arces dothunder stand.

EPI: It seemeth also convenient for the better avoiding of dissensions and dangers, that such heads and leaders, as shall be found to give impediment vnto this manner of reformation, be committed to some safe-gard or prison, and there detained; all which *Dionysius* advised *Dion* sometimes by his letters, wishing him thereby, not to set them at liberty, which hated him and the action which he had then vndertaken of reformation. *Sol:* If the *Dionysius* late of *Salamina* committed to safe-gard by prison, the *Athens* rebellions against the Citie of *Athens*: had there beene safety detained, the warres of *Salamina* had neither beene chargeable nor troublesome vnto the Citie of *Athens*, and if *James Pre. Marcus* in like manner being in safety and custody of officers to answere all accusations of high treason, had not beene set at large by the Iustices for the time beeing, he had not then wasted, burned and spoiled a great part of *Salamina*, neither had he put the Citie of *Athens* to so large and mighty a charge, nor yet combined with the enemy to the great daunger of that estate. Therefore it is a chiefe liberty vnto Princes, and great furtherance vnto actions of importance, to commit to safe-gard and prison, such as may give impediment thereunto for the which cause king *Frederick* did no sooner intend the warres against the *French*, but he apprehended and put in prison the Prince of *Bisgue* and the County of *Ardoloro*, as friends vnto the *French*. But now sith we have spoken at large of the first part and member of this reformation, let vs descend vnto the other, which you have tearmed a reformation absolute and vniversall.

THE SECOND BOOKE OF Solon his follie.

CAP. 1.

A description of a reformation vniuersall, and of the whole state and bodie of the common-wealth.

EPI: This reformation vniuersall of the whole state and body of the common-wealth, is nothing els, but a thorough and absolute mutation and change, of auncient lawes, customes, and manners of the people, and finally of the common-wealth it selfe, vnto a better forme of governement. *Sol:* It seemeth then, that this reformation respecteth three matters principally: first, the mutation of auncient lawes and customes; secondlie, the alteration and change of manners in the people; and finally, a new institution and a better forme of governement, then before, prescribed.

CAP. 2.

Of the reformation of auncient lawes and customes.

EPI: You have well observed my meaning and purpose: and to this effect, a subtile writer making mention of this reformation generall and absolute, saith, that he which shall attempt the same, must alter and chaunge all the auncient

lawes and cuſtomes, *quia ne leges quidem, quæ in ipſo ortu reipub: à bonis viris latæ ſanctæq; ſunt, ſufficientes vtileſq; ſunt adeos ciues frenandos, qui in eadem repub: à maiorum virtute degenerarunt, & prauifacti ſunt*, for, ſaith he, where we finde, the times and people thoroughly changed, embracing now that which is found contrary to their former courſe and manner of living, wee ought alſo to chaunge the auncient lawes and cuſtomes: for, *contraria ſubiecta non debent eodem modo tractari*. The *Romaines* may herein be vnto vs a liuely example: for after they had ſubdued *Aſia*, *Africa*, and in a manner had reduced vnder their governement al *Greece*, they fell eſtſoones into a corruption of manners, contrary to all their former diſcipline, inſtitution, and accuſtomed manner of living: their auncient lawes and cuſtomes eſtabliſhed for creating of Magiſtrates, they mightely abuſed; ſelling their voices of election openly in the market place for mony: in like manner did they abuſe al other their auncient lawes and cuſtomes, namely the lawes and cuſtomes, which devided the common-weale and power thereof into the handes of the people and Senators, ſo as there could not be a reformation of that eſtate, without a mutation made of thoſe auncient lawes and cuſtomes, then growne by the iniquitie of thoſe times out of vſe. *Sol*: But what neede vvee ſearch forraine examples? when *Salamina* doth afforde ſundry proofes thereof, where we may beholde many auncient cuſtomes and privileges, granted (no doubt) at the firſt, for the advancement of publike ſervices, but now turned by a generall corruption in the ſubiect, to the ruine of themſelves and the lande of *Salamina*; which muſt of neceſsitie bee altered and chaunged, before any thorough reformation may there be eſtabliſhed: all which may appeare vnto ſuch as ſhall reade the Act of Abſentes, which is lefte vnto vs as a regiſter of the fall and declynation of the ſtate of *Salamina*; wherein it is manifeſt, that the Lords of the ſeveral counties, of *Carthelagh*, and *Wexforde*, being places priviledged, maie keepe and hold all manner pleas within the ſame, by occaſion and vnder pretence and collour whereof, the kings lawes, writtes, or other proceſſes, be not obeyed, neither anie other lawe or iuſtice there vſed or adminiſtred, for the quieting and good ordering of

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the ſubiect: ſo as in defaulte thereof, the kings enemies have them in ſervage; al murders, robberies, theftes, treaſons, and other offences, remaine vnpuniſhed; the kings wardes, relieſes, eſcheates, and all other his profits and revennewes are there withdrawne; and the ſervice, ſtrength, and aſsiſtaunce of the ſaide ſubiect, is greatly miniſhed; all which more at large ſhall appeare to ſuch as ſhall pervſe the ſaide ſtatute: ſo as we may conclude, that without a mutation, made of theſe auncient cuſtomes and priviledges now growne out of vſe, and declyned from their firſt inſtitution by a generall corruption in the ſubiect, the ſtate of *Salamina* may never be perfitly and thoroughly reformed. For as the ſtate of *Rome*, in manner as afore declined, coulde not by the lawes, *ſumptuarij ambitus*, neither by any other new lawe be ſuſtayned and vnderpropped, without a thorough alteration made of all other the auncient lawes and cuſtomes thereof; ſo may we not expect in theſe daies a thorough reformation of *Salamina*, by the lawes of *Captainſhippe*, the lawes againſt *Coiney* and *Liverie*, the lawes againſt taking of pledges, the lawes againſt wilfull murder, or any other new lawe whatſoever made for the reformation of *Salamina*, without a thorough alteration made of the auncient cuſtomes and priviledges thereof, all which we there ſometimes imployed in that ſervice, were daily taught, rather by experience then by any learned or deepe diſcourſe, that may be made thereof. In like manner if the cuſtome of *Captainſhippe*, the cuſtome of *Coiney* and *Livery*, and the cuſtome of taking of pledges, the cuſtome of *Taniſtery*, the cuſtome of protecting and ſupporting of traitours, had not beene aboliſhed by lawes, then all newe lawes whatſoeuer would have beene founde vnprofitable for the reformation of *Salamina*: for in ſuch caſes it is ſaide by learned writers, that *leges novæ minus prodeſſe queant ad tollenda vitia quæ regnant*. Now ſith it is evident, that a thorough reformation may not bee made without a mutation of auncient laws & cuſtomes, which are found evill in themſelves, or els by mutation and chaunge of times have now loſt their firſt vigor and force, it behoveth that we doe vnderſtand, what order and rule herein is to be obſerved, for the more ready effecting thereof.

CAP. 3.

Of the reformation of auncient lawes and cuſtomes, and what things therein chiefly are to be conſidered.

EPI: In all mutations made of auncient lawes and cuſtomes, three matters eſpecially fall into deliberation: firſt the meanes; ſecondly the forme and maner; laſtly the ſubiect and matter. The meanes are in number five: the firſt is authority; the goodwill and conſents of the people, the ſeconde; the third perſwaſions; a ſufficient power and force, is the fourth; the fifth and the laſt is a magiſtrate, of rare and excellent vertues, which may ſuppreſſe the envie and malice of ſuch, as ſhall oppoſe themſelves againſt this intended reformation, made by the mutation of auncient lawes and cuſtomes. *Sol:* But what authority is required for the better effecting of a reformation? For this as the firſt matter, you have well obſerved to be requiſit herein. *Epi:* All authority herein graunted is after two ſortes: the one abſolute; the other limited by time, and other circumſtances. This authoritie abſolute, was given ſometime into your handes by the *Athenians*; for after ſuch time as they had well taſted of the lawe and ordinance, called Σεισάχθεια, they forthwith did chooſe you their generall reformer of the lawe, and of the whole ſtate of the commonweale, without limiting this power then granted vnto you, but referred all matters indifferently ye vnto your will, as the offices of ſtate, common aſſemblies, voices in election, iudgments in iuſtice, and the body of the Senate. Finally, they gave vnto you all power and authority, to ceaſe and taxe anie of them, to appoint the number, and what time the ceaſe ſhould continue, and to keepe, confirme, and diſanull at your pleaſure, anie of the auncient laws and cuſtomes, then in being. But this authority abſolute, without anie limitation of the power it ſelfe, or of the time and continuance thereof, hath ſometimes turned to the great preiudice and danger of ſuch as formerly have graunted the ſame: for the *Romaines* af-

ter they had elected their *Decemviri*, for the making of a thorough and absolute reformation of the common-weale of *Rome*, they forthwith gave into their handes the sole and absolute power of *Rome*, so as all other authorities and iurisdictions either of Consull, Senate, or Tribunes, ceasing, they wholy and only governed *Rome*, without any provocation or appeale to bee made to any other. Thus when no Magistrate remained, which might observe the actions of such as were founde ambitious, easily did *Appius Claudius*, fall into the thoughtes of the principality of *Rome*; he doeth strengthē himselfe with friendes, & clyēts, and daily increaseth his wealth, and nowe of a Citizen is become a fearefull enemy to the state of *Rome*; in such sorte, as they may neither endure his pride and insolencie, neither may they safely suppresse the same without their common perill and daunger. Therefore more wisely did the *Lacedemonians* give great authority to their kinges; and likewise did the *Venetians* to their Dukes; but yet with certaine limits and bondes, not lawfull for them to exceede; and farther did appoint certaine watchmen, as daily beholders and obsservers of all their actions and doings. *Sol*: But what limitation of time, in granting this absolute authority, may breede safety vnto him that giveth the same? This is the seconde and last matter, nowe remembred by you, and worthie of consultation. *Epi*: The provinciall governement over the *Gaules*, with an absolute power given into the handes of *Cæsar*, for the better reformation thereof, was so long proroged and continued, as at the last with the sword of the *Romaines*, and the money of the *Gaules*, he became terrible, as well to the *Gaules*, as to the *Romaines*, & returned not a Citizen now of *Rome*, but as a fearefull enemie, and conquerour, as well of the Citie, as of all the other territories and dominions thereof. And was not also the provinciall governement of *Spaine*, sometimes given into the handes of *Pompey* with an absolute authority for the reformation thereof, so long proroged and continued, as with one stampe of his foote he was able, (as himselfe reported) to fill the Citie of *Rome* with weapons, and armed men? And did not *Appius Claudius* by proroging his authority but for one yeare, become fearefull to the Citie of *Rome*? And did not the *Romaines* by

making a Dictator perpetuall, looſe the libertye of their Cities and doeth authority thus eaſily corrupt the maners of good ſubiectes? and is the age alſo wherein we live free from ſuch corruption? Nay, more then that, is there not an enemie on foote, that laboureth the corruption of the whole? Then what authoritie here may be limited ſo ſtraight, as in this time may not be thought too large: what time may be ſo ſhorte, which may not be deemed too long? Therefore let every good and faithfull councellour vnto the ſtate, with *Cato* reſiſt here the proroging of *Cæſar* his gouernement, leaſt too late with *Pompey* they acknowledge their errour: it ſhall not ſuffice here to graunt but one yeare more vnto *Appius Claudius*; neither is it ſufficient that *Cæſar* is holden in diſgrace with the Citie of *Rome*; neither may we here ſafely beleeve all which ſhall ſaie vnto *Pompey*, *Cæſar* is hated of the garriſons, and ſouldiers: for when *Cæſar* commeth with his fortune, he ſhall then force, as well *Pompey*, as the Citie of *Rome*, to acknowledge their former follies and errours: *Sol*. But nowe vnto what perſon may this authority be ſafely graunted, is a matter herein, not vnworthy of conſultation. *Ep*: It is ſafely graunted vnto a man approved to be good and honeſt, with this caution, that he be not of ſuch power and force, as the ſtate may ſtand in feare of his greatnes. For the beſt ſometimes have fallen by reaſon of honours and dignities into a generall corruption of manners, and therefore we receive it as a proverbe, *honores mutant mores*. *Sol*. At no time then is it ſafely committed into the handes of perſonages of great might, power, and wealth. *Ep*: You have ſaide the trueth: for what daunger did ariſe to the ſtate of *Athens*, by conſtituting *Garralde Fitz Garralde* attained, Liuetenant of *Salamina*? who having at once might, power, and ſoveraigne commaundement in his handes, did eſtſoones conſpire, and combine, ſundry treaſons, and rebellions. *Sol*: The recordes of *Salamina* doth witnes ſo much as you have ſaide, for there it is alleadged, that he did conſpire with the *French* king and Emperour, for the invading and poſſeſſing of *Salamina*: he did alſo in proper perſon invade the Countie of *Kylkennie*, there burning, deſtroying, & murthering the kinges ſubiectes: he did invade alſo with *Oneyle*, and

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his forces, *O Coner*, and other of the saide Earle his friends, alies, and servants, by his commandement the County of *Vriell*; wherein he was aided, and assisted by *Sir Iohn*, brother vnto the saide Earle. The like or greater daunger did growe vnto the state of *Athens*, by constituting *Thomas Fitz Garralde*, sonne and heire to the saide Earle, Lieutenant of *Salamina*: who succeeding in the place of his father, having the like might, power, & forces lent vnto him by his friends, alies, and servantes, and soveraine authoritie given from the king, did eftsoones revile that famous Citie of *Athens*, and his lawfull soveraigne, and moved all rebellions against them; and did therewith also addresse his letters vnto the Bishop of *Rome*, & the Emperour, for the invading of *Salamina*: and farther did put to death, and cruelly murthered all those which were resident within the lande of *Salamina*, being borne Citizens of *Athens*, and amongst others did put to death that reverende father and faithfull counceller *Iohn Allen* Archbishoppe of *Deublin*, and primate of *Salamina*. More then this, he constrained with his power and forces, the subiectes of *Athens*, to give vnto him an oath of obedience, & forthwith besieged the Castle of *Deublin*, where with his whole armie by the sea coast he incamped, for the better resisting, destroying, and murthering the army of *Athens*, as they landed. No lesse dangers then these formerly rehearsed, appeared at such times, when as the Duke of *Yorke* pretending himselfe Lieutenant of the saide lande, did with his power, and forces, occupie and possesse all the territories and dominions thereof. Therefore of late daies, hath the Counsell of *Athens* most providently committed this soveraine authority vnto such, as may not be able with forces and power to vsurpe the same. But if vnto this authoritie thus given, to effect a reformation, the consentes and good-wils of the people be founde agreeable, no doubt the same shall mightily further that action.

Statutes of Ire: 35. H. 8. ca. 3. fol. 11.

CAP. 4.

The good-will and conſent of the people is a readie meanes to effect a reformation.

EPI: You have ſaide the truth: for where the good-will of the people is firſt wonne and obtained, there the mutation is made, without difficultie and daunger. All which may lively appeare in the hiſtory of *Tarquine*, who having loſt as well the good-will of the people, as of the Senate, by changing the auncient lawes & cuſtomes of the Citie of *Rome*, was eaſily expelled that kingdome. *Sol:* It is true that you have ſaid; for he did drawe vnto himſelfe all the authority, as well of the Senate, as alſo of the liberty of the people, which ſometimes they inioied vnder their former kinges, and for this cauſe chiefely, he failed of the good-will of the people, in this his mutation and alteration of thinges. But *Brutus* on the contrary, having wonne the good-wil of the people, for the effecting of a reformation, and expelling of *Tarquine*, did chaunge the ſtate of the common-weale, without anie difficultie, daunger, or iniurie ſuſtained by anie other, then the expelling of *Tarquine*. Likewiſe, when the *Medicei Urbe Florentinorum Anno ſalutis* M. CCCC. XL. IIII. *pellebantur*, the chaunge was made without daunger and difficultie, for as much as the ſame was effected by the good-will and conſentes of the people. Sith therefore the conſente of the people, doth give ſo great furtheraunce vnto this action of reformation, it ſeemeth a matter verie neceſſarie, that everie Magiſtrate ſhoulde retaine the arte, skill, and knowledge, of perſwading and inducing the multitude, as you have in the firſt chapter of this booke well remembred.

CAP.

CAP. 5.

The force of perſwaſions, and how neceſſarie the ſame is to effect a reformation.

EPIMEN: So it is indeede; for the good-will and conſente of the people, doeth promiſe no ſmall ſecurity vnto the Magiſtrate which intendeth this action of reformation: and therefore not without cauſe, *Pythagoras* was of all ſortes of perſons greatlie honoured, for his ſingular arte and knoweledge in winning the affections of the multitude, and in perſwading, and diſſwading the people, all which *Plutarch* witneſſeth after this manner,

Pythagoras *which lov'd to dwell,*
In higheſt dignitie:
And had a heart to glorie bent,
And paſt in pollicie:
Much like a man which ſought,
By charming to inchaunt:
Did vſe this arte to winne mens mindes,
Which vnto him did haunt.
His grave and pleaſant tongue,
In ſugred ſpeech did flowe,
Whereby he drewe moſt mindes of men,
To bent of his owne bowe.

Though *Lycurgus* vvas the eleventh which deſcended from the right line of *Hercules*, though a man of great authoritie, of great force, of long continuance a king, yet indevoring a reformation of many diſorders, which did chiefely ariſe in that eſtate, by the inequallitie of landes and poſſeſſions, therein (as *Plutarch* witneſſeth) he vſed more perſuaſions, then force: a good vvitneſſe thereof was the loſſe of his eie. You *Solon* alſo altered and

reformed that in the common-wealth of *Athens*, vvhich you thought by reaſon you ſhoulde perſwade your citizens vnto, or els by force you ought to compell them to accept. *Epi:* The *Romaines* therefore well vnderſtanding the force of perſuaſions, in all actions of reformation, did inſtitute the holy order of the *Faciales*, vvho retayning the art of perſwading, and diſſwading the people, did much further the common-weale of *Rome*; for they went many times in perſon to thoſe that did the *Romaines* iniurie, and ſought to perſwade them with good reaſon to keepe promiſe with the *Romaines*, and to offer them no wrong: they did alſo perſwade the people, to deliver *Fabius Ambuſtus*, vnto the *Gaules*, as one that had violated the lawes of armes, and farther proved by manie reaſons, that a preſent reformation made of that diſorder and iniuſtice, woulde deliuer *Rome* from many calamities, then like to inſue by the power of the *Gaules*. By this art and skill of perſuading, did *Camillus* appeaſe the great ſedition and mutinye, rayſed ſometimes by the people of *Rome* againſt the Senators, for that they had not their full minde and libertie, to inhabite the citie of *Vies*. By this art and skil, you *Solon* have now of late induced the *Athenians* to make warres with the *Megarians* for the poſſeſsing of *Salamina*, contrarie to their former liking, publike lawes, and proclamations made in that behalfe: and the like honour did you ſometimes winne by your oration, made in the defence of the temple of *Apollo*, in the citie of *Delphos*, declaring, that it was not meete to bee ſuffred, that the *Cyrrheians* ſhould at their pleaſure abuſe the ſanctuarie of the oracle; by force of which perſuaſions, the councell of *Amphictions* was thoroughly mooved, ſo that they ſought a preſent reformation thereof. By this your art and skill, you alſo perſwaded thoſe which in *Athens* they ſometimes called the abiectes and excommunicates, to be iudged, whereby you did quench and appeaſe two mighty factions, the one ſupported by the iſſues of the rebels, that roſe with *Cylon*, and the other by the offspring of *Megacles*. *Sol:* I acknowledge this your friendly reporte, not as a teſtimonie of anie art or skill, but of the office and duetie which I beare vnto the citie of *Athens*. But after this manner ſometimes a notable

table mutinye and ſedition rayſed by the citizens of *Salamina*, againſt the Iuſtices of aſsizes and iayle deliverie, in my preſence was happely appeaſed. But nowe ſith the neceſsitie of the art and skill of perſwading is ſufficiently made knowne vnto vs, there remaineth, that you deſcribe vnto vs the art it ſelfe, with the partes and members thereof.

CAP. 6.

The art and skill of perſwading, worthely knowne and obſerved of all publike Magiſtrates.

Pl: The art and skill of perſwading, conſiſteth in the knowledge of two matters eſpecially: firſt we muſt know howe to commende the matter, or perſon of ſuch as we intende to perſwade; then how to moove, winne, and diſpoſe the affections of the people. For the firſt, the Poet ſaith truly, that he ſingeth moſt ſweetely, that ſingeth my praiſe and commendation. *Sol:* This which you have ſaide, did manifeſtly appeare after the battaile of *Xerxes* fought with the *Gracian* army, for then all the *Gracian* Captaines being in the ſtraight of *Peloponneſus*, did ſweare vpon the altar of their ſacrifices, that they would give their voices after their conſciences to thoſe they thought had beſt deſerved it, where every one gave himſelfe the firſt place for worthines, and the ſeconde vnto *Themiſtocles*. After this manner, did *Publicola* winne the good-will of *Appius Claudius*, a man of great ſtrength and reputation among the *Sabines*, in giving honour vnto him, by the way of an embaſſage, whereby he gave *Claudius* to vnderſtande, that he knew him right well to be a iuſt man, and hated without cauſe of his citizens; and therefore if he had any deſire to provide for his ſafetie, and to repaire to *Rome*, leaving them which cauſeleſſe wiſhed him ſo much evill, they would publikely and privatly receiue him with due honour; by which meanes, *Publicola* did not onely winne *Appius Claudius* with thoſe of his faction, which were great and manie in number, but alſo ſtaied and turned the warres from the

Romaines, then intended by the *Latynes* and *Sabines*. *Sol:* There remaineth now, that you diſcloſe vnto vs the knowledge, howe to vvinne, move, and diſpoſe the affections of the people, as the ſecond part and member, of the art and ſkill of perſwading.

CAP. 7.

The ſkill and knowledge how to winne, moeue, and diſpoſe the affections of the people.

EPI: Herein three matters eſpecially are founde worthy of conſideration: firſt the affections what they be; ſecondarilie the ſubiect and matter, wherewith they vſually are mooved, and carried awaie, as with the violence of ſome tempeſt; thirdly the waies how to winne, moove, and perſwade the people, according to the example of the worthieſt and wiſeſt in times paſt. The affections which be the firſt, are in number theſe; love, hatred, hope, feare, diſpaire, and ſuch like; the matter and ſubiect which is the ſecond, is parentage, conſanguinity, friendes, goods, poſſeſsions, landes, the cuſtome and manner of living, honours, libertie and life; the preſence whereof wee loue and imbrace, and with their abſence wee are ſoone carried away vnto wrath, hatred, revenge, hope, feare, and diſpaire: therefore from hence as from a fountaine, have the wiſe governours in former ages, drawne all the force of perſuading; by the ſame have they induced the people to imbrace matters profitable to the common-weale, even againſt their wils. And hovv mightely theſe tranſitory thinges haue alwaies appeared in the eie of the multitude, it may appeare by the aunſwere given from the *Athenians* vnto *Themiſtocles*, whereas he perſwaded the people to leave their citie, goods, poſſeſsions, and landes, and to get them to the ſea for the better eſchewing of the Barbarian forces, vvhich then were ſo mighty, as the ſame might not vvell be withſtoode by the proper forces of the *Athenians*: In vaine (ſaith the people vnto *Themiſtocles*) doe we then ſeeke the preſervation of our lives, vvhen wee ſhall forſake the graves

graves of our fathers and auncetours. Such vvas the love they bare vnto those transitory thinges: and therefore one amongest the rest, spake in choler vnto *Themistocles* after this manner; *Themistocles*, for a man that hath neither citie nor house, it is an evill part to will others that haue, to forsake all; but *Themistocles* turning to him, replied, vve have willingly forsaken houses and walles (saith he) cowardly beast that thou art, because vvee vvill not become slaves, for feare to loose thinges that have neither soule nor life. *Sol*: Novv you are to give vs to vnderstand, of the sundry vvaies and meanes, hovv to vvinne, mooue, and dispose the affections of the people, vvhich is the thirde and last matter by you remembred, worthy of every publike magistrate, vvhich shall indevour the knovvledge and art of perswading.

CAP. 8.

Perswasions are after two sortes; the waies, and meanes, how to perswade, and induce the multitude; the art and skill required in all perswasions ordinary.

EP *I*: The vvaies and meanes how to vvinne, mooue, and dispose the affections of the people, are vsuallie after tvvo sortes: the one ordinary; the other extraordinary. The ordinary vvaies and meanes, are in number three: First you shall vvisely observe the affections of such persons, as you intende to perswade; secondarilie, you shall vviselie acquit, and deliver, as vvell the matter, as the person of him that perswadeth, from all suspition of fraude and guile; lastly you shall dravv the people vnto a particular consideration of the matter you intende to perswade. We must diligently observe their affections; for so *Phavias Lesbian* vvriteth, that the mighty and daungerous faction sometimes entertained betwixt the rich and the poorer sort of the citie of *Athens*, vvas by you *Solon* easelie pacified, in that you diligently observed the affections of either, and did secretly promise the poore to devide the landes, vvherewith they remained

highly pleaſed, to the rich you promiſed the confirmation of their contracts, which was the matter they chiefely deſired. Alſo you did not let to feede their humours and affections with the dailie publiſhing of this ſentence, equality doth breede no ſtrife; the which did pleaſe as well the rich and wealthie, as the poore and needy ſorte; for the one conceived of this worde equality, that you woulde meaſure all thinges according to the quality of the men, and the other tooke for their purpoſe, that you would meaſure things by the number, and by the poule onely; thus both being pleaſed with you, for that you well obſerved their humours and affections, they gave into your handes ſoveraine authoritie for the ending of all quarrels, whereby that mighty faction was happely appeaſed, to the generall good of *Athens*. You alſo well obſerved the affections of the people, when as you clothed things bitter and vnpleaſant, with pleaſing names; calling taxes, contributions; garriſons, gardes; priſons, houſes; and ſuch like: by the which pollicie, you made even things odious, pleaſing and acceptable to the people, and eaſily thereby perſwaded the embracing thereof. In like manner *Themiſtocles* indevouring like a wiſe generall to augment his ſtrengthes by the aide of the *Ionians*, in his warres againſt the *Perſians*, did wiſely obſerve the affections as well of the *Ionians*, as of the *Perſians* then his enemies: for paſſing by ſome places, where he knewe the enemie muſt of neceſſity fall vppon that coaſt for harborough, hee did ingrave certaine wordes ſpoken vnto the *Ionians*, in great letters in ſtone, which he founde there by chaunce, or otherwiſe brought thither for that purpoſe; theſe were the wordes, that the *Ionians* ſhould take the *Gracians* part, being their firſt founders and auncetours, and ſuch as ſought for their liberty; or at the leaſt they ſhoulde trouble the army of the Barbarous people, and doe them all the miſchiefe they coulde, when the *Gracians* ſhoulde come to fight with them: by theſe wordes thus ingraven, and diſperſed in fitte places, where the enemy was likely to harborough, he hoped either to induce the *Ionians* to take their part, or at the leaſt, that therby he ſhould make the Barbarous people, ielous and miſtruſtfull of them.

CAP.

CAP. 9.

How that the Magistrate which intendeth to perswade the multitude, must wisely acquite himselfe of all suspicion of fraude.

SOL: Nowe you have sufficientlie discourſed of the firſt meanes, whereby the multitude doe reſt perſwaded, the ſecond nowe remaineth, namely, the knowledge howe to deliver the matter and perſon of him that perſwadeth, from all ſuſpition of fraude and guile; for then all perſwaſions move mightily, and make a deepe impreſſion in the heartes of the people, when like vnto cleare waters, they deſcende from the pure fountaine of integrity. Therefore when *Alcibiades* perſwaded the people of *Athens* to invade and occupie the empire of *Sicilia*, wel hoping that the people woulde aſſigne him general of that armie, *Niceas* a man of rare and excellent virtues, rather regarding the publicke good then his privat profit, diſſwaded the contrarie; and to the ende the people ſhoulde be throughly perſwaded of his integritie herein, he ſpake vnto them after this manner: in times of peace, the Citie of *Athens* affordeth many Citizens, which ſhall have place before me, but in times of warre, I nothing doubt but to be the chiefe and firſt among them; and therefore be you confident in this, that I nowe diſſwade the warres, for that it ſtandeth more with the publicke good, then with my private profitte. In like manner *Numa*, the better to deliver himſelfe from the ſuſpicion of fraude, in all matters wherein he laboured to induce and perſwade the people, hee obſerved two matters eſpecially: firſt he perſwaded them, that he did worke the reformation of that common weale by the meanes and helpe of the Gods, in which action no fraude may receive place, for that they be for the moſt parte, alwaies accompanied with integrity and ſincerity of minde; ſecondlie hee perſwaded nothing vnto the people, but that which himſelfe performed in perſon: for *Numa* iudging it no light enterpriſe (ſaieth *Plutarch*) to plucke downe

the hautie ſtomackes of ſo fierce and warlike a people, did paciſie their fierce courages to fight, with daily ſacrifices, prayer, and devotion, wherein he ever celebrated himſelfe in perſon. In like manner, when you *Solon* were to publiſh your lawe called Σεισάχθεια, the better to perſwade the people of your integrity herein, you were the firſt that followed your owne proclamation, and clearely releaſed your debters of fifteene talentes then due vnto your ſelfe. *Sol*: So I did, though it ſtoode with my loſſe and hinderance. But nowe there remaineth the thirde and laſt meanes, vvherewith the multitude is mightely induced and perſwaded, formerly by you remembred, vvorthy of conſultation, namely, that vve drawe the people vnto a particular conſideration of ſuch matters as vve intende to perſwade.

CAP. 10.

The magiſtrate whioh intendeth to perſwade the multitude, muſt draw them vnto a particular conſideration of ſuch matters as he endevoureth to perſwade.

EP*I*: You have remembred that which I could not well forget, the ſame being alwaies founde the moſt aſſured vvay to induce the people: for in conſulting and diſputing of matters in generall, they greatly erre, iudging all thinges to proceede from other cauſes, then from the true cauſes thereof. Therfore vviſely *Camillus*, vvhen as he indevoured to perſwade the people of *Rome*, from the inhabiting of the citie of *Vies*, then for the ſame cauſe being fallen into a mutinie, he deſcended vnto particulars with the multitude, and pointed vvith his finger vnto the graves of their fathers, and auncetours, ſaying, will you needes inhabite the citie of *Vies*? And will you forthvvith forſake the graves of your fathers and auncetours? And will you now leave the holy temples dedicated to the Gods, and ſanctified by *Numa* and *Romulus*? And wil you ſuffer the holy fire now newly kindled, now once againe to bee put out? And finallie, vvill you leave this your naturall citie (pointing with his finger vnto the

the citie of *Rome*) to be inhabited by ſtraungers in time to come, or els to be a common paſture for vvilde beaſts to feede on? By vvhich manner of perſvvaſion he eftſoones appeaſed the mutinye, and quenched their ardent deſire for the inhabitinge of *Vies*. After this manner, did *Pacuvius* proceede in pacifiyng and ſubduing the peoples affections from killing their Senatours; which matter by them was fully determined, vntill ſuch time, as he conventing the people and Senatours, as for the hearing and determining of ſome publike and waighty cauſe, did proceede with them after this manner: now my friends and Citizens (ſaith he) that which you have even with an ardent deſire and affection long wiſhed, namelie the puniſhment and correction of this deteſtable and wicked Senate, the ſame hath fortune now given into your powre and handes, freely to diſpoſe of them at your pleaſure, being nowe altogether naked, and cloſed in on everie ſide with walles, where, without tumult of the Citie, and perill of your perſons, you may freely diſpoſe of them; but leaſt you ſhoulde preferre the deſire of private revenge, before the common ſafety of al here gathered together, it behooveth before you give ſentence of theſe Senatours, whom you doe mortallie hate, that you proceede firſt to the choice of others; for of force you muſt either have Senatours, which alwaies have bene the moſt wiſe and fit councellors of free eſtates; or otherwiſe you muſt of neceſſitie fall into the hands of a Lorde or King, which free eſtates haue ever hated; proceede therefore to the election of new, and make choice of better men, which may ſupply their places: this matter appearing vnto the people doubtfull, did hold them long in ſilence, but at the laſt one among the reſt beeing nominated, their clamour and noyſe farre exceeded their former ſilence, ſome affirming they knewe him not, ſome accuſing his perſon, others deſpiſing his baſe art and ſcience; and much more in the choice of the ſecond, and third, this diſſenſion was increaſed, they being more baſe and obſcure, then the firſt: then beholdinge the grounde, vvith ſhamefaſtnes they confeſſed their former errour, ſayinge, they did chuſe rather to tollerate an old evill, then a new, which might farre exceede the olde. In like manner the people of *Rome*, con-

ſulting at large, founde that they ſuſtained in all warres the greateſt force of the enemie, they found themſelves alſo to be called to all labours and workes, whereby the common-wealth was to be preſerved or augmented, and ſo forthwith they iudged themſelues as worthy of the office and dignity of the Tribuneſhip, and Conſulſhip, as any Patrician whatſoever: and thereupon contended, that the Tribunes ſhould be equally elected, as wel of the one as of the other ſorte; the which beeing vnto them graunted, and deſcending to make election, could finde none in particular worthy of that honour, or at the leaſt ſo worthy as the Patricians and nobles were; then forthwith they did acknowledge their former errour, and made choice of the Patricians only. After this manner, the people generallie conſulting of the delaies and cunctation, which *Fabius* vſed in repelling the forces of *Hannibal*, forthwith they condemned him to be a cowarde and faint harted; but afterward they waighing that their councell by the ſeverall events and overthrowes they receivedby the raſh and over-haſty proceeding of *Varro* the Conſull, and of *Marcus Sentenius*, with others, they did ſoone after adiudge the wiſedome of *Fabius* to be ſome rare and divine influence received from the Gods. In like ſort the people of *Rome*, after ſuch time as *Brutus* and *Caſſius* had fully executed the conſpiracie then intended againſt the perſon of *Caſar*, generally conſulting of that action, remained for a time, as indifferent beholders thereof, neither accuſing, neither yet making allowance thereof; but no ſooner did *Caſar* his friendes ſhevv forth his teſtament, his ſeverall legacies vnto the people, his manie and cruell woundes, and thoſe every where freſhly bleeding and increaſing like a running ſtreame, the people as poſſeſſed with ſome furie or frencie, every vvhere in the market place, every where in the corners of the ſtreete, in privat houſes, in the fieldes, and in the vvoodes alſo, cruelly murdred all ſuch, as vvere partakers vvith *Brutus* in that action. After this manner, the auncient Tirantes of *Athens*, contending ſometimes to perſwade the people to labour, and eſpecially to til and ploughe the grounde, thereby to render them more obedient vnto their governement, did give out a certaine fable; they

tell

tell of the Goddesse *Pallas*, that shee contending vvith *Neptune* about the patronage of the countrie of *Athens*, brought foorth and shewed to the Iudges the Olive tree, by meanes whereof she obtained the preheminence: by vvhich particular demonstration made, the people vvere mightily induced to labour and till the land. After this manner the people of *Rome*, generallie consulting of the division of landes gained by conquest, did fall into mutinies and seditions against the Senators; then vvisely the Senators deducted forthwith certaine colonies out of the confines of *Italie*, vvhereby eftsoones the multitude vvere given to vnderstande, of the particular charge, travell, and other sundry inconveniences, that did arise by possessing of lands gained by conquest, vvherewith all mutinies vvere appeased. Thus the magistrate that intendeth to perswade the people, must not generally consult of matters, but must descende vnto particulars vvith them; and therefore that oratour shall most readilie perswade, vvhich shall dravv his argumentes and the force of his perswasion, *ab effectibus*, *ab exemplis*. or such like: and these be the ordinarie perswasions. *Sol:* There remaineth nowe the other sote, tearmed by you perswasions extraordinary,

CAP. 11.

Perswasions extraordinary, and when or at what time they be requisite and necessarie.

EPI: Such were they which *Themistocles* sometimes vsed, for (saith *Plutarch*) vvhen all other perswasions failed, and coulde not worke that publicke good which he then intended, hee did threaten the *Athenians* with signes from heaven, and with Oracles, and aunsweres; and when as he coulde not perswade the Citizens of *Athens*, no not for the safegarde of their lives, to departe the Citie at the comming of *Xerxes*, vvhose forces they were not able to withstande, hee pollitiquely caused a brute to be spread abroade among the people, that the Goddesse *Minerva*, the protector and defender of the Citie of *Athens*, had

forſaken the Citie, pointing them the vvaie vnto the ſea; and againe, he vvonne them with a propheſie, which commaunded them to ſave themſelves in walles of woode, ſaying, that the walles of woode, did ſignifie nothing elſe but ſhips; and for this cauſe *Apollo* in his Oracle, called *Salamina* divine, not miſerable and vnfortunate, becauſe it ſhoulde give the name of a moſt happie victorie, vvhich the *Gracians* ſhoulde gette there; by vvhich extraordinarie perſvaſions, hee did induce them at the laſt to leave the Citie of *Athens*, and to betake themſelves to the ſea: by occaſion vvhereof, they did not onely deliver themſelves from the handes of their enemies, but became at the laſt conquerours, and victours over them. In like manner, when all ordinarie meanes of perſvading failed to effect the reformation ſometimes intended by *Numa*, he made his recourſe to theſe extraordinarie helpes and meanes, laying before the peoples eies a terrour and feare of their Gods, bearing them in hande, that they had ſeene ſtraunge viſions, or that he had heard voices, by vvhich their Gods did threaten them with ſome great troubles and plagues: whereby hee did pull downe and humble their hearts (as *Plutarch* witneſſeth) and made thereby a thorough chaunge and reformation, aſwell of the common-weale, as of the manners of the people. Therefore *Plutarch* not without iudgment affirmeth, that the multitude in matters vvaightie, and difficult, reſt ſatiſfied and perſvaded, rather by extraordinarie, then by ordinary meanes: all which he doeth lively manifeſt, vvhereas he induceth the multitude exclaiming vppon *Themiſtocles*, for not ſacrificing the three young priſoners, in ſo much as *Themiſtocles* forced by their rage and clamour, did ſacrifice at the laſt the three priſoners; wherewith the people remained fully perſvaded, that the victorie ſhoulde be given vnto them over their enemies. Againe, ſometimes it fareth vvith the multitude, as with the ſicke patient, vvhich being overcome with the greatneſſe of his malady, is therby become ſo impatient, as he refuſeth all wholeſome medicines, vvhich may breed his health and ſafety; the vvhich malady ſometimes poſſeſſed the people of *Athens*, when as they reiected your counſell for the vvithſtanding of the tyranny of *Piſiſtratus*, having

ving then newly vvith his forces entered the caſtle, and forte of *Athens*, vvherewith the people ſtoode ſo amazed, as they ſhewed themſelves more vvilling to ſuffer that evill, then able to prevent the ſame by your counſell. *Sol:* This happeneth oftentimes, when the people with the ſuddennes or waightines of the matter, are found dulled, mazed, and oppreſſed, and thereby as with ſome great malady remaine overcome; or otherwiſe, when they finde themſelves formerly deluded, by the like matter, or by the ſame perſons, & dare not, or wil not nowe give confidence, though for the preſent he perſwadeth nothing, but that which is expedient & profitable for thē: the which matters, the people of *Rome* obiected ſometimes againſt the Senators, when by the feare of forraine warres, they went about to fruſtrate the lawe of diviſions: and in theſe caſes as *Danta* reporteth in his Monarchie, even with open voice, they embrace their ruine, and abhorre their ſafetie and welfare. But now let vs proceede vnto the fourth way and means, namely, ſufficient forces which in ſuch caſes are to bee prepared, whereby the Magiſtrate with greater ſafety and aſſurance may effect a reformation.

CAP. 12.

Howe ſtrength, power, and forces, are neceſſarie for the better effecting of a reformation, and how in good time, the ſame ought to be applied.

EPI: In the reformation of *Athens*, you *Solon* found the neceſsity of forces, when neither the good-wils and conſents of the people, neither the abſolute auctoritie which they gave into your handes, neither yet the art and skill of perſwading vvhich then in the higheſt manner you retained, vvas found ſufficient to ſuppreſſe the ambition of *Piſiſtratus*, or to confirme the reformation which you had newly eſtabliſhed, for that you wanted ſufficient power and forces, for the better effecting thereof. Therefore this magiſtrate which ſhall intende this action of re-

formation, muſt with *Publicola* have ſufficient powre to execute his vertues and well diſpoſed minde: for by this meanes eſpecially did hee alter, chaunge, and reforme a mighty kingdome, vvhich had continued a long time, and vvas thoroughly eſtabliſhed. *Sol.* For this cauſe chiefely, I muſt confeſſe, that I was altogither vnprovident in taking vppon me the function and office of a king, to decide all controverſies and broyles, at the inſtance of my friendes and citizens, and yet refuſed the kingly name and powre, the which then vvas offred vnto mee, and vvithout the which I founde by experience, that I coulde never ſafely execute that which ſeemed to me then profitable for the beter reformation of the common-weale of *Athens*. *Epi:* So it appeared; for ſoone after you well vnderſtoode your former errour, the vvhich you did ſometimes liberally confeſſe, ſaying after this manner, that with the authoritie and power then committed into your handes, a man poſſiblie

Could not controll
the peoples mindes,
Nor ſtill their braines
that wrought like windes.

Sol: You have ſaide the truth: and for the ſame cauſe alſo at another time, I coulde not appeaſe the ſedition vvhich did ſometimes ariſe in *Athens* by reaſon of the inequality of landes and poſſeſſions after the example of *Lycurgus*, by making an equall diviſion thereof, for that I had not then the power, forces, and authority of *Lycurgus*. Howbeit I performed that which poſſiblie I might vvith the ſmall power and forces then given into my handes by the Citizens of *Athens*. *Epi:* Surely this occaſion of reformation is full of difficulties, as you have ſaide, and manie will ſtill be founde, which ſhalbe diſcontented therewith; the which hath beene eſpied by men of wiſedome, and ſuch as have beene experienced in ſuch caſes, and ſometimes your ſelfe not without iuſt cauſe did acknowledge in theſe verſes following.

Full harde it is all mindes
content to have,
And specially in matters
harde and grave.

Many and vniuſt are the accuſations and attemptes of the multitude, againſt ſuch as have authority and commaundement ouer them; great and many be they in number, eſpecially in common-weales corrupted in manners, vvhich doe labour and travel ſo with envy againſt all excellent men, as that they rather wiſh their countries deſtruction, then by them a proſperous reformation thereof; by the which occaſions, the faith and ſervices of men, are oftentimes finiſterly interpreted, ſometimes by opinion, ſometimes by malice, as well to the overthrowe of great and profitable actions, as alſo of worthie and faithfull ſervitors. *Sol:* Therefore *Moyſes*, before he coulde eſtabliſh the lawes, which God vnto him had delivered, and commaunded, founde it neceſſarie, vvith forces to remove ſuch, as being pricked forwarde with envie, did oppoſe themſelves againſt his intended reformation. And *Hieronymus Savanarole* vvanting ſufficient forces, was ſoone oppreſſed by the envie of others, and fayled of his intended reformation, as it may appeare by his ſermons, *Contra ſapientes huius mundi. Ep:* Neither is it ſufficient in theſe caſes to have forces, but as neceſſarie it is to make vſe thereof, and in due time to applie the ſame to the better furtheraunce of this action of reformation: vvhereof *Lycurgus* fayling, did eſtabliſh his reformation with the loſſe of his eie, and with no ſmall daunger vnto his perſon, for that he contended rather with perſwaſions then with forces, to eſtabliſh a reformation of auncient lawes and cuſtomes, and of the landes and poſſeſſions of the Citizens. In like manner *Peter Soderin*, having ſufficient forces that might well have overcome the envy and malice of ſuch as were founde to oppoſe themſelves againſt him, did not in time applie the ſame, and make vſe thereof, but rather contended with benefites and with a iuſt and honeſt courſe of life, to overcome the envie and

malice of ſuch as vvithſtoode his reformation; whereby in a ſhort time, he did not onely periſh and vndoe himſelfe, but alſo did overthrowe his country and regiment; forgetting that which now is everie where in experience, that the malice of the envious man, may neither with offices nor benefites be pleaſed and reconciled.

Sol: If the neceſsity of forces be great to effect a reformation, (as it plainely appeareth by that which hath bene ſaide) in ſuch common-weals eſpecially where the manners of the people are found corrupted, then much greater is the neceſſity thereof, when reformation is to be made of a common-weale, gained by the ſword and conqueſt, as alſo corrupted in manners; for that the people having here ſuſtained many iniuries by force and violence, whereunto the conquerour is drawne oftentimes by their diſobedience, maie not at anie time after with newe benefites, offices, and rewardes, be reconciled and pacified: neither ſhall we finde here profitable lawes, or any ſufficient meanes to effect a reformation, without ſufficient forces, to repell all daungers, and difficulties: all which *Salamina* may well witnes vnto the worlde; for when as the governour there, did contende to ſuppreſſe by publike proclamation thorough out the whole province of *Mounſter*, that deteſtable cuſtome of *Coiney* and *Lavery*, and other extortions, which had then conſumed the marrowe and fatneſſe of that common-weale of *Salamina*; then it was founde not ſufficient to have the ſame eſtabliſhed by late lawes, whereunto the whole parliament had agreed and conſented; neither vvas it ſufficient, that the ſame tended to the vniverſall good of the common-weale; but forces herein alſo were requiſite, to ſuppreſſe the *Butlers*, and *Garroldines*, which then on every ſide did ariſe in the mainteinaunce of that deteſtable cuſtome of *Coiney* and *Livery*: all which Sir *Warram Sentlenger*, then provinciall governour, can well witnes: by whoſe care and diligence togither with the aide and aſſiſtaunce of the forces and garriſons of *Salamina*, they were ſoone ſuppreſſed. Forces being thus neceſſarie for the effecting of a reformation, into whoſe handes the ſame is to be given, is the fifth and laſt meanes worthy of conſultation.

CAP.

CAP. 13.

How a Magistrate of rare and excellent vertues is required in this action of reformation.

EPI: This action of reformation with sufficient forces, for the better effecting thereof, is to be given into the hands of some man of rare and excellent vertues, by whose constancy and integrity, the envy and malice of the enemy may be quenched. Therefore the *Florentines* did not a litle erre, which in the times of their difficult warres, helde *Antonie Iacomine* above all others in greate estimation, for that onely he had taught the *Florentine* army, as it were with his finger, to fight, conquer, and commaund: yet in milder times, when as the warres by his industrie were growne easie and placable, they lesse regarded those his vertues, in such sort, as when three Captaines were propounded to be chosen for the suppressing of the *Pisans*, he was not accepted to be one of that number; from the which errour this mischiefe did arise vnto the *Florentines*, that the *Pisans*, which by the industry of *Antonie* might easily have beene reformed, and forced to have obeyed the *Florentines*, made eftsoones head against those vnskilful Captaines so strongly, as the *Florentines* were forced dishonourably to purchase their obedience with money. Againe *Philip* of *Macedonie*, after he had beheld the affaires of the *Athenians* to be given into the handes of *Molosses*, *Caridemus*, and such other vnskilfull Captaines, he conceived a great hope to overcome them. In like manner, the weakenes and facilitie of *Collatinus* the Consull, did much encourage the traitours, in such force, as he had never prevailed against the *Tarquines*, nor reformed the state of *Rome*, if the great vertue and severitie of *Brutus* had not governed at that time the helme and sterne; whereby the courage and boldnes of the traitours, raised by the suffrance and lenitie of *Collatinus*, as a tempest was suddenly calmed and pacified. *Sol:* Therefore provident

vident were the counsel of *Athens* in committing this actiō of the reformation of *Salamina*, sometimes into the handes of the L. *Gray*, sometimes into the handes of Sir *William Russell* as vnto another *Iacomine*, by whose rare skill and knowledge in militarie discipline, the *Pisans* have and will be forced at the last to obey the *Florentines*. But let vs nowe proceede vnto the forme and manner of altering of auncient lawes and customes, as the second parte and member of your generall division, worthy of consultation.

CAP. 14.

The forme and manner of altering the auncient lawes and customes of common-weales.

EPI. The forme and manner of altering auncient lavves and customes, is vsually after two sortes: either *simul ac statim*, or otherwise, *sensim paulatimque, antequam ab omnibus id animadvertatur*. After this first manner, you *Solon* reformed the citie of *Athens*: for you did not straight plucke vp the mischiefe by the rootes, but by little and little you chaunged their lawes, customes, and manner of living. After this manner, did *Numa* alter and chaunge the accustomed manner of living, and the manners of the citizens of *Rome*, from a warlike liberty to a life peaceable and obedient, and that by little and little as (*Plutarch* witnesseth.) But others led with the opinion and reason of *Plato*, say, that to reforme a mischiefe after this manner, is no other but to cut of one of the *Hydraes* heads, of the vvhich came afterwardes seven in the place: and therefore *Agis* and *Cleomenes* toke vpon them to make a chaunge and innovation even at once, and as it vvere with one constant stroake of the hande, to cut of all the mischiefes of their country, so as wee may conclude, that the formes and maners of reforming of mischiefes in the common-weales, be sundry and diverse, the which proceede sometimes of the diversitie of meanes and occasions, which diverslie doe offer themselves; as also from the diversitie of the subiect and matter, which being

diverſe in it ſelfe, requireth a different forme of governement. *Sol:* You have ſaide the truth; and therefore a vviſe governour doth governe diverſlie according to the meanes and occaſions offred, taking every thing in his beſt time vvherein hee meanes to deale, the which commendacion was ſometime given not vndeſervedly vnto *Publicola*. *Epi:* You *Solon* did ſometimes reforme the citie of *Athens*, not as you might have done, neither yet as the neceſſitie of that common-weale required, as well in reſpect that the firſt inſtitution thereof was meere popular, corrupt, and not durable, as alſo for that it vvas declined by many and infinite diſorders, ſo as it could not for theſe cauſes rehearſed have long continuance, vvithout making a thorough reformation of auncient lawes, cuſtomes, and governement, and vvithout pulling vp the miſchiefes even by the rootes; the which with that ſmall powre and meanes then left vnto you, you durſt not attempt, leaſt by turning vpſide-downe the vvhole governement, you might afterwards have never beene able to ſettle and eſtabliſh the ſame againe: for theſe defectes chiefely in that reformation, it hath beene obſerved even of the wiſeſt, that you *Solon* have already ſeene the overthrowe of your common-weale of *Athens*, and the tiranny of *Piſiſtratus*. *Sol:* Yes verily, I did well foreſee the ſame, but yet having neither meanes nor power to reſiſt ſo hard deſtinies, I was forced to ſuſtaine the perſon, rather of a forrowfull beholder, then a reformer of ſo great calamities: but more happie and fortunate was *Lycurgus*, *Publicola*, and *Cleomenes*, and ſuch others, though nothing ſuperiours to my ſelfe in that care and love which every citizen beareth vnto his Countrie, for that they had ſufficient power and meanes left vnto them (as *Plutarch* witneſſeth) to execute their vertuous deſire, vvhereby they made a thorough chaunge and reformation of their common-weales, by cutting vp all miſchiefes by the rootes, by reaſon whereof the ſtate of their common-weales continued long, happy, and proſperous. *Sol:* But what difficulty ariſeth from the diverſitie of the ſubiect and matter?

CAP. 15.

The conſideration of the ſubiect and matter of all reformations, and howe the ſame is divers in it ſelfe, and conſequently requireth a different forme of gouernement.

Epi: The matter and ſubiect of all reformations is diverſe in it ſelfe, and therefore admitteth the ſundry formes of reformation aforeſaid: for ſometimes the matter or ſubiect which is to be reformed, is a miſchiefe or evill by long continuance inveterate, and growne to the height of his ſtrength and perfection, and there the ſame ſhalbe more wiſely ſometimes indured, then haſtily rooted out, to the overthrow of the common-wealth: the which caution if *Tiberius Gracchus* had ſometimes well obſerved, the citie of *Rome* had not ſo haſtily declined, and fallen to her laſt ruine and deſtruction. *Sol:* But *Plutarch* led with a contrarie opinion, commended the law *Agraria*, as the worthieſt act that ever *Tiberius* performed. *Epi:* Therein he erred much: for this law was not vnworthy onely of a wiſe citizen in thoſe times, and in that manner as he then preferred the ſame, but farther was the overthrow of the common-weale. *Sol:* It ſeemeth alſo requiſite, that ſo often as the ſubiect or matter of this reformation commeth in queſtion, that we make a difference in the manner of reforming of a free and popular eſtate, from the Monarchy; for in this one, we ſhal wiſely make a thorough alteration and change, without leaving any reſemblaunce or ſhadow thereof; but in the other, we are to chaunge the ſubſtaunce, leaving in the place onely a ſhadowe and reſemblance of that which is chaunged, for the better contentment of the people; for they diſcerne all things by the outward ſence, and not by the ſounde diſcourſe of reaſon, iudging thinges to be ſuch as they ſeeme to be in outwarde appearance. This order did the *Romaines* ſometimes obſerue in inſtituting of there popular gouernement, and in reforming of auncient lawes and cuſtomes, after they had expelled their kings; for they altered

altered the ſubſtaunce, and left in place thereof onely a ſhadow and reſemblaunce of the thinges altered; for in place of their kings they produced two Conſuls, *ſed vnum tantum faces habere voluerant, & quidem totidem numero quot reges vſurpare ſolerent:* and whereas their kings in perſon did perfourme certaine publicke ſacrifices, *regem ſacrificulum creant qui hiſce ſacris praeſſet, vt nequaquam apud eos regum deſiderium eſſet.* Thus by retayning the ſhadowe onely of auncient lawes and cuſtomes, the people remaine thereby perſwaded, that nothing of the ſubſtaunce thereof is taken away or diminiſhed: in like manner, they carefully obſerved this rule of pollicie in the creation and election of Magiſtrates and officers, for although they aſsigned vnto them newe offices & functions, yet they did wiſely holde the auncient names, ſtile, and number with their former magiſtrates, that the people might deeme thereby nothing to be altered and chaunged.

CAP. 16.

Of the right inſtitution and reformation of a monarchie.

BVT otherwiſe wee are to inſtitute and reforme a Monarchy, by making there a thorough alteracion and chaunge of auncient lawes, cuſtomes, and governement, yea and of the honours, titles, and dignities alſo, not leaving any ſhadow or reſemblaunce in place thereof. For after this manner did king *David* eſtabliſh an vniverſall reformation. In like manner *Lyſander*, did pull downe the pride of the citie of *Athens*, and tooke from them the libertie of a popular governement, vvhereby in former times it was ruled and governed, and eſtabliſhed there ſharpe and ſevere magiſtrates. But ſome others carried with a contrarie diſpoſition of minde, have not attempted a thorough and generall reformation of the common-wealth, but reſerved onely vnto themſelves a principalitie and commaundement, the which forme of governement was obſerved by *Sylla*; for when he had taken the citie of *Athens*, after the citizens had made fierce warres with him, yet hee

leſte it free vnto them, enioying their owne laws. The ſame counſell did other of the *Romaines* followe, as it appeareth by the wordes of *Camillus* vſed vnto the Senate after he had conquered the *Latines*: *Dij immortales ita vos potentes huius conſilij fecerunt, vt ſit Latium an non ſit, in veſtra manu poſuerint, ſi vultis crudelius conſulere in dedstos victoſq; ſed ſi vultis exemplo maiorum augere rem Romanam victos in ciuitatem accipiendo, materia creſcendi per ſummam gloriam ſuppetit.* It ſeemeth therefore by the wordes of *Camillus*, that the *Romanes* made not at al times a thorough and vniverſal reformation of common-weales which they gained by conqueſt, but embracing rather the counſell of *Sylla*, reſerved onely a prncipalitie and commaundement; for by this meanes, they did eaſily nouriſh the ambition which they had in conquering: for ſuch as have a purpoſe to performe great actes, and to winne fame and glorie, having a mighty power to effect the ſame, they maie ſafely follow the ſteppes of *Sylla*, and other of the *Romaines*, they may ſay with *Camillus*, let vs *exemplo maiorum augere rem Romanam victos in ciuitatem accipiendo, materia creſcendi per ſummam gloriam ſuppetit*: but ſuch as ſhall contend to make continuance of their conqueſt, being not of great forces and power, ſhould imitate *Lyſander*, and make a thorough and abſolute reformation of the whole common-weale. For *Plutarch* erred not, when he ſaide that *Sylla* did performe the greater actes, but *Lyſander* committed the fewer faultes, and did poſſeſſe with greater ſecuritie that which he conquered. *Phillip* of *Macedonie*, followed the ſteppes of *Lyſander*, whereby, poſſeſſing at the firſt but a ſmall kingdome, he became in a ſhorte time a mighty commaunder of all *Greece*. *Solo*: The Gaules in like manner following the ſteppes of *Lyſander*, did ſecurely poſſeſſe for a long time the partes of *Italie*, called *Longobardia*: ſome others have beene found neither to imitate *Sylla*, nor *Lyſander*, but have helde a meane courſe betwixt both, in eſtabliſhing their governement. Such were the *Florentines*, which in ſuppreſsing the rebellion of the *Aretines*, did remove ſome of their principall commaunders from their place and offices, others they banniſhed, manie they condemned, but they did not reſume into their handes the landes, which might have afforded ſufficient

maintenaunce vnto their citizens, neither did they destroy the principall citie, but preserved the same; whereby they lost the opportunitie of confirming their empire and governement, and of augmenting their common-weale. This meane course hath never as yet beene founde happy and prosperous: For not throughly conquering our enemy, neither by sworde, neither yet by our bountie and liberalitie, vve may not long holde them, either as subiects or friendes. Therefore such as shall contend to be prosperous, and make continuance of their state, and governement, must with the *Romaines*, so suppresse and sharpely punish the *Latines*, as at no time they be able to rebell, or with bounty and goodnes so winne the affections of the privernates, as at no time they should be willing to rebell. The meane course in times past hath beene holden for the governement of *Salamina* by a long space; In which times they were never founde happy and prosperous in their governement. *Sol.* Now sith we have discoursed at large, of the reformation of auncient lawes and customes, and of the helps meanes and other rules therein to bee observed, as the first and principall matter in all reformations absolute and vniversall to be respected, there remaineth now a reformation of manners in the people, as a second matter worthily considered.

CAP. 17.

Of the reformation of manners, and how that this vniversal and absolute reformation maie not be effected without the same, and how that the corruption of manners may be discerned by his fruites and effectes.

PI: The reformation of manners, doth mightily advance all common-weales, and doth render them prosperous, and fortunate, of long continuance. *Sol:* Therefore not vvithout cause did the *Romanes*, constitute Iudges, and Censors of the manners of the people, which did carefully from time to time, execute all the lawes, *De morum censura*. Neither was the place

of the Cenſores holden to be ſacred, without due conſideration of the common-wealth: Neither were they without cauſe above all other officers honoured in that common-wealth, in ſuch ſort, as they did depoſe, and diſplace, ſometimes the Conſuls, ſometimes their Dictator, at their pleaſure; for no doubt, what by the reformation made by the induſtry of their Cenſors, and by their skill and knowledge in militarie diſcipline, they quietly governed at home, and fortunately conquered abroad in all partes of the world. Therefore ſince the reformation of manners, is a matter of ſo great importaunce vnto eſtates and common-weales, it ſhall bee convenient, that you doe deſcribe at large vnto vs what you intende thereby. *Epi:* We intende nothing els by a corruption of manners, but a departure from the feare and reverence of God, from the honour and obedience due vnto Princes governours and Magiſtrates, from the love which wee owe vnto our Country, and generally a declining from a iuſt care and regarde of publike affaires, and all heroicall vertues, vnto pleaſures, wantonneſſe, vices, and other ſuch private reſpectes and regardes. *Sol:* You have exactly deſcribed the ſame; for as the fatneſſe and goodneſſe of the earth, is eaſily diſcerned by the large profit and benefite it yeeldeth to the labouring hande; and the goodneſſe of the tree by his pleaſaunt fruite; ſo the corruption of manners in the people, by his infinite evils, miſeries, common calamities, ruines, and deſtructiones of ſtates, which every where it begetteth and bringeth forth, as by his ſeveral fruites and effectes may be diſcerned. For it breedeth in men a baſe opinion and eſtimation of vertues, and a contempt of magiſtrates, it offreth in open market the ſale of offices, the voices of election, yea even Iuſtice it ſelfe, it enableth *Caſar* with the money of the *Gaules* to purchaſe not onely favour, and offices, but even the libertie of *Rome*. From this fountaine ſpringeth ambition, deſire of revenge, mutinies, ſedition, treaſon, and rebellion, finallie it leaveth no place, no not the Senate houſe of *Rome*, nor the pulpit for orations, nor the image of *Pompey*, no not the open & publicke market places vndefiled and free from bloud, no not the pallace of princes, *Vti Galba & Pertinaci accidit*, both which

moſt

moſt vertuous kings were killed by their ſubiectes; the which miſchiefe did ariſe vnto them, chiefely for that the manners of their ſubiectes and ſouldiers were corrupted by the malice and evill governement of their predeceſſors, ſo as generally it may be reputed the mother, and nourſe of al common calamities. *Epi:* That deteſtable cuſtome, and more deteſtable confirmation thereof, for receiving and ſupporting of traitours, rebels, and evil diſpoſed perſons, comming and arriving into the lande, did firſt occaſion ſo generall a corruption of manners in *Salamina*, as more at large the ſame may appeare in the act of repeale thereof made by king H. the 7. *Anno 12. Hen.*

Sol. Sith then this generall corruption of manners doth draw with it ſo many publicke miſeries and calamities, as are before remembred, we can not, except men be altogither voide of humanity and reaſon, but abhorre even the remembraunce of theſe lamentable times, and be forthwith kindled with a deſire of reformation.

CAP. 18.

The ſeverall occaſions which breede in the heartes of the people or nation, a generall corruption of manners.

EPI: That we may the better effect this reformation of manners, it behooveth vs to vnderſtande the ſeverall occaſions which doe nouriſh the ſame, and laſtly the ſundry waies & meanes which may be found for the better reformation thereof. *Sol:* Firſt let vs vnderſtand the occaſions as you have ſaide. *Epi:* Sometimes we remaine corrupted in manners by eaſe, wealth and ſecurity, with the *Romaines* after their ſeverall conqueſtes of *Aſia*, *Africa*, and the greateſt partes of *Greece*, and vvith the invincible army of *Hanniball*, by the pleaſures of *Capua*; ſometimes by bitter adverſities, with the *Athenians* we become haters & deſpiſers of vertue, and we make vnto our ſelves that hateſull lavve of *Oſtraciſmus*, whereby we baniſh and put to death men of rare and excellent vertues, with the *Heſtomarij* and *Hiereling*; ſometimes

times we mutine, and rise in armes against the rich, and other times with the poorer sort of the oppressed factiō of *Marius*, we cōpasse the Senate house, and demaunde the delivery of *Cesar*; sometimes by the malice and practises of forreine enemies with the *Ile* of *Euboea* and the other partes of *Greece*, by corruption of *Phillippe* of *Macedonie* we depart from our obedience; sometimes by contēpt and neglect of religion and the professors thereof with *Samaria* & the citie of *Ninivie*, we fall into a generall corruption of manners, lastly either by our lightnesse or incredulitie with the *Vandales*, sometimes in *Africa* of the *Arrian* sects we dismember the body of the Church by sects and factions, so as either with the Churches of *Greece*, *Rome*, and *Ravenna*, we rise in armes one against another, or at the least the common people amiddest so great variation of sectes and opinions, finding no ancore or place of rest, that may quiet their troubled soules and consciēces, die and live for the most part in great anxietie and incredulitie.

Sol: Nowe you have at large discussed the occasions vvhich maie draw the people into a generall corruption of manners, it shall not be impertinent, to intreate of the severall remedies which may be found to resist so great an evill, vvhich worketh the ruine of states and common-weales.

CAP. 19.

The readie waies and meanes to reforme and resist a generall corruption of manners.

EP I: The chiefe and principall remedies are found to be in number three: namely a secret prudence and wisedome; secondarily good lawes well executed; thirdly a succession of severe Magistrates: for no doubt like as the wilde olive and figge tree, by the continuall addressing of a skilfull husbandman, is made at the last kindely, profitable, and fruitfull, and not inferiour to the naturall braunches; so a common-wealth overgrowne with a generall corruption of manners, and thereby become savage, barbarous, and barren, like vnto the vvilde

olive

olive and figge tree may by the continuall pruning and addreſſing of a skilfull magiſtrate, be made obedient, civill, and profitable vnto that prince, whom God hath conſtituted to be the labourer in that vineyarde; the which is to bee effected by the three waies and meanes before remembred: the firſt whereof is a ſecret prudence and vnderſtanding, wherein two matters principallie are found worthy of conſideration: firſt the ſubiect and matter; ſecondarily the time; for as the infirmities in our naturall bodies, growing vppon contrarie cauſes, receive not their cure by one ſelfeſame councell, and medicine, for the which cauſe we endevour, to cure the frenzie by reſt, and by motion the lethargie; ſo it fareth with the infirmities of a pollitike body; for where the corruption of manners in the multitude groweth by wealth, reſt, and ſecuritie, there it receiveth his preſent cure with the lethargie by motion, diſperſing the humours, and finally by ſharpe correction and diſcipline: but otherwiſe it is where the ſame proceedeth from extreame aduerſitie for there it receveth a happy cure, with the frenzie by eaſe, pacience, and ſufferance, for *Contraria ſubiecta non debent eodem modo tractari*: Wherein *Charles* the fift hath leſte vnto vs an example, when as he ſtoode before *Meats* in *Loranie* with his army, vvhich vvas then ſo diſtreſſed by extreame ſickneſſe and famine, as they openly railed on him, eſpecialle his *Spaniſh* woulde call him the ſonne of a mad woman withall the vile wordes they could deviſe, yet he would not heare them, but threw crownes amongeſt them, ſaying to his nobilitie, harken theſe knaves, yet if I call the worſt by his name, he will not refuſe to doe anie thing for me though it coſt him his life. The like wiſedome was ſhewed in the like matter by *Cato*, and other Senatours of *Rome*, at ſuch time as when the poore and needy perſons which at that time had repoſed all their hope and confidence in *Ceſar*, had compaſſed the Senate houſe and called aloude for *Ceſar* then accuſed before the Senatours, bidding them to let him out, *Cato* then to acquite the common-weale of the inſurrection of the poore and needy perſons, did not ſeverely correct them, but contrariwiſe perſwaded the Senate to make a ſtaincke diſtribution of corne amongſt them for one moneth the which amounted to one

hundreth and fiftie *Myriades* made at the common charge of the citizens, by the which councell he quenched not onely a present great feare, but did in happy time scatter and disperse abroade the best part of *Cæsars* force and power, at such time as hee was made Prætor, and that for respect of his office he was most to be feared. The same councell did *Pericles* sometimes imbrace, when as the people of *Athens* did mutine against him, for that he would not suffer them to hazarde the battaile with the *Lacedæmonian* army, then burning and spoiling in all the partes of their countrie; for he did not then with bitter speeches and sharpe punishmentes pacifie that mutinie, but contrariewise with a large distribution which he caused to be made amongst them out of the common treasure, and division of lands that were gotten by conqueſt, he did quench that sedition. And it is said, that when *Lutatius*, one of the greatest authority at that time in *Rome*, did inveigh against *Cæsar*, in that he had seditiously set vppe the honoures and victories of *Marius* contrarie to their publike lawes and decrees, and vrged then a condigne punishment aunswerable to so greate an offence, he spake nothing for the punishment of the people which then gathered themselves together for the aide of *Cæsar*, and the rather for that they being of the faction of *Marius*, had bene long oppressed and troden vnder foote by the authoritie of *Sylla*. In like manner, when we shall beholde men of rare vertues and great desertes towardes the common-weale, in times of peace and libertie contemned and despised, with *Narcetus* that rare and excellent captaine, least thereby they fal with him into a generall corruption of manners, and combine with the king of *Lombardy*, for the invading of *Italy*, wee shall wisely vvith the *Venetians* in such cases, alwaies better the fortune of those which have faithfully served, & never remoue them from their former dignity, without giving to them places of higher and greater commaundement, and vvith *Themistocles* not only speedily revoke the banishment of *Aristides*, and such others of his quality, but also to advaunce them to greater honour then before, fearing least otherwise he take part with the Barbarian nation to the ruine of the state of *Greece*. But herein one caution is wisely observed, that in such cases contending to

remove

remove a corruption of manners, which may otherwise possesse the mindes of rare and excellent personages, by a contempt and disdaine which followeth them, chiefely in times of happinesse, wealth, and securitie, wee doe not endaunger thereby the whole state of the common-wealth, the which wee shall then easilie prevent, if we shal not imploy them in the greatest places of commaundement, least contending to acquit themselves with *Claudius Nero*, of all disgraces and iniuries wrought by the deceit of *Hasdrubal*, they desperately hazarde, and put in adventure the whole state thereby. Neither are wee in such cases with the *Romaines*, to giue vnto *Camillus* discontented with his banishment the supreame commandement of the City and army; for after slaughter made of all other their captaines by the power of the *Gawles*, they were ledde therevnto rather by necessitie, then by wise-dome; neither doe all men banished and disgraced, carry with them that honourable minde of *Camillus*, and that ripenesse of iudgement, to preferre the honour and publike good of the common-weale before his priuate reputation and welfare: But on the contrary, if we shall labour to cure the corruption of manners that groweth by peace, wealth, and securitie, we are in such cases, with *Lucretius* to remove the same by sharpe discipline, whose councell if the Senatours had then followed, many miseries and publike calamities, which the ambition of *Cæsar* soone after wrought against the citie of *Rome*, had beene wisely foreseene and prevented: or otherwise in such cases, if wee shall like vnto the wise phisition disperse abroad those pestilent humours according vnto the example of *Camillus*, and with him imploye the citizens of *Rome*, now puffed vp with the pride and insolency of their new obtained victorie and conquest of *Vies*, and with the rich spoiles thereof, now in mutinie against the Senatours and nobles, now resorting with great tumult about the pulpit for orations, for establishing of lawes tending rather to the destruction then to the division of *Rome*, as in the warres against the *Phalerians*, and there besiege the chiefe citie, not so much with a purpose to winne the same, but rather with him to keepe our countrie men busied least by repayring to *Rome*, they should take occasion to mutine.

whereby with the wise phisition we shall dispersse abroad those humoures, which may trouble the quiet state at home. Lastly if wee shall wisely take holde of time, whilst she is running her swiftest course with her force and violence, perhaps vve may be caried more then vvith an ordinary expedition vnto the height of our thoughtes and desires; for the times which shall represent vnto vs the shevv and face of publike calamities, as famine, plague, pestilence, povertie, and warres shall mightily advaunce this action of reformation: for so the Senatours of *Rome* by an appearaunce of forraine warres did often pacifie the mutinies and seditions of the citizens of *Rome*, raised for the law of division of lands gained by conquest: and the *Romaines* after the battell of *Cannes* gave due obedience vnto Magistrates, and did severely prosecute their lawes against the *Vestall* Nuns, and finally whatsoever the Magistrates did commaunde, the people would most readily obey. The like obedience was sometimes found vnto lawes and Magistrates, after the people of *Rome* had received their overthrow by the power of the *Gawles*, in such sort, as the corruption of manners that then reigned in them vvas soone quenched and reformed. The times also which did produce sundry publike calamities in *Vlster* parcell of the dominions of *Salamina*, did worke there the like effectes, as it appeareth in the statute of Attainder of *Shane Oneile*; where it is saide after many publike calamities sustained by the warres, they cried first for mercy, and then for Iustice, in such sort, as the reformation of that country did offer it selfe easie vnto the handes of the Magistrates that woulde laie holde thereof, as by expresse wordes of that statute more at large may appeare. Wisely therefore *Plutarch* in comparing the actes of *Fabius* with *Pericles*, saith, that *Pericles* governed the *Athenians* in their chiefest prosperity and wealth, whereby they were corrupted in manners, and rendered insolent, and mutenous, and not easily governed; but *Fabius* then governed *Rome*, when as it was humbled by many adversities, esteeming it a matter of no great difficultie, to rule a citie all ready brought low by adversitie, and which compelled by necessitie is contented to be governed by a wise man.

Sol: But ſith this matter is at large diſcourſed, let vs proceede vnto the other meanes which are leſte vnto vs for the better reſiſting of a generall corruption of manners, and what force, good & profitable lawes may have therein.

CAP. 20.

The neceſſitie of good and profitable lawes for the better effecting of a reformation of manners.

EPI: The *Aegyptians* by a long ſpace prevented this generall corruption of manners, which either peace, wealth, ſecurity, or otherwiſe the fertility of place might breed in the hartes of the ſubiectes. The like lawes did *Romulus*, *Numa*, and other governoures which ſucceeded them, carefully from time to time eſtabliſh, as neither their long peace and reſt which they enioyed in the governement of *Numa*, neither yet the fruitfulneſſe of the ſoile of that empire, nor the commodities of the ſea, neither their daily victories, could by the ſpace of a long time and many ages, corrupt the manners of the people. In like manner the *Germanes* above all others have beſt continued the integritie of manners in the ſubiect, chiefely for that they have not onely beene moſt ſtudious of profitable lawes, but alſo moſt faithful obſervers thereof, the which thing above all others hath preſerved their people and country, as well from this corruption of manners, as alſo from the ſervitude and oppreſſion of others. And where it is ſaid, that *Spaine* hath not fallen ſo deepely as *Italy*, and *Fraunce*, into a generall corruption of manners, this proceedeth not from the goodneſſe of their nature, but from the ſtrict obſervation of the auncient lawes and cuſtomes of that kingdome. *Sol:* I have viewed the lawes of *Salamina*, and I finde them no leſſe profitable then the lawes either of the *Egyptians*, *Romanes*, *Germanes*, or others whatſoever, for the reformation of manners: ſo as there remaineth nothing, but that vvith the *Germanes* vve be faithfull obſervers of our lawes: for ſo it may appeare

An. 28. H. 8. c. 13. fo. 1. by expresse wordes contained in the statute made against imbrasing and fostering, where it is related after this manner: Notwithstanding diverse good statutes and actes of parliament made for the reformation of that countrie, wherein is contained, that every of the kings subiectes offending the same, shoulde be a traitor attainted, yet by the default and negligence of the heads and rulers of that lande vnder the kings highnesse, the saide statutes vvere not duely put in execution, so as no reformation hath followed the same. In like manner, disorders were sometimes committed in the countries of *Flamminia* and *Emilia*, by the negligence of Magistrates in not executing the lawes, before Pope *Alexander* the sixt had wisely displaced and removed the negligent governoures thereof; before which time, these regions were full of theft, robberies, and rebellions, the vvhich offences did not arise from the nature of the place or people, as some did then suppose, but rather from the malice and negligence of their governoures; for they beeing poore, woulde notwithstanding live richly, and sumptuously; they made lawes, and were the first that offended against the same, and by their example invited others therevnto; neither did they punish any that offended the lawes, vntill they increased to great strengthes and numbers, *ac tunc demum* (saith the author of this historie) *non Iusticiæ conservandæ causa, sed præda dulcedine permoti, pœnas ab omnibus simul gravissimas exigebant; ex quare hoc sequebatur absurdum, vt expilati assiduis illis multis homines ad paupertatem redigerentur, atque hinc impellerentur ad vexandos alios, quibus existimabant se viribus esse superiores, quo quidem modo vitia non emendabantur, sed ad ea homines instituebantur, dependebantque hæc omnia ex prava eorum regulorum natura.* Lastly, the many and sundry priviledges are found to give impediment vnto the execution of profitable lawes, and to nourish a corruption of manners in the subiect, as more at large it doth appeare in the act of Absentes, which is lefte vnto vs as a register of the fall and declination of the state of *Salamina*, vvherein it is manifest that the Lordes of the several countries of *Catherlagh* and *Wexforde* being places priviledged, may keepe and holde al manner pleas vvithin the same, vnder colour whereof the kings lawes,

writes,

writtes, or other proceſſe bee not obayed, neither any other Iuſtice there adminiſtred, for the quieting and good order of the ſubiect, ſo as in the default thereof, the kings enimies have them in ſervage, all murders, robberies, theftes, treaſons, and other offences remaining there vnpuniſhed. *Sol:* But what Magiſtrate may be found ſufficient to eſtabliſh a reformation of manners? *Epi:* A ſevere Magiſtrate is herein required: for that a common-weale mightily corrupted in manners, is ſquared and reformed onely by the rule and line of Iuſtice which wee call diſtributive, the which for the inequality thereof, may not without great motions and ſharpe remedies reforme the enormities and miſchiefes of the common-weale. Laſtly where the manners of the people remaine corrupted, there the lawes, *De morum cenſura*, and all other lawes are found vnprofitable, vnles by a ſevere and ſtout Magiſtrate they be ſupported and maintained. For if *Brutus* had not ſeverely proceeded, as well againſt his owne ſonnes, as againſt all other traitours, he coulde not have reformed the corruptions of *Tarquine*, and of other his confederates. *Sol.* He that ſhal in theſe waighty actions of reformation proceede as you have ſaide with lenitie and ſoftneſſe, ſhall never with *Collatinus* bee able to ſuppreſſe a corruption of manners in the ſubiect, but he ſhall by that courſe rather imbolden and comforte traitours in their intended purpoſes; therefore herein the wiſedome of *Valerius* vvas highly commended, vvho though by nature curteous, and gentle, and thereof ſurnamed *Publicola*, yet by wiſedome now became ſo ſevere & ſharpe for the reformation & good of his countrie, as he moſt ſharpely and bitterly proſecuted the treaſons of *Tarquine*. *Epi:* They which ſhall live and governe *Sparta*, where the people are in manners corrupted, muſt with *Cleomenes* ſharpely proſecute and puniſh offendours; but where the manners of the people be not corrupted, there a milde courſe of gouvernement doth worke his effect, and carrieth with it allowance and commendations. For this cauſe it is ſaid, that the patience of *Peter Soderin* was profitable as well to the common-weale as to himſelfe, ſo long as the age and time continued milde and gentle, but after the times were changed into an yron age, the

same then required a greater severitie then could be found in *Peter Soderin*, which by no meanes nor occasions, nor by the change of times, could be ledde from his accustomed patience, by the which he did not onely overthrow himselfe, but did also perish his whole countrie. Therefore very well saith a learned author, for the better reformation of manners corrupted in the people, and for the better reviving of the force of auncient lawes, a severe Magistrate is requisite. *Sol:* But great is the hatred which in such cases followeth the person of a severe Magistrate, and it draweth with it sometimes perill and daunger vnto Princes. *Epi:* This question admitteth one other distinction: for an absolute Prince is to imitate the humanity of *Cyrus* described by *Xenophon*, but such as shall governe by way of deputation, are rather to follow the severitie of *Manlius Torquatus*, least otherwise with *Peter Lawredane*, we doe not onely make the *Venetians* ielous, but also disable our selves by our lenitie and softnes, to performe this difficult action of reformation, wherein severitie is required. To conclude, it must be that grave and severe *Tymasicheus*, that shall reforme the licentious citie of *Lyparensis*, and drawe them from spoiling, praying, and rebelling. Lastly, wee must make a continuall succession of severe Magistrates, as before I have remembred. For *Epaminondas* with a iust severitie may reforme a corruption of manners in the *Thebanes*, but if he once fortune to dye, the *Thebanes* shall eftsoones returne to their former corruptions.

Sol: Nowe sith you have at large discussed of the two partes and members of this vniversall and absolute reformation, namely the reformation of auncient lawes, customes, and lastly the corruption of maners in the people, there remaineth nowe a newe and better institution then before prescribed, as the third and last member of your generall division. *Epi:* I will proceede then vnto the institution it selfe, wherein foure matters are found worthie of consideration: first, the soverainitie and commaundement; secondly, the forme of governement; thirdly, the forme and manner of the institution it selfe: lastly, the severall endes and scopes of this institution? For the first, which is the soverainty and commaundement, the same is given sometimes into the hands of one,

some-

ſometimes in the handes of fewe, and ſometimes into the handes of all in generall. This one is termed a *Democratia*, or a popular eſtate; the other an *Ariſtocratia*; the laſt a Monarchie. Thus be common-weales properly diſtinguiſhed by the ſoveraintie and commaundement, and not by the diverſity which ſometimes appeareth in the forme and governement thereof: for all inſtitutions are made after the one of theſe kindes, and all other are but corruptions of theſe eſtates, and no proper or diſtinct common-weales. *Sol*: But which inſtitution is to be preferred above others? *Epi*: The inſtitution no doubt of the Monarchie, is the moſt firme and durable, and freeſt from al diſſention, mutinies, and ſedition. And the wiſe men of *Rome* vvere not deceived, when beholding the market place filled with bowes, ſlings, and ſwordes, and the pulpit for orations ſprinckled with bloud, they ſaid, there remaineth nowe no other way to give helpe and remedie to theſe troubles of our common-weale, but the authority of one man onely, that may commaunde vs all. And as this eſtate is freeſt from trouble, as you have ſaide, ſo is it of all others moſt honourable and glorious, and even the very lively image of God and nature, as *Artibanus* did ſometimes faithfully deliver vnto *Themiſtocles*. The next manner of inſtitution in account, ſeemeth to be the *Ariſtocratia*, for that it acquiteth it ſelfe beſt of al other common-weals, from corruption & errours in their cenſures and iudgements: for as the large and running waters, are not ſo eaſily corrupted, as the ſtanding poole; ſo many wittes, and mindes, are not ſo eaſily deluded and corrupted, as one. But worſt of all others doeth this common-weale acquite it ſelfe of envie, diſſention, and emulation amongeſt themſelves, which like vnto a mothe or worme, gnaweth a ſunder the heart and intralles of that common-weale, and at the laſt confoundeth and deſtroieth the ſame. But yet the popular eſtate is of all others leaſt permanent, eſpecially where the common-weale is mere popular, aſwell in regard of the ſoveraintie and commaundement, as of the forme & manner of governement; wherof the common-weale of *Athens* maie be vnto vs an example, which was inſtituted by you *Solon*, and after in the ſame age confounded by *Piſiſtratus*: *Solo*

So it was: for wanting ſufficient power and forces, I was forced to make ſuch lawes for the inſtituting of that common-weale, as they vvere willing to receive, and not ſuch as I was willing to give: for I muſt confeſſe, that popular inſtitution, which is equallie tempered, and compounded of the three ſortes and formes of governement, after the maner and inſtitution of *Rome*, to be more firme and durable; and this forme of governement alſo doeth give a perfection and continuance to all other eſtates before remembred. Therefore *Romulus* after the death of *Remus*, and *Tatius Sabinus*, did ayme at that forme of government in the inſtitution of the common-weale of *Rome*; for he reſerved vnto himſelfe the ſole and kingly auctority over the armie onely, and to convent the Senators for the affaires publicke, the which forme of governement, in his perſon was kinglike, and after the forme of a Monarchie; but in the perſon of the Senators, who had auctoritie to conſulte, and publikely to perſwade and diſſwade the attempts for wars, and to diſcuſſe all other civill cauſes, as the ſtate of that common-weale required, the forme of an *Ariſtocratia*, was rightly by him obſerved; and in the other partes of his governement, as in framing of his lawes and ſuch like, he rather affected a popular liberty, then a Monarchie. *Epi*: After this manner the king of *France* hath reſerved vnto himſelfe a kingly name, ſtile, honors authority, and commandement over the Senate, and to aſſemble them for the affaires publicke, and a ſole abſolute and royall authority over the armie for making or finiſhing the warres, laſtly an authority for the levieng and receiving of the revenews belonging to the crowne, but the execution of lawes he leaveth to the Senate, and Iudges, who governe by ſuch lawes as reſpect a popular liberty and free eſtate, in the making of which lawes, the people have alſo their voices, like as in popular eſtates, where the people holde the ſoverainty and commaundement; ſo as by this forme of governement as well to the king, and the nobles, as alſo to the people, ſuch power is graunted, with ſo iuſt and equall proportion, as either the dignitie of the one, or the liberty of the other may iuſtly require; in the well tempering wherof, all the skill, arte, and pollicie of governement is wholy contained, and he that

ſhall holde the beſt and moſt iuſt temperature herein, commeth neareſt to the perfection of nature; who by how much more equally ſhee doth temper the foure humours and elements in our naturall bodies, by ſo much we receive a more perfit ſtrength, & a longer being & continuance. *Sol.* This is the beſt forme of inſtituting of common-weales, the which you have now deſcribed; but in this inſtitution ſome are founde to ayme at peace, ſome at honour, as the butte and ſcope of all their actions; ſo as their ende and ſcope being divers, it ſeemeth they may not imbrace one forme of inſtitution. *Epi.* You ſay well: for they which ſhall aime at a common-weale peaceable & permanent, it behoveth them to ſeclude ſtrangers, not to traine their people and ſubiectes in militarie diſcipline, according to the example of the *Lacedæmonians*, and to poſſeſſe a place or fort, as well by nature and the ſituation thereof, as by art rendred invincible, according to the example of the *Venetians*. But ſuch as ſhal ayme at honour and glory, as the butte & ſcope of their inſtitution, muſt entertaine ſtrangers, they muſt indevour to render the common-wealth populous, they muſt daily traine and exerciſe the people in military diſcipline, and they ſhal wiſely deliver the feble, and weake, from the hands of the oppreſſour, they muſt entertaine many aſſociates & friends, by the which policies they ſhall render themſelves every where invincible according to the example of the *Romanes*. *Sol.* But what manner of inſtitution is moſt permanent and to be preferred? *Epi.* Neither the one nor the other may be founde ſo happy and permanent, but at the laſt, with the apple in his ful ripenes, they fall with their owne weight and poyſe to the ground; the one by diſcord and mutinies of the ſoldiours, for that their citizens are rendred bold by the continual vſe and trayning in military diſcipline; the other by effeminacie, eaſe, reſt, and ſecurity, haſteneth in like maner vnto mutinies and diſcords, as to his laſt ruine; ſo as either by a fatall deſtinie (as it were) imbraceth there owne confuſion: but not after one manner; for the one like vnto a flowre, or the pride of youth, in the height of his glory, vaniſheth, away, and leaveth the image of true glory, as a lively picture, to inveſt a perpetuall memory of a worthy and excellent Inſtitution. But the common-weale

which in his firſt Inſtitution aymeth only at peace and permanency, with effeminacy, diſcorde, and mutinies, bredde by long eaſe, reſt, and ſecurity, embraceth with the other his final & laſt deſtruction, but leaveth not the like memory of his Inſtitution. *Sol:* It ſeemeth thē by that which you have ſaid, that the inſtitutiō of that cōmon-weale, which aymeth at vertue, honour, and glorie, is to be preferred before the other, & of princes much more to be deſired. But may not one ſelfeſame common-weale, ayme at the one and the other? *Ep:* No verily: for as the tree which hath but a ſlender roote, may not long ſupport waighty and mighty braunches, againſt the furie and violence of the winde and tempeſt; ſo common-weales which ayme at peace, having but a ſlender roote, and foundation, laide for the ſupporting thereof, as before I have remembred, may not be long victorious, and hold themſelves vpright in actions of great importance: and if they fortune to be ſo with the *Venetians*, which have much regarded this manner of inſtitution, they ſhal no ſooner winne, but eftſoones for want of proper forces to defende, they ſhall looſe the ſame againe: ſo as for free eſtates and common-weales, this manner of inſtitution ſeemeth not to be the beſt, but for ſervile common-weales, and ſuch as have lived alwaies ſubiect to others, as *Piſa* ſometimes to the *Florentines*, *Cremona* to the *Venetians*, and *Salamina* to *Athens*, it may be holden for the ſafeſt: for by this maner of Inſtitution, they ſhall more eaſily retaine the ſubiectes in their obedience and ſubiection.

THE

THE THIRD BOOKE OF Solon his follie.

CAP. 1.

A deſcription of this worde Declination, with the ſeverall ſignes and tokens thereof, whereof ſome are tearmed ordinary, others extraordinary.

SOL: You have made a perfect anatomye of this worde Reformation, and not onely with the cunning Painter you have deſcribed the outwarde ſhews and lineaments, but with the wiſe Phiſition you have well knowen, and laid open the inward partes therof: but now diſcloſe vnto vs, the ſecrets which lie hidden vnder the words ſubſequent, and contained in the firſt and generall deſcription, namely of a declined commonweale. *Ep:* Theſe words offer ſundry matters worthy of conſideration. *Sol:* What be they? *Epi:* Firſt, the deſcription of this word Declination; ſecondly, the ſignes and tokens; thirdly, the times; fourthly the partes and members; fiftly, the cauſes and occaſions; and laſtly, the meanes to reſiſt the ſame. *Sol:* Make the firſt ſtep vnto the deſcription thereof, which is the firſt matter herein to be conſidered. *Epi:* A Declination of a body polliticke, is nothing els but a fall and departure from his firſt inſtitution, and perfection, ſo as we may rightly tearme it the ſubiect and matter of this our reformation. *So:* You have aptly deſcribed the ſame: therefore make your progreſſion vnto the ſecond matter, and declare vnto vs the ſignes and tokens, which with *Ionas* as forerunners and meſſengers, giveth the City of *Ninivie* to vnderſtand of their declination, and deſtruction. *Epi:* The death of noble and worthy perſonages, doeth threaten a declination of the welfare and happines of

eſtates, and common-weales. For the firſt token (ſaith *Plutarke*,) that threatned ſome great miſchiefe to the common-wealth of *Rome*, was the death of *Iulius* one of the Cenſores: for the *Romanes*, ſaith he, doe greatly reverence the office of a Cenſor, and eſteeme it as a ſacred place. *Sol.* And hath not the cittie of *Rome*, of late yeares beene deprived of grave and worthy Cenſores, by vntimely death, not inferiour to *Iulius*? *Epi:* Yes verily: and for this cauſe we are greatly to feare that chaunging our auncient Conſuls for new *Decemviri* with the citie of *Rome*, wee periſh and fall in actions of great importaunce and difficulty: and therefore with that faithfull and worthy citizen *Camillus*, I pray dailie vppon my knees, that this bitter calamitie vnto vs now threatned, if the ſame may not be turned from vs, doe light vpon my ſelfe, and ſuch other private citizens of *Rome*, that have deſerved the ſame, ſo as the citie vvith her noble armie and forces may be preſerved. *Sol:* Paſſe this over with this comfort, that the new *Decemviri* retaine in them the great vertue and worthines even of the auncient Conſuls; and proceede vnto ſignes of declination. *Epi:* There may not be greater ſignes founde of common calamities enſuing, then an vniverſall ſecuritie, which ſometimes poſſeſſeth the mindes and heartes of the ſubiectes. The which was founde in the *Romanes*, at ſuch time as they ſuſtained the great overthrow by the power of the *Gawles*; for then all ſortes of perſons in the citie were founde to be poſſeſſed with a generall ſecuritie, in ſomuch that they neglected all religion, they contemned the holy order of the *Facials*, and made no account of their propounded religion, and laſtly they were founde ſo ſecure, as they neglected all their former diſcipline of warres, yea they ieſted and made themſelves merry with *Marcus Cedicius*, which gaue them vvarning thereof. In like manner a generall ſecurity did poſſeſſe the *Philiſtians*, when as *Ionathan* ſaid to the young man that bare his armoure, come, and let vs go over vnto the garriſon of theſe vncircumciſed, for it is not hard for the Lord to ſave with many or with few, ſo as they both ſhewed themſelves to the *Philiſtians*; but they as men ſecure, ſcorned *Ionathan*, and ſaid, ſee the *Hebrewes* come out of the holes wherein they have hid themſelues for a

long

long time, but *Ionathan* eftſoones put them to the ſworde. But for that the hiſtories and reportes of ages paſt, doe afforde infinite proofes and examples hereof, let vs proceede readily vnto other ſignes and tokens of declinations. *Sol:* Before a generall declination, the people are found poſſeſſed vvith a generall feare; for before the overthrow given by *Samuel* vnto the *Philiſtians*, the people were holden with a mighty feare of their future fortunes, and of the event of thoſe warres, inſomuch as it is ſaide, there was a feare in the hoaſt, and in the fielde, and amonge all the people, the garriſon alſo and they that vvent out to ſpoile vvere afraide themſelves, and the earth trembled, for it was ſtriken with feare by the Lord. And after this manner *Chriſte* prophecieyng of the deſtruction of *Ieruſalem*, vnto ſuch as asked what ſignes ſhal there be when theſe thinges ſhall come to paſſe, he ſaide, there ſhall be trouble vpon earth, and amonge nations perplexity, & mens heartes ſhall faile them for feare, and for looking after thoſe things which ſhall come on the vvorlde. *Epi:* After ſuch time as *Camillus* was vniuſtly condemned and baniſhed, there vvas not a *Romane* of any vnderſtanding, but believed certainely, that ſome great puniſhment would follow them incontinently, and that the wronge and iniurie which they had done him, would be quicklie requited with ſome ſharpe and terrible revenge, not onlie vnpleaſaunt to thinke vppon, but farther moſt notable to be ſpoken of thorough the world: then fell out ſo ſodainely vpon the ſame, ſuch miſchiefes towardes the citie of *Rome*, as it was doubted to bee the handy worke of ſome God, that woulde not ſuffer vertue to be vnrecompenſed vvith ingratitude. *Sol:* There remaineth yet a greater ſigne of declination. *Epi:* What may the ſame be? *Sol:* When the common-wealthes ſhall generally depart from all the partes and right rules of governement, the ſame is a manifeſt ſigne of declination. For before the overthrow of *Rome* by the power of the *Gawles*, there was found all diſorder and confuſion, they were not governed by one ſelfeſame commaunder, as in former times, but their governoures being many, contrary to the diſcipline of warres, bredde naught elſe but confuſion. The like diſorder did they admit in all the other partes of

their governement, as in the hiſtorie thereof more at large appeareth, the which did breede the ruine and deſtruction of that citie. Theſe bee the ordinary ſignes of declination. *Sol:* You ſeeme hereby to give vs to vnderſtande of ſignes extraordinary. *Epi:* Yea verily. *Sol:* What be they? *Epi:* Great earthqnakes ſhalbe in divers places, hunger, peſtilence, and fearefull thinges, and great ſignes ſhall there be in heaven, there ſhall be ſignes in the ſunne, and the moone, and in the ſtarres, the ſea and waters ſhal roare; this is the time wherein *Ieruſalem* ſhal be troden vnder foote of the *Gentiles*, vntill the time of the *Gentiles* be fulfilled; theſe be the times wherein they ſhall fall on the edge of the ſwoorde, aud ſhalbe ledde captive to all nations; theſe be the ſignes whereby as by the budding of the figge tree, wee knowe ſummer to bee neare at hande, ſo by theſe we may diſcerne common calamities a farre of, as alſo when they approach neare vnto vs. *Sol:* Before *Cæſar* was murdered in the Senate houſe, there appeared many terrible ſignes in the heavens, in the aire, and vppon the earth, vvhich did threaten his overthrowe and deſtruction, and many common calamities vnto that citie: in like manner before the ſacking, burning, and deſtroying of *Rome* by the *Gaules*, one *Marcus Cedicius* a man of faire condition, honeſt, and of good conſcience, tolde vnto the Tribunes a thing that was well to be conſidered of: for he ſaide that the night before as he was going on his waie, in the new ſtreete, he harde one call him alowde, and returning backe to ſee what it was, he ſawe no living creature, but onely hearde a voice bigger then a mans, which ſaide vnto him, *Marcus Cedicius*, goe thy way to morrowe morning to the Tribunes of the ſouldiers, and bid them looke quicklie for the *Gaules*. *Epi:* Surely God governeth the worlde, and the creatures vppon earth, mercifullie and lovingly, in ſending ſometimes *Marcus Cedicius* vnto the citie of *Rome*, yea ſometimes *Ionas* vnto the citie of *Nimvie*, nay that which is more, in making the dumbe creatures, as well in heaven as in earth, to ſpeake vnto vs, and foretell vs of our deſtruction. *Sol:* To the good they be tokens of his mercie and favour, and to the wicked they threaten his Iuſtice and iudgement, ſo as what the higheſt hath determined in his ſecret

cret fore-knowledge, the ſame ſhall ſtande and may not paſſe. For in vaine ſhall *Calphurnia* crie out in the night, *Ceſar* is ſlaine, for hee ſhall not give credit vnto dreames; in vaine ſhall ſhe perſwade him in the day to keepe his houſe, & not to go abroad, for he ſhalbe deluded with the hopes and flatteries of *Brutus*; in vaine ſhall the ſouthſaier forewarne him of his deſtruction, for he ſhal not regarde prophecies; in vaine doe his friendes and vvelwillers ſet downe in writing the daies, times, and meanes of his deſtruction, and deliver the ſame into his handes, for he ſhall not once reade or regarde it; ſo the higheſt hath determined and the ſame ſhall ſtand and may not paſſe: *Brutus* ſhall flatter, wounde, and kill him, and he ſhall fall with the ſtroke thereof; in vaine ſhall *Marcus Cedicius* forewarne the Tribunes of the people, that the *Gaules* with their armie are marching towardes *Rome*, for they ſhall laugh and make themſelves merry thereat, and not foreſee howe they may reſiſt them; they ſhal be as men amazed and bewitched, and forget even their ordinarie diſcipline, and fall into all diſorder of governement, their Citie ſhall be waſted and deſtroyed; for ſo the higheſt hath determined, and the ſame ſhall ſtande and may not paſſe. *Epi:* To this purpoſe *Plutarch* writing of the death of *Ceſar*, ſaieth, that the declinations and deſtinies are more eaſily foreſeene then avoided.

CAP. 2.

The times wherein common-weales doe vſually fall and decline,

SOL: But what may be the times ordained by a ſecret fore-knowledge in the breſt of the higheſt, of the declination of common-weales? *Epi:* The ſame onely is known to the higheſt, and to vs left vncertaine. *Sol:* But what doth hee not manifeſt every where by his ordinary power and governement of this inferiour worlde, of that whereof we may in no ſort be ignorant? *Epi:* By his ordinary governement you meane naught els but his power, wherby he giveth to all things their firſt being, pro-

greſſion, continuance, perfection, and declination. *Sol:* Thus you make the perfection of all thinges, to be the ende of his continuance, and the beginning of his declination, and to be the laſt ſhewe of his being, and the firſt of his declining. *Epi:* I will ſhewe you the trueth, even from the mouth of that Prophet *Daniell*, a mighty king ſhall ſtande vp, ſaieth he, that ſhall rule with great dominion and doe according to his pleaſure, and when hee ſhall ſtande vppe, his kingdome ſhall be broken, and ſhall be devided towardes the foure windes of the heavens, and not to his poſterity nor according to his dominion, which he ruled, for his kingdome ſhalbe pluckt vppe by the rootes, and the ſame given vnto others. *Sol:* By this example, you ſeeme to inferre, that kingdomes and principalities, being at the higheſt, doe then decline and fall: for ſo did this mighty king *Alexander* (whome the Prophet *Daniell* nowe intendeth) ſometimes rule great dominions, but even then ſaieth the Prophet did he periſh, even when he commanded at his pleaſure, and laſtly, even when this king (ſaith the Prophet) did ſtand vppe, and was at the higheſt, even then did he fall with a diſeaſe which followed his drunkennes and ſuperfluitie, or otherwiſe by the poiſon which was given by *Caſſander*, even then was his kingdome broken, ſaith the Prophet, and pluckt vppe by the rootes, even then was the time wherein it was devided amongeſt ſtraungers, namely his twelve chiefe princes, and not given vnto his poſterity, then it was wherein his poſterity did murther and deſtroy one the other, even theſe were the times, wherein his kingdome ſoone after vvas devided towardes the foure windes of the heavens: for *Seleucus* had *Siria*, *Antigonus Aſia Minor*, *Caſſander the kingdome of Macedonia*, and *Ptolomeus Aegypt*. *Ep:* You well vnderſtande as well the matter, as my meaning, and to the ſame purpoſe, ſaieth the Prophet *Daniell*, there ſhall ariſe a king ſo mighty, that he ſhall doe what him liſt, he ſhall exalte and magnifie himſelfe, againſt all that is God, but vvhen his glorie ſhall be every vvhere encreaſed, then the king of the South ſhall puſhe at him, and the king of the North ſhall come againſt him, and like a whirlewinde, with chariots, and horſemen, and vvith manie ſhippes, ſhall enter his pleaſant coun-

countrie, and have power over all the treasures of golde and silver, and over all the princes things of *Aegypt*, and none shall bee founde that may withstande him, he shall plant the tabernacles of his pallace, betweene the seas and the glorious and holy mountaine, but even then is the time, saieth the Prophet, that he shall come to his ende, and none shall helpe him. *Sol:* These vvere the *Romanes*, vvhich sometimes raigned vpon earth like Gods: but even then eftsoones they perished as men. For when *Augustus* had overcome the *Parthians*, and recovered that which *Antonius* lost, vvhen they were found to raigne quietly from sea to sea, and in *Iudæa*, then came they to their ende, and none was founde that could helpe them. *Epi:* The same Prophet saieth, the king of the South shall be angry with the king of the North, and shall set forth a great multitude, and fight with the king of the North, and the multitude shalbe given into his handes, then the multitude shalbe prowde, and their hartes shalbe lifted vppe, for he shal cast downe thousandes, but he shall not still prevaile, for the king of the North shall come and cast vppe a mount and take the strong Citie, and the armes of the South shall not resist, neither shall there be anie strength to withstand, but he shall come and doe with him what he list, and none shall stande against him. *Sol:* The Prophet intendeth *Philopater* which sometimes governed great dominions, yet coulde he not withstand the power of *Antiochus*, & *Phillip* king of *Macedonie*, which thē came against him, neither shal the *Aegyptians* be able to resist *Stopus Antiochus* captaine, for this is the the time wherein none shall bee founde that may withstande them. *Epi:* And in the same place it is saide, that when the king of the North shall take the stronge citie, yea even when the armes of the king of the South shall not resist him, yea then when there may not be founde any strength to withstande him, even then when he hath planted himselfe in the pleasant lande, even then, saith the Prophet, shall a Prince be founde, which shall cause his shame to light vppon him, beside that hee shall cause his owne shame to turne vppon himselfe by retiring towardes the fortes of his owne lande, but he shall be overthrowne and fall, and be no more founde. *Sol:* Thus did *Antio-*

thus ſometime fall, whom the Prophet heere intendeth, when as *Attilius* and *Lucius Scipio*, did put him to flight, ſo as for feare of the *Romanes*, hee was forced to flie to his holdes and fortes, and after robbing the temple of *Iupiter Dodonæus*, was ſlaine by the people of the country: ſo as we may inferre by theſe examples nothing els, but that common-weales doe participate with the qualitie and nature of all other creatures, in that firſt they haue their being, their progreſſion, their continuance, their perfection, and laſtly their declination; ſo as from their being they receive progreſſion, from progreſſion they receiue continuance, from continuance a perfection, from their perfection a declination: for his perfection is naught els, but his ripeneſſe which is gathered by continuance, by whoſe poyſe and weight, eftſoones it falleth to the ground and declineth. *Epi*: You well vnderſtande the matter. *Sol*: Then let vs make our progreſſion vnto the partes and members of every declination.

CAP. 3.

All declinations are in number two, the one ad ſanitatem, *the other* ad interitum.

EPI: All declinations are after two ſortes: the one, *ad ſanitatem*; the other, *ad interitum*; both which declinations did ſometimes appeare in the common-wealth of *Rome*: the one, whē as the Senate and people by cōtending for honours, gave occaſions of moſt happy lawes, and more happy reſtitution of the declined ſtate of that polliticke body. But after declining by peace, reſt, and ſecurity, vnto a corruption of manners, they never could give an ende vnto their contentions then raiſed for profitte and gaine, ſo as the ſame may be ſaid to be a final declination, not *ad ſanitatem*, but *ad interitum*.

CAP.

CAP. 4.

The severall occasions and causes of all declinations, and first of occasions malitiously suggested.

SOL: There remaineth nowe that we doe proceede vnto the occasions and causes of all declinations, which is the fifte matter remembred by you worthy of consideration. *Epi:* You have well put me in remembrance thereof. For as the declination of our natural bodies ariseth chiefely either from occasions, as rest, labour, heate, colde, hunger, thirst, superfluity, abundance, or from the malice or distemperature of the disease or sickenes it selfe: so the declination of this polliticke bodie groweth partely by occasions, and partely from the malice and corruption of the subiect, as from the vnnatural distemperature of that body. *Sol:* The truthe of your opinion neither wanteth proofe nor example: for in the declination of the common-weale of *Rome*, in the times and regiment of *Tarquine*, we may behold first a generall distemperature bred in the body of that cõmon-weale by his misgovernment, so as the people and Senatours did expect nothing more then a fitte occasion to execute the same. And if the deflowring of *Lucretia* had not happened, yet noe doubt this distemperature and malice of the subiect would have attended other occasions, as they should conveniently have offered themselves. But if this malice and distemperature had not proceeded with the occasion, or if the occasiõ had not accompanied this distemperature, no doubt *Brutus* and *Collatinus* would have desired the iust punishment of this offence, rather at the hands of *Tarquine*, then by the aide & helpe of the people. *Epi:* Therefore wisely saith one, *sine occasione frustra virtus, sine virtute frustra occasio sese obtulit.* For in vaine shall occasions profer themselves, where they finde not the malice of the subiect ready to rescue and assist them. And in vaine likewise shall the malice of the subiect swel and overflow his bounds, when all occasions shall be removed, which are in place of the feete and

legs that ſupport this diſtemperature. *So:* To diſcloſe therefore the chiefe & principal occaſions, which may further and nouriſh any way the diſtemperature of this polliticke body, ſeemeth a matter not vnworthy of deliberation. *Epi:* Nay it is a matter rather which ſhould poſſeſſe the higheſt thoughts of the minde & vnderſtāding of Princes and Emperours. *Sol:* Let vs proceede to enumber them if we may, and ſet them downe vnder the accompt of matters neceſſarie for the better ſuſtaining and vpholding of this polliticke body. *Ep:* Occaſions are vſually after two ſortes: either given; or malitiouſly ſought and ſuggeſted. *Sol:* You have ſaide the truth: for when *Darius* preferred *Daniell* above all the other rulers and governours, becauſe the ſpirit in him was excellent, they ſought an occaſion againſt *Daniell*, concerning the kingdome, but they coulde finde no fault, and therefore it is ſaide, we may finde no occaſion againſt *Daniell*, except we finde it againſt him concerning the lawe of God: whereupon the rulers craftely conſpired to go vnto the king, and after this maner to advance their malice they ſpake vnto him, king *Darius* live for ever: all the rulers of thy kingdome, the officers and governours, the counſellers and dukes have conſulted togither to make a decree for the king, and to eſtabliſh a ſtatute, that whoſoever ſhall aske a petition of any God or man for thirty daies ſave of thee O king, he ſhall be caſt into the denne of Lions. Nowe O king confirme the decree, and ſeale the writing that it be not chaunged according to the lawe of the *Medes* and *Perſians* which altereth not. This requeſt feeding the ambition of king *Darius*, was eſtſoones ſealed by him, & he made a law and decree. Then theſe men aſſembled and found *Daniell* praying and making ſupplication vnto his God. The which eſtſoones they embraced as a fit occaſion lente for the deſtroying of *Daniell*, and repayring to the king, ſaide vnto him after this manner, haſt thou not ſealed the decree that every man that ſhall make requeſt to any God or man within thirty daies ſave to thee O king ſhall be caſt into the denne of Lyons? the king anſwered and ſaide, the thing is true according to the lawe of the *Medes*, and *Perſians*, which altereth not. Then aunſwered they and ſaide vnto the king; this *Daniell* which is of the children of the

captiv-

captivity of *Iudah*, regardeth not thee O king, nor the decree that thou haſt ſealed, but maketh his petition three times a day. But vnderſtande O king, that the lawe of the *Medes* and *Perſians* is, that no decree or ſtatute which the king confirmeth, may be altered or broken. Then forthwith by the kings commandement, *Daniell* was caſt into the Lyons denne. This one example may ſuffice for occaſions malitiouſly ſuggeſted.

CAP. 5.

Of occaſions given by miſgovernement, and ſuch other meanes.

SOL: Let vs now proceed to enumber the occaſions given. *Epi:* Occaſion of declining is then given, when the nobility is not reſpected: for *Ceſar* by holding a light eſtimation of the Senanators and nobles, at ſuch time as they repayred to give vnto him honours, and by depriving and abuſing the Tribunes *Marullus* and *Flauius*, did give the firſt occaſion, ſaith *Plutarch*, of his fall & declining: & *Romulus* intreating the Senators and nobles of *Rome*, more ſeverely and rigorouſly then in former times they were accuſtomed, was for this cauſe by treaſon murthered. *Sol:* And no leſſe occaſion is then given of falling and declining, when either by the iniquity of times, or the proper induſtry of princes, the nobilitie is in ſo great meaſure advanced, as they become thereby dangerous & feareful vnto the ſtate: by the one occaſion *Salamina* hath often & ſundry times declined. *Epi:* What by the iniquitie of times? *Sol:* Yea verily: for vpon the diviſion of the houſe of *Lankaſter* & *Yorke*, iuſtice there declining, the nobility helde as it were a ſoveraigne commandement over the cōmonalty, they call their lands by the name of their cuntries, their tenants by the name of their followers and men, they give laws, and preſcribe vnto the people their manner of living, they oppreſſe where they diſlike, they reward whom they favour, they periſh whom they hate, and finally they make themſelves iudges and arbitrators of the goods, lands, life, liberty, and of all the fortunes of the ſubiect. The which overgreat power and commandement doth lively appeare in the act made for the taking awaye of the great authority of Captainſhip with all exactions: vvherein it is declared, that the Lordes of *Salamina* in the

Anno tricesimo decimo Edw. cap. 7. fol. 168.

time of iuſtice declination, vnder the pretence of defending the people of *Salamina*, & their own poſſeſſions, arrogated vnto themſelves abſolute and regale authority within large circuits; by the diſtributiō whereof each man had as much righte as force would give him leave, by meanes whereof they grew vnto ſuch greatneſſe as they acknowledged no ſuperiour, no obedience vnto the counſels of *Athens*; they holde for lawes there owne willes and deſires, by their proper authority they gather and aſſemble the people of the ſaide pretenced countries, rules, and Captaineſhips, to treat, conclude, and agree for making of warre, or peace, roades, iniuries, granting of ceaſes, benevolences, finding of men of warre, as horſemen, footemen, galloglaſſe, kearne, hasbutteres, horſes, horſeboyes, huntes, ſtudkeepers, officers, and adherentes: and more then this, theſe Nobles and Lordes did leade as Captaines, the people thus aſſembled vnto the accompliſhing of act and actes offenſive, and invaſive without ſpeciall authority. *Epi:* By theſe ſtatutes and recordes thus by you remembred, it ſeemeth that all the warres of *Salamina* did proceede from the greatneſſe of the Nobles and Lordes. *Sol:* So much the recorde it ſelfe doeth report, where as it it is ſaide, that their greatneſſe was ſuch, as they did acknowledge no ſuperiour, nor any obedience vnto *Athens*. It is ſaide alſo that the might and greatneſſe of *Iames* ſometimes Earle of *Deſmonde*, *Garralde Fitz Garralde*, Earle of *Kildare*, and *Thomas Fitz Garralde* his ſon, was the occaſion of many rebellions, as by the recordes of *Salamina* more at large it may appeare. *Epi:* It ſeemeth alſo by the recordes of *Salamina*, by you now remembred, that the Nobles & Lords by their greatnes did mightily oppreſſe the cōmonalty, inforcing thē to graunt ceaſes, benevolēces, finding of men at armes, as horſemen, footemen, galloglaſſe, kearne, halbutters, horſes, horſeboyes, huntes, ſtudkeepers, officers, and adherents. *Sol:* Yes verily: for by way of protection and defence the nobility did levie exactions intollerable, ſo as they were forced to eſtabliſh a law, that no man within the land of *Salamina* ſhall have any tribute, or exaction, or any other vnlawful impoſition of or vpon any ſubiect within the ſame lande. *Epi:* Herein they were provident of the preſervance and continuance of the eſtate of *Salamina*

Anno 11. Eliz. cap. 7. fol. 168.

Vid Attay. of the earle of Kildare. acts 28. H. 8. cap. 1.

lamina; for nothing giveth greater occasion of declining then the oppression of the cōmonalty. For the *Israelites* beeing mightily oppressed by the *Ægyptians*, vvere thereby inforced to follow *Moyses*, by whom they vvere restored vnto their libertie. The *Persians*, *Medorũ imperio infensi*, were thereby induced to follovve *Cyrus*. And the naturall citizens of *Rome*, being not defended from the oppression and furie of *Hanniball*, tooke occasion of revolting and rebelling. How displeasing oppressions be every where vnto the multitude, the same the people of *Salamina* have livelie vvitnessed, when as they tearmed sometimes the exactions of *Coney* and *Liverie*, imposed by the nobility and Lordes of that land, by the name of grievous exactions: nay vvith great *Emphasies* they tearme it the frette of our times, and substaunce: nay yet with greater indignation carryed against this manner of oppression, they tearme it by the name of that horrible and most detestable custome of *Coiney* and *Liverie*, yea they terme it to be the very nurse, and teate, that gave sucke and nutriment to all disobedience, rebellions, enormities, vices, and iniquities of that realme over fowle and filthie, here to be expressed, and such as did iustly provoke the wrath and vengeance of the almighty God vppon the people of that lande. The like oppression of the nobility over the meaner people, was sometimes the authour of many seditions in *Rome*, and provoked the people to demaunde Tribunes, which as arbitrators of the insolencie of the nobility, might give them iust defence from their oppression. And this stirreth the people sometimes the better, to make their deliveraunce from the oppression of the mighty, with the consent of the forrain enemy, even to the invading and destroying of the people & country.

CAP. 6.

The meanes to withstande all occasions of declining, growing vnto the common-wealth by the greatnesse of the nobilitie.

SOL: Sith this seemeth to be a matter of so great importance, to defende the multitude from the oppression of the mighty, it shall be convenient that we now proceede vnto the meanes whereby we may in such cases, as well abate the greatnes of the Lordes and Nobles, as also deliver the multitude from their oppressions and wrongs. *Epi:* The meanes are sundry. *Sol:* What be they? *Epi:* First we are to establish lawes, wherby as well the dignity of the Nobles, as the liberty of the people, may be preserved and defended, according to the example of all common-weales well governed. *Sol:* Herein *Salamina* is found inferiour to noe nation, especiallie for lawes, which respect the liberty and welfare of the people, the which is the matter nowe in deliberation. *Epi:* What be they? *Sol:* The lawes against *Coiney* and *Livery*, the lavves against Captainship, the lawes against taking of pledges contrarie to the common law, with many other lawes prohibiting vnlawfull customes and exactions; so as it seemeth that good lawes are not sufficient to render a common-weale, happie and prosperous. *Epi:* Noe surely, no more then a medicine well prepared may cure the diseases of the body, if the same be not rightly applied: it resteth therefore, that governoures provinciall, doe diligently intend the observation of these lawes, in such sort, as they be inviolable, whereby in a short time they shall confirme the mindes of the multitude, and render them secure, quiet, and contented. *Sol:* This which you haue saide, by sundry actes and recordes, nowe extant for *Salamina*, maie appeare: for there it is saide, that the people

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were not onlie drawne from rebellions and vnlawfull attempts, by the extirpation of this exaction of *Coiney* and *Livery*, but they were ſometimes by the due exaction of that lawe, ſtronglie induced to affect and imbrace iuſtice and peace, ſo as al commaundementes by waie of iuſtice are there obeied. Naie that vvhich is more, in place of curſing and rebellions, there is founde ioie, iolitie, and bleſsing of that goddeſſe *Minerva*, the protectour and defendour of *Athens*, by whoſe providence ſo great an evill was remooved. So as we maie conclude, that nothing doeth ſo much induce a nation or people, be they naturall ſubiects or gained by conqueſt, to imbrace that governement which is preſcribed vnto them by thoſe which have rule, power, & authority over them, there is nothing (I ſay) ſo availeable to render thē loyall ſubiectes, & willing embracers of governement, as a iuſt defence given by due execution of profitable lawes from all oppreſsions and wronges. *Epi*: You have ſaide the trueth: for a nation conquered deſire their former libertie, for no other cauſe ſo greatly, as thereby to poſſeſſe that which is their owne freelie and ſecurelie; ſo as enioying the ſame, they have attained the ende of their deſires, and reſt for the moſt parte contented with the governement. But on the contrarie, with the oppreſsion of the mighty, the thoughtes and deſires of their former libertie are daily kindled, in ſuch ſorte, as they ſticke not to practiſe with forraine enemies the reſtitution thereof. It is neceſſary therefore in ſuch countries, that the lawes for the defence of the multitude againſt oppreſsions bee holden inviolable, in ſuch ſort as everie one maie confidentlie ſaie with the governoures of *Darius*, it is the lawe of the *Medes* and *Perſians* which maie not be broken. *Sol*: But ſome provinciall governoures of *Salamina*, have beene founde more ſtudious with *Savanorola* in making of profitable lawes, then faithfull obſervers thereof, whereby the whole countrie of *Salamina* hath vvell neare periſhed: but I could vviſh, that with *Savanorola* at the leaſt they might looſe their honour and eſtimation amongeſt the *Florentines*: for much evill ariſeth vnto *Salamina*, not onelie from the malice of the people, but by the negligence of Magiſtrates, in that they holde not their lawes inviolable; for the vvhich cauſes they maye

never confirme the mindes of the multitude vnto the ſtate, nor render them quiet, and contented. But what other meanes is now left vnto vs to deliver the multitude from oppreſsion? *Epi:* Commiſſioners in every of the ſeveral Provinces are to be conſtituted, which as iudges ſhall reſtraine and ſuppreſſe the ambition of the nobles, and ſhall carefully defende the people from oppreſſors. Therefore wiſely the king of *Fraunce* hath conſtituted a iudge or arbitrator, which as a third perſon *ſine regis invidia proceres cæderet, & tenuiores tueretur. Nihil melius, nihil ſapientius hoc decreto eſſe potuit: nec regnant ipſius regis potior ſecuritatis cauſa. Sol.* But what number of iudges may ſuffice herein? *Epi:* You ſay well: for if one iudge bee ordained, the mighty and great perſonages ſhall more eaſily corrupt him, then manie. Therefore the *Florentines* having entertained but one iudge for the ſuppreſsing of the ambition of the nobility, whom they called *Capitaneũ*, ſeeing him ſeduced by the nobilitie, in his place conſtituted eight iudges or Commiſsioners. *Sol:* But in this ſecond inſtitution, they founde leſſe ſecurity then in the firſt: for vvhere a fewe are placed for the rule and governement, there they be founde commonly miniſters and pleaſers of the nobility, and contemners of the people; the which the *Venetians* wiſely foreſeeing, have not onely ordained their *Decemviri*, but alſo other magiſtrates, *quos Quarantos vocant*, & further for the ſame onely they have conſtituted *Concilium Præium qui ſummus eſt magiſtratus*, to this ende, that neither iudges nor accuſers ſhould be wanting for the ſuppreſſing of the ambition of the nobilitie. *Epi:* As you have ſaide, this muſt needes be the beſt forme of governement that may poſsibly be ordained in ſuch caſes; for many iudges are not ſo eaſily corrupted as one: againe many are founde to be of greater ſtrength and integritie to reſiſt the diſpleaſure of the nobilitie then fewe; and like as many eies diſcerne more perfectly then one, and that which eſcapeth or deceiveth one eie, maie be perceived and that without errour by many; ſo many wits iudge more ſoundly and ſincerely then one. Laſtly, wee all obey more willingly the cenſures of many, then the iudgements of a fewe, or one perſon whatſoever. *Sol:* But vvhither are we in ſuch caſes more to endevour the favour of the nobility

bility or the multitude? *Epi:* It is saide that a Monarchie governed popularlie is then secure and voide of perill: for in the multitude or people consisteth the strength and force of every kingdome; the vvhich *Nabid* king of the *Lacedæmonians* well vnderstanding, endevoured wholie the love and favoure of the people, so as with his proper forces hee was able to vvithstande and resist his enemies, vvithout the aide of forraine princes. And *Appius Claudius* on the contrarie, neglecting the favoure of the people, did vvholy cleave to the nobilitie, and lost thereby the principalitie and commaundement vvhich then hee had obtayned. *Solo:* It must be confessed that in common-weales gained by conquest, you shall advance your governement more assuredly by the favoure of the people, then by the might of the nobilitie; for nature it selfe by an inforcing necessitie hath taught the weaker part to adheare vnto that which is the strongest; and for this cause the people diverse vvaies oppressed by the ambition of the mighty, are forced thereby to hasten and runne vnto their conquerour, as vnto a large palme tree, to bee defended from the stormes and violence of the mighty, so as delivering them from oppressions, they vvillingly yeelde their obedience; but of the contrarie the nobilitie are not so readily wonne nor so easily kept. Therefore the *Romaines* in all countries by them conquered, did labour nothing more then to humble and deiect the mightie, & to protect and defend the feeble & weake, and deliver the people from oppresions. The like order of governement did the *Græcians* observe, especially in provinces by them conquered, which differed in language and maner of living: for there the people, if they be not carefully defended from the oppresions of the mighty, by these outward differences as signes and badges of their former liberty, doe hasten for the restitution thereof vnto all rebellions, and doe provoke some forraine enemy to invade. Farther in common-weales where generally the manners of the people are found corrupted, there dangerous it is to advance the Lords & chieftaines, as it may appeare by the statuts & records of *Salamina*: for there it is declared that the Lords and chieftaines of that land, in the times of iustice declinatió, by pretext of defen-

Anno: 11. Eliz. cap. 7. fol. 168.

defending the people and their owne poſſeſsions, arrogated vnto themſelves abſolute and roiall authority within large circuites, by meanes wherof they grew vnto ſuch greatnes, as they acknowledged no ſuperior, nor obedience vnto *Athens*, they held for laws their owne willes and deſires, and finallie they aſſembled and led the people vnto the accompliſhing of all actes offenſive and invaſive, without ſpeciall authority, as before we have at large diſcourſed. Therefore in *Salamina*, and in other common-weales gained by conqueſt, where the manners of the people remaine corrupted, we are to give impediment (ſaith a learned authour) vnto all the meanes wherby the nobles may raiſe themſelves vnto ſuch greatneſſe, as thereby they may become fearefull vnto the common-weale, and providently ſhall we favour and deliver the people in ſuch eſtates from oppreſſion. *Ep:* For this cauſe wiſely have the councel of *Salamina* ſuppreſſed and cut of al exactions and tributes, by a firme and ſtable law before remembred, as the meanes, whereby the nobles and cheifetaines did raiſe themſelves vnto ſuch greatneſſe, as they became daungerous vnto the common-weale. And to the ſame purpoſe have they made another ſtatute, wherby it is ordained and enacted, that no Lorde nor gentleman of the ſaid land, retaine by liverie, wages, or promiſe, ſigne or token, by indenture or otherwiſe, any perſon or perſons, but onely ſuch, as be or ſhalbe his officers, as baylifes, ſtewardes, learned counſels, receivers, and meniall ſervantes, daily in houſeholde, at the ſaide Lordes proper coſtes and charges entertained. Thus if wiſely we give impediment vnto the meanes which raiſe the chiefetaines and nobles of *Salamina* vnto this greatnes; if with *Pompey* we ſhall impeach the forces of *Caſar* by calling awaie two legions or regimentes; if with *Pompey* we ſhal withdrawe from *Caſar*, *Labienus*, and other his friendes and commaunders; if we ſhall cut off all exactions, and tributes, which *Caſar* leavieth vppon the people; if we ſhall cut off all that infinite number of retainers, followers, and men which followe *Caſar* more then his menial houſholde according to the ſtatute of retainers; if we ſhall ſuppreſſe all vnlawfull authorities of Captainſhip and ſuch like, which *Caſar* chalengeth over the meaner people; if the great and large countries

Aſt Anno. B. 7. po. cap. 6.

tries which *Cæſar* poſſeſſeth, we ſhall part and diſmember by drawing in the cuſtome of Gavelkinde, by the which pollicie, *Wales* was ſometimes reformed, and brought in ſubiection; then *Cæſar* ſhall be no more able to rebell, and we ſhall rightly manage the ſtate of *Salamina*. *Sol:* Doe you thinke, that the ſtatute againſt *Coiney* and *Lyvery*, is a ſufficient barre againſt the Lordes and cheiftaines that they raiſe not themſelves vnto their former greatneſſe? *Epi:* No verily: for nowe they chalenge thoſe exactions as lawfull ſervices and reſervations by the way of tenier heretofore reſerved by their aūceſtors, & predeceſſors, & by theſe meanes holde the ſubiect in ſervage, or otherwiſe they drive them to particular ſhiftes, vvhich are tedious, infinite, and troubleſome to the ſtate, and the vtter vndoing of the ſubiect; all which may well be appeaſed by way of compoſition betwixt the Lordes and tenantes: and the better to enable vs to make an equall compoſition herein, we are to vnderſtande that theſe demaundes are of three ſortes, and kindes: The one received his beginning by vnlawfull meanes, namely by force and by violence, theſe are commonly called by the names of blacke rentes; ſuch were the exactions which the *Obrians* ſometimes levied vpon the inhabitaunce of the countrie of *Limbricke*. Other demaundes there be, which did growe by way of giving protection and defence, from ſuch as founde themſelves oppreſſed with the power and might of others; ſuch exactions ſometimes have beene yeelded by the inhabitants of the ſmall countrie of *Limbricke*, vnto the aunceſtors of the nowe Earle of *Kildare*, and ſuch did *Mac Morris* ſometimes yeelde vnto the late Earle of *Deſmond* attainted. Laſtly, other demaundes there be vvhich did growe by the way of tenier; theſe may eaſily bee diſcerned from the others, in that they be due vnto the Lorde onely, from the handes of his proper tenantes or freehoulders, and the ſame commonly ſhall appeare to be ſo by vvriting or indenture. *Sol:* You have vvell diſcloſed the meanes whereby the greatneſſe of the nobility and chiefetaines may be abated, and the people defended from the oppreſſion of the mighty, in times peaceable, wherein lawe and iuſtice doeth prevaile. It ſeemeth alſo that it is a matter of like neceſſitie that the good ſubiect bee defended

from the oppreſsion of the enemie or rebell: for the naturall ſubiectes of *Rome*, revolted vnto *Hannibal*, when as they found themſelves not defended from his oppreſſion. *Epi:* We muſt with *Fabius* providently from time to time ſende aide ſufficient to ſuch as are our ſubiectes and friendes, vvhereby we ſhall ſtill holde and keepe them in obedience and ſubiection. *Sol:* If this courſe had generally beene holden by ſome governours of *Salamina*, the rebellions had neither beene great, neither yet of long continuaunce; therefore wiſely it is ſaide, *Qui non defendit nec obſiſtit ſi poteſt iniuriæ, tam eſt in vitio, quam ſi parentes aut patriam aut ſocios deſerat*: and after this manner ſpeaketh a chriſtian Doctor, ſaying, *Fortitudo qua per bella tuetur â Barbaris patriam, vel defendit infirmos, vel â latronibus ſocios, plena iuſticia eſt*. By which courſe of governement, the *Romanes* almoſt conquered the vvhole vvorlde, as *Cicero* witneſſeth ſaying, *Noſter populus, ſocijs defendendis terrarum iam omnium potitus eſt*. *Epi:* It ſeemeth alſo to bee a matter of like neceſsity, that the governours of *Salamina* doe vvith all care and indevour confirme the mindes of the ſubiectes by having a due regarde of their merites and ſervices towardes the ſtate, leaſt otherwiſe when no eſtimation is had of their merites and publique ſervices, they take occaſion thereby of diſcontentment. For the ſlender care & eſtimation the *French* ſometimes helde of the publicke merites of ſuch as had well deſerved, gave the firſt occaſion of their expelling out of *Italy*; for ſo much doe their Cronicles and hiſtories witneſſe, where it is ſaide, that the nobility were not imbraced vvith that humanity they looked for, and much leſſe had recompenſes equall to their merites, yea they found manie difficulties to enter into the chambers and audience of the king. There was no diſtinction of perſons, the merites and ſervices of men vvere not conſidered, but at adventure, the mindes of ſuch as were naturally eſtraunged from the houſe of *Arragon*, vvere not confirmed, many delaies and difficulties were ſuborned touching the reſtitution of the landes and goods of thoſe that vvere of the faction of *Anion*, and of the other Barrons that had beene baniſhed by the olde *Ferdinando*. And laſtly favoures and graces were imparted to ſuch as procured them

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by corruption and meanes extraordinary, & not to such as had deserved the same. Wisely therefore shall the governoures of *Salamina* confirme the mindes of such as are estranged from the house of *Arragon*, and countenaunce such as were banished by *Ferdinando*, and lastlie if they shall imparte favoures and graces to such as have deserved the same, according to the advise of *Plinie*, which saith, *Tu largiere bellorum socijs, periculorum consortibus.*

CAP. 7.

The occasions of declining, which vsually arise vnto the state by the disorders and oppression of the souldier.

EPI: Noe lesse occasion is offered of declining, when by the oppression of the souldier, the people remaine discontented. *Sol:* You saie truely: for the disorder and violence of the souldiers draweth with it a suspition of perpetual servitude, which caused the *Italians* to abandon the power of the *French*, for that they committed many disorders, and offered violence vnto the people; so as that loue, that desire, that affection, wherewith they honoured them before, had now taken contrary qualitie, and not only turned into hatred, conspiracie, and accursings against them, but also in the place of the malice they bare to the *Arragons*, there was new infinuation of compassion to *Ferdinando*, in such sorte, as all the kingdome vvith no lesse desire expected an opportunity, to repeale the *Arragons*, then a fevve monethes before they had desired their destruction. *Sol:* The same historie doeth witnesse the like in sundry other places, saying, that garrisons governed vvith a desire to spoile, and pray, be the authoures of great discontentment: yet some there be carried with a contrary opinion, which give liberty vnto the souldiers to oppresse and spoile the people, following the counsell of *Severus Imperator*, which sometimes he gave vnto his children, saying, *Inter vos consentite, milites vitate, reliquos omnes spernite.* *Epi:* This counsell of *Severus Imperator*, no Prince maie safelie put in practise, but

ſuch as have a collected power and force into the ſtrength of one entire armie, vvhich ſhall farre exceede the force and ſtrength of the people: as the *Sulthan*, the *Turke*, and ſuch like kingdomes, which hath of footemen, twelue thouſande in number, and ſixteene of horſemen, for the garde of his perſon. Theſe kingdomes and ſuch like, ſhall more wiſely favour and enrich, rather the ſouldier, then the people. But ſuch Princes which have not a collected power, and force, and ſuch as doeth farre exceede the ſtrength and power of the people, are no farther to ſatisfie the ſouldiour then iuſtice, his deſertes, and the lawes of the lande ſhall require. Therefore *Carolus* paſsing manie countries, where the forces of his ſouldiers were inferiour to the people, did ſtreightly commaunde, that they ſhoulde abſtaine from committing of vvronges and iniuries. *Sol:* This vvhich you have ſaide agreeth vvith reaſon, but ſometimes not vvith the neceſſity of times, vvhich vvas never yet ſubiect to humane diſcretion. *Epi:* It muſt be confeſſed, that the times of warres, and peace are not all one, but yet as vvell in the times of vvarres, as alſo in times peaceable, we ought to ſhew our ſelves ſtudious in delivering the people from oppreſsion: For vvhat hope may we have of thoſe cities, *vbi emitus in cives graviùs quam in hoſtes graſſantur.*

CAP. 8.

The readie waies and meanes to reſiſt all occaſions of deeming, which maie ariſe by the oppreſſion of the Souldiers.

SOL: Then we ſhall readily performe the ſame, if we ſhall remove the occaſions which are in number two: namely the want of pay; and want of other diſcipline; for if the ſouldier vvere well paied, and offending by martiall diſcipline well puniſhed, all diſorders by theſe meanes would be eaſily reformed. *Epi:* You ſaie well: payment ought firſt to be made, and then diſcipline exerciſed, for *diſciplinam, inquit Caſsiodorus, ſervare non poteſt iejunus exercitus, dum quod deeſt ſemper præſumat armatus.*

Sol:

Sol: But ought this payment to be made at the charge of the Prince, or of the ſubiects. *Epi:* At the common charge of the ſubiects: becauſe it is a common ſafegard [redacted] benefite which equally redoundeth to all. *Sol:* You ſay well: for garriſons are placed for naught elſe, but to garde the good ſubiect from the ſodain invaſion or oppreſſion of the enemy or rebell, and if they ought to defray the charge, that reape the benefite, then every ſubiect ſhoulde make equall contribution herein. *Epi:* Wee doe agree herein, that payment ought to be made at the common charge of the ſubiect, but convenient it were that this charge were drawne to a contribution certaine; for where the contributions are altogither vncertaine by the waie of ceaſe, or otherwiſe, there the people are vſuallie oppreſſed, and the Prince vvearied with complaints, or the ſame reiecting, the people, take occaſion thereby to mutinie and rebell. Therefore wiſely *Henricus ſecundus rex Francorum noſtra aetate tributum imperarat*, Anno. 1549. *Quod vulgus talionum appellavit, teſtatus ſe id militum ſtipendio daturum, ne cum caeteris vectigalibus conturbaretur, vt plebs ab iniurijs ac direptionibus militum tuta eſſet.* At an other time, payment was made by certaine citties for the maintenaunce of tenne legions, *vt ab incenſionibus ac direptionibus militum tutae eſſent.* In like manner the counſel of *Athens* by receiving a compoſition certaine from the handes of the ſubiect, in liew of ceaſe and duties vncertaine, have thereby mightily quieted and pacified the ſubiect, augmented the publike treaſury, and advaunced and reformed that governement. *Epi:* Shew vs I pray you the order and manner of the compoſition. *Sol:* The firſt compoſition taken for the weſt partes, was framed after this maner, as it may appeare by this preſident vvhich I doe here deliver vnto you:

By the Lorde Prefident and
Counſell of Mounſter.

Whereas *Iohn Mac Conogher* of *Corbally*, in the County of *Waterforde* gentleman, complained vnto vs, that he holding and occupying two plough landes in *Corbally* aforeſaide, the ſame being

charged with ceaſe, and other impoſitions vncertaine, he deſired to yeeld a yearely rent out of the ſame to her Maieſtie, in reſpect of the ſaide ceaſe and other [redacted] charges, to the maintenance of the houſhold of the Preſidencie, or otherwiſe that by occaſion may be impoſed vppon the ſaide County; and therefore hath graunted and compounded for him and his heires, to pay to her Maieſties vſe, yearelie out of the ſaide two plough landes, the ſumme of fortie ſhillings ſterling; which being by vs on hir Maieſties part and behalfe accepted, We will and require you, and every of you, from hence forth in no wiſe to charge and impoſe or ſuffer to be charged, or impoſed, the ſaide landes, or any part thereof, with any her Maieſties ceaſe of horſemen, horſe boyes, kearne, galloglaſſe, biefe, mutton, porke, corne, ſubſidie, or any other charge or proviſion whatſoever, tending or belonging to her Maieſties ſervice by waie of ceaſe to be demaunded or challenged: In witneſſe whereof, I the ſaid *Iohn* have to this parte of the Indenture remaining with the ſaide Lorde Preſident ſet to my hand and ſeale, the xxvi of *October*, 1577. *Epi:* I finde ſundry matters obſerved in the making of this compoſition worthy to be commended. Firſt for that the ſame was effected with the conſentes of the ſubiectes, and not forced and commaunded, as ſometimes the *Iſraelites* were by *Samuel*, which in his oration vnto the people, ſaide, *Regem habituri eſtis, qui decimas fructuum vobis imperaturus eſt:* neither here are they preſſed by the authority of any duke of *Albane*, to render the tenth part of all things vendable, *Vnde porro Belgarum ab Hiſpanis rebellantium orta ſeditio. Sol:* I hold reaſonable tributes to be a matter of ſo great importaunce and neceſsity, as Princes may lawfully commande and exact the ſame at the hands of the ſubiect, and therefore ſaith one, *Quid enim reſtaret, quo princeps imperium tueri poſsit, ſublatis portorijs ac tributis?* And therefore when *Nero* offered to acquite and deliver the ſubiect of all tributes and impoſitions, wiſely the Senate after thankes rendred vnto *Nero*, diſſwaded the fact, *Ne Reſpub: ære diruta, momento collaberetur*; ſaying, though many ſeditious perſons deſirous of innovatiō have promiſed the people immunitie of all tributes and impoſitions, yet to graunt the ſame it were altogither vnlaweſull; and if

it

it were lawful, yet ought you not to do the same for the safety of the common-weale, *Cum conclusi firmamento Resp: nitatur*. *Epi:* Be it so, that they may commaunde a matter so necessary for the sustaining and vpholding of the common-weale; yet for the avoiding of sedition, and the discontentment of the people, their consentes are required, the time also is to bee regarded, the nature of the common-weale is to be respected, and lastly the imployment of those tributes ought to be vnto publike vses. For Princes in the beginning of their governement are not to impose tributes, fearing least the ten tribes for this cause shall rebell, and that a new king be chosen in the place of *Roboham*. But at such times they shal more wisely with the Frēch King being newly possessed of the *Duchey* of *Millaine*, acquite & discharge the people of al tributes, which did mightilie as then advance his conqueſt. Againe, the nature and condition of the common-wealth is a matter no lesse worthy of consideration, then the time: for if the common-weale hath beene from time to time a free estate and not subiect to others, as sometime the *Romaines* were, to such estates all manner of tributes are grievous, and therefore not to be exacted, but vppon vrgent causes, the which ceasing, the people ought to be delivered from tributes. But the people of *Florence* on the contrary, having alwaies lived in servitude, and as tributaries to others, admitte vvillinglye all sortes of impositions and tributes from time to time imposed vppon them by their duke: and for this cause *Salamina* long ere this might have beene made profitable vnto *Athens*, for that they have alwaies lived in servitude, and subiect to all impositions and tributes, and many exactions have beene reared there by force and violence, to the maintenaunce of idle and evill disposed persons, the which being converted to private vses and not to publike services, have little profited the Citie of *Athens*; all which the recordes and statutes of *Salamina*, doe mahy waies witnesse, and especiallie the statutes against *Coine* and *Liverie*: and therefore the last matter which is the imployment of tributes to publike vses, is not the least vvherein vvee are to have diverse regardes: first, care is to bee had of the Prince and his family; secondarilie of the stipen-

dary ſouldiers, the vvhich two matters are chiefely reſpected and regarded in the compoſition before remembred; thirdly of magiſtrates, which for want of their pay and ſtipend, doe more egerly ſometimes then the ſouldiers rob and devour the people; fourthlie of ſuch as have well deſerved of the common-weale. Finallie care is to be had of the poorer ſubiects, leaſt by want, and extreame povertie, they become movers of ſedition. *Epi:* The charge being thus defrayed, to the ende exact paiment may be made, it were convenient that the ſouldiers vvere payed by the poule; for if paiment be made as now vnto the Captaines, the ſouldier receiving not the ſame in due time, dareth not complaine againſt him, but is driven to ſeek his maintenance by oppreſſing of the people. Thus oftentimes the ſouldier is founde to hate his captaine which faileth to make paiment, and the captaine diſliketh the ſouldier, becauſe he faileth in order and government, ſo as by this private malice, impediment is given oftentimes vnto publike ſervices. The which miſchiefe hath reigned long in *Salamina*. *Sol:* Doctor *Smithe* that learned and skilfull writer hath diſcourſed hereof at large in his militarie workes, and therefore we vvill proceede vnto the other occaſion of all the diſorders in the men of garriſon, which is the want of militarie diſcipline; for having neither a iudge nor court martiall orderly kept for the due triall and puniſhment of offendours, the ſouldier for the moſt part receiveth no puniſhment for his offences, or being puniſhed in courtes civill, they may well complaine of their manner of triall by the native borne people of the countrie. *Epi:* It is prohibited in all countries well governed to the men of garriſon, to holde any affinitie, conſanguinitie, contract, or bargaines, with the native borne people of the countrie, fearing leaſt by this entercourſe of friendſhippe, the garriſons may be at the laſt corrupted: but greater occaſion of corruption is there given in *Salamina*, vvhere not onely theſe diſorders are admitted by the negligence of Magiſtrates there placed, but that vvhich is more, the native borne people are made tryers of the life and fortunes of the men in garriſon: and may they boldlie proſecute in times of warres ſuch as be enemies to the ſtate, whome in times of peace they maie not the feare as malicious tryers

of their goods, life, and fortunes whatsoever. Therefore most necessarie it is, that a court martiall be established and orderly kept, as you haue said, thoroughout the whole province of *Salamina*, for the reforming of disorders and mischiefes before recited.

CAP. 9.

Occasions of declining are then given, when Magistrates placed for reformation of any Countrie or province, are not supported and countenanced during the time of their gouernement.

SOL: There remaine yet other occasions of the declining of common-weales, worthy of remembraunce. *Epi:* What maie the same be? *Sol:* If Princes, Kings, and States, shall not publikely grace, countenaunce, and support all gouernoures and Magistrates by them placed for reformation of any province or nation during the time of their gouernement, the subiects shal take thereby occasion of rebelling. For the *Gaules* vnderstanding that *Rome* did conspire to disgrace *Cæsar*, raised themselves forthwith in armes vnder the leading of *Ambiorix*, and *Vercingentorix*, in such sort, as if they had not to hastily proceeded therein, they had put all *Italie* in as great feare and daunger, as it was sometimes when the *Cimbri* came to invade their cittie. *Epi:* Wee neede not search forraine examples herein: for *Salamina* by this errour committed was for many yeares vexed with the rebellions of the *Burkes* and the *Ormkes*, vntil that famous knight Sir *B. Bingham* by his singuler art and skill in military discipline, as an other *Cæsar*, suppressed at the last *Vercingentorix*, and the rebelling *Gaules*. *Sol:* What gouernoures were there, that were found so vnskilful in their charge? *Epi:* A late deputie of *Salamina*, whose name here I passe over with silence, for that I may not say, *honoris causa nomino*. But O you gouernoures, Princes, Kings, and Emperours, what-

whatsoever, countenaunce all inferiour governoures and magistrates placed for the reformation of any nation or province: countenaunce *Pericles*, which beholdeth alwaies the *Amazon* holding his dart with a hande stretched forth even in his face, with whome as with a deadly enemy hee must alwaies be fighting: countenaunce *Camillus*, which now is placed to reforme and suppresse the mutinous citizens, wherein if he fortune to be inferiour for want of your countenaunce and assistaunce, he shall be suppressed, condemned, and banished, or at the least hee must of force surrender his office of Dictator. Countenance *Pericles*, for otherwise he shall be as one that hath committed incest, he shal be a coward, the author of warres, yea of the plague, and of whatsoever else, which maie draw with it the hatred of all the citizens of *Athens*. Countenance *Camillus*, for there shall be a *Lucius Apulius*, which malitiously shall accuse him for stealing part of the spoile of the *Tuscans*: Lastly countenaunce this Magistrate placed for reformation; for with *David*, he is placed to fight with a beare after a lion, with a Giant after a beare, with a King after a Giant, and with the *Philistians* after a King. They must fight with infamie after envye, with accusations after infamy, with condemnation after accusations, with iudgement after condemnation, with imprisonment after iudgement, with banishment after imprisonment, for *Simul iste mundi conditor posuit Deus, odium atque regnum*. But if you shall not countenance them, the *Gaules* shall rebell against *Cæsar*, the citizens shall mutinie, but *Camillus* shall not be of force to suppresse them; yea this action of reformation shal fall to the ground, and the common-weale it selfe may not long continue.

CAP.

CAP. 10.

Occasions of declining, which arise vnto the common-weale sometimes, by secluding a nation conquered, from bearing of offices, and dignities.

SOL: Let vs proceede vnto other occasions of declining of estates and common-weales, which arise oftentimes by secluding a nation or people conquered from bearing of offices or dignity in the common-weale: for they remaine possessed with a desire to be restored vnto their former liberty, for this cause especially, *Vt ipsis dominari, & publicis muneribus præfici liceat*. Ep: And one the other side, no lesse occasion is given of declining, if you shall advaunce them vnto the offices, and dignities of the common-weale. For did not *Salamina* decline sometimes by constituting *Garralde Fitz Garralde* attainted, Lievetenant of *Salamina*? did they not at other times decline by constituting *Thomas Fitz Garralde* sometimes Lievetenaunt of the severall provinces thereof? and at other times, by giving authority into the hands of *Iames* of *Desmonde*? all which, to them which shall viewe the severall recordes of their attainder, more at large may appeare. For the like causes, *Nec Achæorum merita in Romanos, vel Ætolorum vniquam effecerunt, vt aliqua sibi imperij fieret accessio; nec Antiochi potentia fuerunt inducti, vt suo ipsorum consensu aliquam in ea provincia potestatem haberet*. If the *Lacedæmonians* in their petition exhibited to the counsel of *Amphictyons*, held it convenient and necessarie, that the townes and Cities of *Greece*, which were not of the league with the *Gracians*, against the barbarous people, should be removed from the place of a councellour; then much more, those which are not onely, not parties with the *Gracians*, but of league with the barbarous people, yea their feeed and sworne servantes, are to be dismissed by the counsell of *Amphictyons*; for to such we shall more safely give offices of profite, then of commaunde-

ment, whereby the multitude shall rest pleased, and the state acquitted of peril and daunger: and if we shall give any higher places to anie then those of profite and gaine, let vs then carefullie with *Antipater* make choise of such *Athenians*, as shall not be studious of any innovation.

CAP. 11.

Occasions of declination, which arise sometimes by the difference of lawes, religion, habite, and language.

SOL: You have well discussed this matter: therefore let vs proceede vnto other occasions, amongst which I may finde none that doth more containe, and holde the subiect of *Salamina*, in their disobedience and savage life, then the difference of lawes, religion, habite, and language, which by theeie deceiveth the multitude, and persuadeth them that they bee of sundry sortes, nations, and countries, when they be wholy togither but one body, as the same more at large appeareth by the statutes and records of *Salamina*, in the which a manifest proofe is alleadged of that which I have saide; for there it is affirmed, that those partes of *Salamina*, which embrace an vniformity of lawes, religion, habite, and language, vvith the Cittie of *Athens*, are founde by daily experience, much more loyall, civill, and obedient, then all the other partes of *Salamina*, which are not as yet reduced vnto so good an vniformity: for the which causes as wel the counsell of *Athens*, as of *Salamina*, have established certaine lawes for the vniformity of religion, lawes, habite, and language, and therby have charged the subiects and governours of *Salamina* vpon their dueties of allegeaunce, to holde throughout all the partes thereof, one vniformity. *Epi*: The Citties and townes which the *Romaines* did not destroy, were permitted as free subiectes to live, and to enioy their owne lawes: and it is saide, that the king of

Act.28.H. 8.cap.16.

Act.28.H. 8.cap.16.

Fraunce

Fraunce beeing taught by experience, that it was the moſt ready way to win the affections of the people, to permit them as free ſubiectes to live, and enioy their owne lawes, did revoke & call home his deputy from the governement of the Cittie of *Genuenſes*, and permitted them to make choiſe of their owne governour. *Sol:* Theſe obiections which you have made, doe receive ſeverall anſweres: and as for the *Romaines*, they helde that courſe and order of governement by you remembred, vntill their power did extende beyonde the confines of *Italy*, but then they gave Prætors, and provinciall governours vnto their Citties. Againe, their lenitie by you remembred, did as much aduãce their ambitious thoughtes in conquering, as ſometimes their knowledge in militarie diſcipline, ſo as it may be commended for a ready way to conquere, but not as a ſafe waie to holde and keepe. And as for the *French*, we may not ſafely followe their ſteppes as guides herein, for that they are deemed of all nations valiant conquerours, but not provident defenders and keepers thereof, ſo as vnto them we may rightlie ſay, *Vincere ſcis Hannibal, ſed victoria neſcis.*

CAP. 12.

The ready weyes and meanes to remoove all occaſions of declining.

BVT now let vs cloſe vppe this long diſcourſe with one pollicy vſed by the *Romaines*, which being rightly applyed maie remoove all occaſions of declining: for after they had ſubiected *Macedony* vnto their rule and governement, for the better preventing of all occaſions of rebelling, they deuided the kingdome into fower provinces, with a capitall puniſhment to be impoſed vppon ſuch, as ſhould wander and travell from province to province, or ſhould chaunge their habitation, or contract affinities, or vſe marchandiſe with thoſe of other provinces, by which courſe of govetnement, they did eſſoones remove all occaſions of declining and rebelling: for traytours and rebels having once incur-

red the penalty of lawes, may finde no safety but in wandering from province to province; their broken and decayed forces may not be repayred, but by contracting of affinities with such of other provinces, which they finde to be of strength and force; and sometimes vnder the coulour of merchandise, they transporte letters, importing and nourishing thereby a generall combination; by which meanes *Shane Oneile* attainted, sometimes laboured the corruption of all the West partes of *Salamina*, as in the statutes of his attainder it doth lively appeare: and by the like practises before remembred, did the late *Burkes* and *Orurkes* of *Conought* nourishe for a long time all their wicked rebellions. And therefore *Mummius Consul Achais victis, quo minus rebellarent, caetibus ac societatibus interdixit, Corunthum, qua duo maria brevi terrarum intervallo iungebat, disturbavit.*

CAP. 13.

The subiect and matter, as also the forme, from whence every distemperature of this politike bodie hath his being and subsisting.

SOL: But sith wee have discussed at large of the principall occasions of declining of estates and common-weales, and of the waies and meanes to suppresse the same, it remaineth that we intreat at large of the distemperature of this politicke body: for it behooveth princes not onely to foresee and prevent occasions of their declining, but also to knowe the nature of this distemperature, and howe it hath his subsisting and being, and by what meanes the same may be suppressed; for in vaine shall occasions offer themselves, where this distemperature is not kindled, or being kindled where it is suppressed. *Epi*: You have moved a matter of good importaunce, whereof the first is a distemperature of this politicke body, the which is nothing els but a declining

ninge from a iuſt proportion eyther in obeyinge or governing the ſubiecte. This diſtemperature with all other thinges hathe his beeinge and ſubſiſtinge from his proper matter and forme: the matter alſo hath his beeing, eyther from a generall corruption of maners in the people, as in the times wherein *Galba*, and *Pertinax* lived and raigned, who though moſt iuſt and vpright kings, were notwithſtading ſlaine by their ſubiects; or els it proceedeth from a corruption in the heade onely, the which ſometimes raigned in *Tarquine*; for if the people had then beene corrupted in maners, they could not have beene founde ſo conſtant defendors of their liberties, and ſo deſirous of reformation. The forme as in all other things, ſo vnto this diſtemperature as vnto his proper matter it giveth his ſubſiſting & being, the which forme if we ſhal deſcribe, it may be reſembled to a faire cloake giv̄e to cover foule practiſes, ſhaped out by a cunning workeman, whereby the people oftentimes remaine deluded, and the common-weale ſubverted; for ſo ambitious perſons deſirous of innovation. have alwaies proceeded vnder an honeſt cloake and ſhew, to diſtemper and diſquiet the common peace of the weale publike, and therefore it is truely ſaide, *Ambitio tam per virtutes quam per vitia nos oppugnat*. *Epi*: But heere we are to obſerve this caution, that if this forme hath not his proper matter vvhich is the corruption of manners in the people, vvherein it maie make a deepe impreſſion, the diſtemperature that groweth thereby, ſhall eaſilie be recovered: and for this cauſe the forme vvhich *Tarquine* gave to his ambition, was eaſilie defaced by *Brutus*, and *Valerius*, for that the manners of the people vvere not then corrupted. In like manner *Marcus Manlius*, and *Spurius Caſſius*, had ſet downe vnto themſelves a forme of diſturbing the peace of the common-weale, and for the advauncing of their owne ambition, but finding the manners of the people then vncorrupted, the matter wanting, into which, the forme which they before had framed, might be received, they both failed of their purpoſe. But otherwiſe it fareth vvith the common-vvealth, when this forme hath founde his proper matter and embraceth the ſame, namelie the corruption of manners in the people; for in ſuch a caſe there is kindled foorthvvith

ſo mighty a diſtemperature, as without great reſiſtaunce it maie not be quenched: and for this cauſe the forme of ambition vvhich ſometimes *Sylla*, *Marius*, and *Ceſar*, had framed vnto themſelves, meeting and concurring at once vvith the corruption of manners in the people as his proper matter, did aſſuredly advaunce their ambition, to the overthrow of that eſtate. Therefore moſt falſe is that poſition, vvhich affirmeth, that the people corrupted in manners, are more eaſily held in ſubiection, then a nation vncorrupted. The ſeconde caution to be obſerved, is the conſideration of the ſundry formes of diſturbing common-weales, vvhich vſually doth advaunce her ambition not after one ſelfeſame manner, but ſometimes vvith a ſhevv of profit, ſometimes vvith the ſhevv of magnanimitie, and at other times ſhee promiſeth an alteration and chaunge of thinges to the contentment of al. After this laſt manner ſhe preſented her ſelfe ſometimes vnto the *Athenians*, and therefore it is ſaide, that notwithſtanding the citizens of *Athens* obſerved and obeyed the lawes, which you *Solon* made for their reformation, yet they were found ſo corrupted in manners, partly by reaſon of their ſeverall factions, and partly by idleneſſe, vvherewith the citie of *Athens* was well neare deſtroyed, as they deſired nothing ſo much as a change and alteration of thinges, every man hoping thereby to be better then his adverſaries. Secondarily by a ſhevv of magnanimitie, the people of *Rome* were ſometimes induced ſo farre to imbrace the counſell of *Varro* for the reſiſting of *Hannibal*, as thereby they neare periſhed themſelves and the common-vveale. Finally, many are no leſſe bewitched with a gliſtering ſhew of profit and gaine, the which *Pericles* vvel vnderſtanding, did forthvvith devide the enemies landes gayned by conqueſt, among the people, and did appointe them rewardes for all thinges, and did make large diſtributions among them, whereby at the laſt he did withdravv their obedience from the counſell *Areopagite*, vnto his ſole rule and gouernement: in like manner *Philip* of *Macedonie* corrupted certaine tiraunts of the Ile of *Eubœa*, who with money in like ſort corrupted the people, vvhereby they became rebels and traitoures to their countrie; after the ſame manner he corrupted and

ſubdu-

ſubdued the moſt partes of *Greece*, but ſhall not now the infinite calamities and miſeries of the other partes of *Greece*: admoniſh vs not to be deceived with this forme of ambition vvhich *Philip* of *Macedonie* hath now framed to our vtter deſtruction? O you *Gracians*, let him not ſay as heretofore, with my treaſure I have corrupted and ſubdued the moſt parts of *Greece*, & have found there no fort ſo ſtrong, but that with an Aſſe laden with golde, I might enter the ſame, fearing in the ende hee make vs his Aſſes and Mules, to carrie his ſilver & golde and not to vſe the ſame, or rather ſlaves to be committed to perpetuall bondage: but let vs with the noble *Romaines*, refuſe the money of *Spurius Caſſius*, *Ne libertatem vendere eo pretio videamur*; let vs not give credit to his flattering orators the Ieſuits, which bribed by *Polycarphon* laboure the deſtruction of *Athens*; let vs not be infamous with the *Neapolitanes* for vnconſtancie; let vs not be led this day to affect the French, and to morrow with a new inſinuation of *Ferdinando*; for ſo it will be, when the yoke of the French ſhall once ſeeme heavie and vntollerable vnto our ſhoulders. In vaine then with the labourer of *Phrygia*, ſhal we digge the earth, and ſearching ſay, we ſeeke for *Antigonus*; for ſuch as governe, doe rule as tyrauntes and oppreſſors over vs: in vaine with the vvorthy woman of *Megara*, ſhal we take vp the bones of *Phocion* in the night, & give vnto them the honorable ceremonies of burial, for the affaires of the *Athenians* may not proſper, becauſe *Phocion* is dead; in vaine ſhal we then cry and ſay, O deare hearth & toombe, we pray thee faithfully to keep the bones of this honourable perſonage, vntil ſuch time as the *Athenians* ſhal repent them of the many iniuries and wrongs done vnto him, for *Phocion* is now dead, and the affaires of the *Athenians* may not proſper: in vaine ſhall we make vnto our ſelues a coſtly ſtand or image in remembraunce of ſo worthy a perſonage, for the affaires of the *Athenians* ſhall not proſper, in that *Phocion* is dead. Let vs therefore in time with the wiſe govern our ſuſpect the flattering of this our enemie, as the calmenes of the ſea, which is naught elſe but a manifeſt token of a preſent and imminent tempeſt; and with *Cicero* and *Cato*, withſtande in time the flatterie and ambition of *Ceſar*, leaſt with the *Romanes* to late we repent the ſame: let vs not as men

overcome with the greatnes of the tempeſt, deſperately ſeeke our ſafety in the middeſt of the rockes and ſands, but rather let vs fighting for our Prince and country, ſay, we will overcome, or die.

CAP. 14.

The ſundry waies and meanes leſte vnto vs for the ſuppreſsing of every diſtemperature raigning in this politicke bodie.

SOL: But what meanes are left vnto vs to ſuppreſſe this diſtemperature? *Epi:* Firſt we are to give impediment vnto the forme and manner, and vvith *Valerius* deny the embaſſadoures of *Tarquine* to ſpeake vnto the people, leaſt by flatterie they be deluded: with *Brutus* vve are to condemne and execute even our owne ſonnes, corrupted by *Tarquine*: and with *Valerius* we ought to deny the deliverie of *Vendicius* vnto the traitoures: thus we muſt give impediment vnto the forme, wherein this caution is to be obſerved, that the ſame be done in the beginning. For the *Romanes* having ſometimes laide a forme of their ambition for the diſturbing and conquering of others, the ſame was at the firſt litle regarded, vntill they had advaunced their ambition ſo highly, as to late their aſſociates and neighboures did acknowledge their errour, and when they much deſired, they founde themſelves much nable to ſuppreſſe the ſame. *Sol:* What other meanes remaine[v] to ſuppreſſe this diſtemperature? *Epi:* Firſt wee are to proceede by good and profitable lawes to the ſuppreſsing thereof: for the *Romanes* being given to vnderſtand, that forty ſeveral nations had combined for their ruine and deſtruction, they did forthwith create a Dictator to manage the affaires of their vvars, vnto whome they gave an abſolute power; all which, as well the manner of the creation, as his authority and continuaunce was eſtabliſhed by lawes, fearing leaſt when this diſtemperature ſhould bee once thoroughly kindled in the bowels of the common-weale,

they

they might want either time to effect the same, or that this innovation might then give occasion of mutiny. Secondly, we are to make preparation for the wars, and with *Themistocles* daily to arme and exercise the *Athenians*, to builde and vittaile our gallies, for the battaile of *Marathon* (saith he) will not give an end vnto these warres, but rather it doeth foretell vs of greater troubles. Thirdly, we are to resist this distemperature by the force and strength of our alies, confederates, and associates: and herein above all others, we are highly to esteeme and regarde the confederation of free Cities and estates; for they doe not easily, or for light causes depart the same, in regarde they proceede iudicially by voices, as well to establish, as to dissolve the same; the which caution *Tusci olim observabant*, and therefore it is saide, *Multum negotij fuit populo Romano cum Tuscis hoc modo inter se confederatis*: by which observation they became as well by sea as by lande, mighty commaunders; so as it is saide, *Quod ante tempora Romanorum Tusci potentissimi fuerint terra mariq;*. After this manner doe the *Helvetians* at this day proceede in their warres: and in times past, *Achei atq; Ætoli*. In like manner the *Romaines* the better to overcome all difficulties in their warres, did make an association with other free Cities and states, by the which manner of proceeding, they did every where conquere and commaunde. But the *Lacedæmonians*, and the *Athenians*, not making anie confederation, or association with other free Cities, did not long continue their greatnes. Fourthly, wee must bee able at all times to produce a collected power and strength of our proper subiectes, well trayned and exercised in military discipline, for the suppressing of this distemperature; for otherwise the *Thebanes* and the rest of the Cities of *Greece*, shall decline and revolte from the *Lacedæmonians*; and *Italy* shall revolte from the *Venetians*, *Quoniam resp: Spartanorum & Venetorum populum habuit imbellem*; therefore saith one, *In promptu habeas exercitum egregium ad exemplum Romanorum, quo motos liceat componere fluctus*. Fiftly, necessarie it is, that we doe possesse all the strong fortes and holdes, the which although they shall litle availe vs against any general or strong assault made against them, by such as commaunde the fielde, for that either

with the forte or rocke of *Arazze*, they ſhall give place vnto the furie of the artillerie, or with the towne and forte of *Avon* for want of ſuccours, or with the towne *Valencey* by the treaſon of *Donate Raffagnin*; yet they beeing placed vpon the confines of the countrie, may withſtande all ſodaine attemptes, and give ſuccour vnto the wounded and diſeaſed. Sixtly, for the better ſuppreſſing of theſe diſtemperatures, we are to take hoſtages and pledges vvith king *Porſenna*, from ſuch perſons as are likely to departe from their obedience, to the diſturbance of the common peace, and tranquillity of the ſubiectes, by the vvhich way hee ſuppreſſed the malice of the *Romaines*; then ſhall we ſafely with him diſſolve our armie, and vvithdrawe our ſtrength. The people of *Salamina* hath in all ages beene founde ſo factious and rebellious, even in the times before *Athens* made their conqueſt over them, as the whole kingdome being then devided into foure ſeverall partes and provinces, vvhich they tearmed kingdomes, yet all beeing commaunded by the king of *Ulſter*, they did from time to time yeelde many of their beſt and chiefe perſonages, for pledges and hoſtages of their obedience vnto the king of *Vlſter*: if then their native borne kinges alied, foſtered, maried, and continued even one in the others boſome, did yeelde pledges for their obedience, howe may we in this troubled age ſafely diſmiſſe pledges, and ſet them at liberty? may we expect greater fidelity, then they bare ſometimes to their native kinges? or doe theſe times offer more ſecuritie? or doth this nation vſe more fidelitie? who ſo looketh into the hiſtories and recordes of their newe and late warres, ſhall finde in them their olde diſpoſition to rebell; and that this vniverſall obedience which nowe they yeelde, is nothing but a ſodaine heate or calme, vvich is the true meſſenger of a tempeſtuous weather. The ſeventh caution obſerved for the ſuppreſſing of this diſtemperature, is ſpeedily to diſarme the people, and not ſuffer them at all to be trained or exerciſed in militarie diſcipline, eſpecially where the people be not free, but obedient and tributaries vnto vs: for the vſe, knowledge, and exerciſe of militarie diſcipline, doeth render them bolde, turbulent, diſobedient, and rebellious againſt vs: for what boldneſſe and diſobedience raigneth

neth in the people of *Salamina*, by trayning and exerciſing them in the feates of warres, the ſame may lively appeare in their recordes and ſtatutes, where it is ſaide, that diverſe perſons have aſſembled with banners diſplaied againſt the lieutenaunt and deputie of the ſaide lande, whereby many times the deputie hath beene put to reproch, and the common-weale ſet in adventure: for this cauſe it is ſaide, that *Veneti & Spartani opera plebis in bellis non uterentur*; and more wiſely the *Lacedæmonians* holding *Thebes* vnder their ſubiection and obedience, woulde not permitte that anie Cittizen of *Thebes* ſhould be trained in the warres, but rather laboured to render them peaceable, and by eaſe and reſt, ſoft and effeminate; and there was no ſmith to be found through all the lande of *Iſraell*, during ſuch time as the *Philiſtians* held them in ſubiection, leaſt the *Hebrewes* make them ſwordes and ſpades, ſaie the *Philiſtians*. Let vs then drawe the people of *Salamina* from the exerciſe of the warres; let vs with *Numa* coole and pacifie the hoate courage of the *Romaines to fight*, by the daily vſe and exerciſe of religion, prayer, and devotion; and let vs vvith the ancient kinges of *Athens*, draw them vnto planting, ſowing, & ploughing the land; and let vs there advance and ſhewe forth the olive tree vnto the iudges; let vs there from henceforth honor the Godeſſe *Pallas*, and not *Mars* or *Neptune*, as heretofore; for ſhe of right ought there to prevaile, and have preheminence; for ſhe it is that ſhall cauſe the people to imbrace with all humility and obedience the governement of kinges. Put that great number of *Heilotes* to laboure, and plough the grounde, and let no man be trained but the free Citizen, ſaieth *Lycurgus*, let them yeelde vnto vs *magna vectigalia*, and let vs give vnto them *magnum & egregium exercitum*, if nede ſhall require. Laſtly, let vs advance all occupations and ſciences with the counſel of *Areopagite*, that thereby they may be drawen from the ſtudy and thoughts of innovation and change, for *difficilis res eſt*, ſaith a learned writer, *innumerabilem multitudinem a principe vel a paucis coerceri, niſi plebs operibus intenta quæſtum faciat*. Therefore wiſely did ſometimes *Pericles*, *Veſpaſianus*, *Auguſtus*, and nowe the *Venetians*, holde the mindes and thoughts of their Citizens alwaies occupied and imploied in

Anno.10. H.7.cap.13

labours, occupations, and ſcienees. *Sol*: There are which finding this politicke body diſtempered, have devided the ſame into partes and factions, whereby as a ſmoke parted into many rivals it looſeth his principall force: for with the aide and aſsiſtance of the weaker parte, they have ſuppreſſed the ſtronger, and then eaſily commaunded the weaker; and for this cauſe it is ſaide, that the kinges of *Ægypt* have heretofore devided their regions and kingdomes by factions, *Ne vnquam conſpirare inter ſe Ægyptij omnes poſſent*. *Epi*: This courſe of governement is never to be embraced, but vpon a great extremitie, when as neither there remayneth counſell, nor forces, which otherwiſe may ſuppreſſe this diſtemperature: for thereby foure miſchiefes ſhall ariſe vnto the ſtate; firſt the rentes, revenewes, cuſtomes, compoſitions, tributes, eſcheates, and other profites annexed vnto the crowne, ſhall thereby ceaſe; for it is ſaide, the *Florentines* by their civill factions, that firſt received their beginning of the diſorders which were in the governement popular, were rendred as well vnable to pay the *French* king the reſidue of the money which had beene lent them by the Duke of *Millaine*, as alſo to defray the ordinarie charges of the warres with *Piſa*. The like miſchiefe did ariſe vnto the ſeverall townes of *Romagna*, from their ſeverall factions and diſorders; but why doe we ſeeke forraine examples? did not all compoſitions, cuſtomes, rentes, revenewes, tributes, and other eſcheates, and profits, for a long time ceaſe by the extreame povertie of the ſubiectes of *Salamina*, which did firſt ariſe vnto that countrie by reaſon of their ſeverall factions? as it may appeare by the ſtatute of Captaineſhip, where it is declared, that in the time of iuſtice declination, the Lords and chiefetaines fell into much ſtrife for greatneſſe of rule and governement, by reaſon whereof they drewe vnto them other inferiour ſtates to be of their ſeverall factions, vvhereby the countrie was drawen into that povertie, as for a long time, all rentes, revenewes, and other profits there ceaſed, and more then that, a newe charge and trouble did growe vnto *Athens* for the appeaſing of thoſe diſorders. Againe, the honour of well governing and commaunding is hereby loſt, which is a ſecond miſchiefe that ariſeth vnto vs herein; for *ob diſcordias ci-*

vium

vium accidit, vt vnius imperio non pareant, sed in diuersas partes diuisa regio nullis principibus parere cogatur. All which did sometimes lively appeare in *Salamina*, when as the Lordes and chiefetaines of that land, by drawing all other inferiour states vnto their severall factions, did thereby withdraw the feare, obedience, and attendance of the subiect of *Salamina*, due vnto the state of *Athens*, and wholy converted the same vnto themselves, as in the statute of Captainship more at large may appeare. Thirdly by factions and discordes there groweth a neglect of al publike affaires; for it is truely saide, that in the civill discords of the *Florentines*, no man having a sound care of the affaires publike, & many of the principal citizens being suspected, either to frēd the *Medices*, or as mē that desired an other forme of governement, things were overruled more with confusion then with counsel. Lastly, greater mischiefe then any before remembred, ariseth by factions and discordes; for in such cases a third person shall easily atchieve vnto the principallity, & suppresse either faction at his pleasure; for so *Clearchus* by the assistance of the faction of the nobility, was inabled to hold the place & kingdome, as wel against the people as nobles, which were then the two factions that raigned & disturbed the politike body: & it is also said, the particular factions of the citizēs of *Millaine* drawing to privat counsels, did immediatly conspire & take armes against *Lodowicke Sforce*, in such sort, as he was forced thereby to make his present departure with his wife & childrē, at which instant the citizens of *Millain* with francke & ready goodwil received the enemy: & have not several factions of *Salamina*, offred thēselves with frācke & ready goodwill to receive the enemy? hath not *Iames* sometimes Earle of *Desmond* sent vnto the french king, & by al means excited & provoked him to send an army for the invading of *Salamina*, the which conspiracy did not then take his desired effect, by reason of a peace thē immediatly cōcluded betwixt King H. the 8. & the french King? againe being frustate of that hope, hath he not many waies provoked the emperour, to send an army for the invading & possessing of *Salamina*? in like maner hath not *Thomas Fitz. Garrald* addressed his letters vnto the Bishop of *Rome*, as also vnto the Emperor, by one *Gale* in *Granyll*, otherwise, called *Charles Raynold* Archdeacon of *Kelles*,

Act. of captainship. 11. Eliza. cap. 7. folio. 168.

Act. 28. H.8.cap.1. for the invading of *Salamina*? all which in the act of the attainder more at large may appeare. And hath not *Oneile*, who by ſufferaunce and tollerance, long ſupported his faction againſt the ſtate, ſometimes addreſſed his letters vnto ſeveral forraine Princes, for the drawing in of ſtraungers to invade and poſſeſſe *Salamina*, the which vvere publikely intercepted by the Lorde Deputie? &c. All vvhich may evidently appeare in the ſtatutes of his attainder. Againe did not the faction of the ancient *Brittains* lay open a gap vnto *Cæſar* his invaſion, and did hee not by the aide of one faction of the *Gaules* ſubdue the reſt, and them alſo in the end? Was not the Duke ſometimes of *Valentinois*, emboldened to invade the dominion of the *Florentines*, with a weake and ſlender armie, by the feare, ſuſpition, and great diſagreement, that then poſſeſſed them, for that he had in his army *Vitellozze*, and the *Vrſins*, and for that alſo *Peter de Medicis* was abiding at *Loiana* in the countrie of *Bollognia* at his direction? for it is ſaide that hee did entertaine *Peter de Medicis*, *Vitellie*, and the *Vrſins*, not vvith a minde or deſire to advaunce them, for nothing more then that could be farther from his thoughtes, but to augment the mutinies and diſagreementes of the *Florentines*, by the vvhich he hoped to vrge them either to better conditions, or be able to occupy ſome place of importance in their iuriſdiction. And did not the *Megarians* during the vproares raiſed by the ſeverall factions then maintained by the iſſue of *Cylon*, and the offſpring of *Megacles*, take from vs the haven of *Nyſea*, and the ile of *Salamina*? then vvee may rightly conclude, that ſo long as vve have an enemy, vvhich raiſeth himſelfe againſt vs, ſo long we ought for the ſafetie of the vvhole, ſtrongly to ſuppreſſe all factions vvhatſoever: for factions breede an vnſetled minde in the people, and doth nouriſh this deſire of chaunge and alteration; the vvhich did lively appeare in the people of *Athens*, during the continuance of the ſeverall factions, then entertained betwixt the people of the valley, ſea-coſt, & mountaine; for notwithſtanding they al kept & obſerved the laws made by you *Solon*, for their reformatiō, yet there was none founde but gaped for a change, and deſired to ſee thinges in another ſtate, either parties hoping their condition & ſtate of life would

would amend by chaunge, and that every of them ſhould be better then their adverſaries. There remaineth now that vve deduct colonies, which is the laſt, but not the leaſt meanes to ſuppreſſe this diſtemperature, vvhich of all others is the moſt beneficiall for the cõtaining of a nation conquered in their duty and obedience; wherein foure matters are worthily conſidered: firſt the neceſſitie of deducting colonies; ſecondarily the benefite that redoundeth thereby vnto common-weales; thirdly what order and manner in deducting colonies is to bee vſed and obſerved; laſtly, the impedimentes which are vſuallie given vnto the deducting of colonies. *Sol:* Shew vs the neceſſitie of collonies. *Epi:* A nation conquered may not be contained in their obedience vvithout the ſtrength of colonies or garriſons: for may we be induced to beleeve, that that people or nation, who daily bewaileth & accuſeth his preſent ſtate and condition, may perſiſt therein longer then they be preſſed therevnto by neceſſitie? and more then this in the act of *Abſentes*, the meere native borne people of *Salamina*, are tearmed to be mortall and naturall enemies vnto their conquerour and all his dominions. After this ſort did the citizens of *Cremona* affect the *Venetians*; and the *Piſans*, the *Florentines*: but now to ſuppreſſe this diſtemperature, if wee ſhoulde give vnto them garriſones, and *Præſidia perpetua*, *nihil iſto intollerabilius eſt*, ſaith a learned writer, *quia tantum abeſt vt victi vincentium imperijs aſſueſcere condiſcant, vt non prius a novandis rebus conquieſcant, quam aut præſidia interemerint, aut arces ceperint, aut finitimos principes ac populos ad bellum accerſerint*; whereof we neede not ſearch forraine examples, when the daily calamities of *Salamina* doe witneſſe the ſame, which happened ſince the times, wherein we gave vnto them *præſidia perpetua:* for how many waies did this people incite the French King, hovv oft have they provoked the Pope to invade this lande of *Salamina*? Againe the Emperour and all other Princes and Potentates, vvhat fortes and holdes have they not taken, and how many of our garriſons have they moſt cruelly ſlaine and murdered, the ſame, in the ſeveral actes of Attainder of *Shane Oneile*, *Garralde Fitz Garralde*, *Iames* of *Deſmond*, and by ſeverall other recordes, may appeare at large

28. H.8. cap. 3.

28. H.8. cap. 1.

large. Neither doth this forme of governement drawe with it a perpetuall discontentment onelie, but also an infinite and continuall charge in maintaining these severall garrisons, as well to the Prince, as to the subiect; for so in the act of subsidie and other recordes it may appeare. Neither be these all the discommodities that perpetual garrisons drawe with them, for these notwithstanding, we have beene forced to send at sundry times armies roiall to suppresse disorders and rebellions, as the same more at large may appeare in the act of restraining of tributes; so as wee may conclude, that where colonies are not strongly and faithfully deducted, there the ende of the first warres, is but a beginning of the second more daungerous then the first; the vvhich maie appeare by the recordes of *Salamina*: for no sooner were the people or sects, called *Omores*, *Odempseis*, *Oconores*, and others, expelled by great forces and strengthes, to our great charges, out of the severall countries of *Liece*, *Slewmarge*, *Irry*, *Glimnalirry*, *and Offaile*, but eftsones for that we deducted not colonies, they traiterouslie entered the said countries by force, and long detained the same, vntill they were with greater forces expelled, all which more at large may appeare in the act made for the deviding of countries, into shiere groundes, so as we may conclude, that it is not for wise Princes to persevere in that course of governement, which doth nourish as it were a perpetuall interest in troubles, charges, and expenses: for the which causes chiefely did the *Venetians* willingly abandon the governement of *Bybienna* and *Pisa*, and wee of *Athens*, *Salamina*, the which did chiefely arise vnto vs, for that in steede of planting of colonies, we placed garrisons. Now then if we be willing to cast of our former and manifolde troubles, if we be desirous to dismisse our selves of these infinite and perpetuall charges, and lastly if we indevour to be strong against the invaders, and such as shall contend to occupie *Salamina* by force, let vs loose no opportunity of deducting of colonies, for they be deducted and maintained with small or no charges, & with no great offence, but onely to such whose landes and houses they possesse, the which remaine for the most part pacified, in that they enioy their life which stoode in the handes of the Prince, as vvell as their

28. H. 8. cap. 11.

Act. An. 3. 4. Phil. & Marie c. 2. folio. 145.

their landes to diſpoſe, for their offences: and if they ſhould remaine diſcontented, for that having reſpect to the whole kingdome they be but a handfull, and alſo diſperſed and poore, they may never be able to hurt or diſturbe the ſtate, & all others which finde themſelves free from their loſſes, ſhall reſt pacified, partely fearing, leaſt they commit any thing raſhly or fooliſhly, and partly doubting, leaſt the like befalleth them as to thoſe which remaine ſpoyled for their offences. Againe, being thus deducted with ſmall or no diſcontentment, and maintained with far leſſe charge, they bee founde alſo more faithfull and ſtoute defendours of the confines of the country then garriſons, and therefore it is ſaide by a man of great vnderſtanding, *Si reges noſtri capto Ludovico 12. rege Inſubriæ, Colonias eo miſiſſent, vt quondam Celtarum reges feciſſe dicuntur, Inſubria a Francorum ditione ac poteſtate non tam facile defeciſſet: nec vero Hiſpani præſidijs militaribus nulla Colonia deducta perpetuum eius regionis imperium tuebuntur, ſed ab imperio ſubditi arrepta occaſione deſciſcant oportet; non aliter quam Belgæ, quos iam pridem colonijs Hiſpanorum ad imperium retinendum continuè neceſſe fuiſſet, quoniam nec vlla vis diuturna eſſe poteſt, & peſſimus diuturnitatis cuſtos eſt metus*: in like manner *Salamina* notvvithſtanding the ſtrength of garriſons, doth daily take all occaſions of declining, but in former times, after colonies were deducted, then *Salamina* continued for many ages in their obedience, in ſuch ſorte, as none durſt beare vppe heade, but lived as vaſſals and obedient people, vntill partly by the iniquity of the times, partly by our domeſticall factions, and laſtly by a negligence and ſecurity then found in theſe colonies, they were overthrowne and expelled by the native borne people of that lande, all which in the act of attainder of *Shane Oneile* more at large may appeare, as alſo in the ſtatutes of *Abſentes*. *Sol*: Nowe ſith the neceſſity of colonies doeth manifeſtly appeare by vnfallible proofes and examples, let vs proceede vnto the profite and benefite that grovveth thereby. *Epi*: The benefites that hereby ariſe to the common-weale, are ſundry and diverſe: firſt the people poore and ſeditious vvhich were a burden to the common-weale, are drawen forth, vvhereby the matter of ſedition is remooved out of the Cittie; and for this

cauſe it is ſaid, that *Pericles* ſent into the country of *Cherroneſus*, a thouſand free men of his Cittie there to dwell, and to devide the landes amongſt them; five hundreth alſo into the Ile of *Naxus*, into the Ile of *Andros* others, ſome he ſent to inhabite *Thracia*, and others to dwell with the *Biſaltes*; as well thereby to ridde the Cittie of a number of idle perſons, who thorough idlenes began to be curious and to deſire chaunge of thinges, as alſo to provide for the neceſſity of the poore townſ-men that had nothing, which being naturall Citizens of *Athens* ſerved as garriſons, to keepe vnder thoſe which had a deſire to rebell, or to attempt any altera-teration or change: ſecondly by tranſlating of colonies, the people conquered are drawen and intiſed by little and little, to embrace the manners, lawes, and governement of the conquerour: laſtly the colonies being placed and diſperſed abroade amongeſt the people, like Beacons doe foretell and diſcloſe all conſpiracies, and as a garriſon alſo are wont to ſuppreſſe the mutinies of ſuch as are deſirous of alteration and change; and to this effect it is ſaide, in the ſtatute of *Alfonſus*, that the colonies, which were ſometimes deducted for the defending of the confines of *Salamina*, then and many ages after abiding in the ſaide lande, did nobly and valiantly defende the ſame againſt all enemies whatſoever, as alſo kept the ſame in ſuch tranquillity & good orders, as the kings had due ſubiection of the inhabitance, the lawes were well obeyed, and of all the revenewes and regalties they were duely aunſwered as in any place whatſoever: laſtly, they yeelde a yearely rent, profite, or ſervice vnto the crovvne for ever; for theſe cauſes above rehearſed it is ſaide, *Romani victis hoſtibus Colonias deducebant*: and the French conquering *Lombardy*, did chaſe out the auncient inhabitants, and in their dwelling placed colonies: in like manner the Emperour of the Turkes from time to time, of Chriſtians whome then he reduced in ſervitude, deduceth colonies, ſo as it is ſaide, that *Carolus 5. imperator debellatis Peruanæ regionis gentibus, eadem quam Turcarum rex, in coloniarum tranſlatione, ratione vſus eſt, Sol*: Nowe ſith as well the neceſsity as the profite of deducing colonies doth ſufficiently appeare vnto vs, let vs proceede vnto the manner and order of tranſlating of colonies, as

the thirde matter vvoorthy of consultation. *Epi*: In the order and manner of deducting collonies, certaine rules are to bee observed: first that the lands be so devided, as strengths by great numbers may be deducted, and therefore *Duo cuiq; iugera tributa sunt*; but not long after, *Prolatis finibus, lege Licinia septem iugera cuiq; civi assignata legimus*, the which order was observed by the *Romaines*. But otherwise the Emperour of the Turkes, *iugera quindecim cuiq; attribuit*. The *Romaines* laboured to deduct collonies by great numbers, especially out of the confines of *Italy*, to the ende that by the proper strength and forces of colonies, they might easilie defende the confines of their dominions, and suppresse al such as were founde desirous of innovation. Secondly we are to plant and place our colonies in the most rich and fruitfull landes, *Vt in eo civibus numero auctis alimenta suppetant, potentiaq; aucta huiusmodi novæ urbes, omnem internam vim propulsare atque etiam opprimere queant*. Thirdly, such as are to be deducted in the number of colonies, we shall wisely make them but proprietaries of the landes, during life onely, *Vt fructuarij occasu fructus in erarium cogerentur, quoad principis beneficio alius succederet, quemadmodum Amurates cum Timariotis egit*: by vvhich constitution three matters beneficiall to the weale publicke shall arise; first opportunity shall be lent from time to time, to recompence servitours by these casuall profites that shall arise, without imposing any newe charge vpon the common-weale; secondly by the death of this tenaunt for life, the profites thereof growe vnto the prince vntill the landes be newly disposed by him; thirdly, the prince or state being to dispose these landes at his or their pleasure, shall with this rewarde binde the proprietarie of the lande during life, in all services to be loyall and faithfull; lastly, by holding this course, sundrie inconveniences shall be eschewed which vsually followe such as graunte these landes in perpetuity; for in such cases they have beene founde in *Salamina*, especially after two or three descentes, to inter-marry and foster with the meere native people, and by that occasion decline sometimes from their obedience; at other times they are founde to make leases of their landes, or to make a grant over of their estates vnto such as are not

well affected vnto the gouernement, to the ouerthrowe of themselues and common-weale, as it may appeare in the statute of Absentes, where it is saide, that the colonies being possessed of their landes, did make leases of diverse of their holdes and manners vnto the late Earle of *Kildar* attainted, by occasion whereof the same came to the possession of *Thomas Fitz Garralde*, his sonne and heire, who intending a daungerous rebellion, was aided, assisted, and maintained against the state, by the inhabitants, & occupiers of the saide lande, so as the state was compelled of force to sende thither an army royall for the better suppressing of those disorders and rebellions; lastly, these colonies must vnite and gather themselues together into places of strength, walled or intrenched for their better defence against sodaine incursions, and neuer be destitute of prouision sufficient for their defence: for such of our auncient colonies in *Salamina*, which in times peaceable suffered their townes, holdes, and castles to decay, and neglected the mainteining of such garrisons, as of right appertained vnto them to maintain, were in difficult times exiled, banished, or put to the sword, onely such remained and prevailed, which with a collected power and strength, did inhabite places walled or intrenched, and were not founde destitute of sufficient prouision for the wars, as it may more at large appeare in the act of *Absentes*. Therefore of late daies two worthy Knightes, Sir *Henry Walloppe* Treasurer, and Sir *Nicholas Bagnole* Knight Marshall, being the principall personages of the late deducted colonies, for the better strengthening of the confines of *Salamina*, haue not dispersed their forces but wisely collected them into one place of strength, vvhereby they haue repelled from time to time, all internall forces or sodaine incursions. *Sol:* You haue at large described vnto vs the necessity, the profite, and the order and manner of deducting of colonies, you shall orderly proceede, if you nowe intreate of the impedimentes vvhich vsually are given vnto such actions. *Epi:* The impediments are sundry and diverse: the first is given by such as vsually oppose themselues against all newe orders, for that they reape a benefite by the olde disorders. The second is equall with the first, and proceedeth from a generall incredulitie ingrafted in

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all sortes of persons, which never yet have given affiance or confidence vnto newe attemptes, be they never so profitable. The thirde impediment ariseth greater then the rest, when the authours of these new orders, shall become faint defendors thereof, and shall give leave and waye to others, which give impediment thereunto. The last impediment is the great trouble and charge, which followeth such as shall inhabite landes farre removed; with the consideration whereof, the *Romaine* Cittizens were sometimes withdrawen, and discouraged from the inhabiting of the lands removed out of the confines of *Italy*, and the same also doeth not a little withdraw the newe colonies from inhabiting *Salamina*: But *Muhamedes* the Emperour sometimes of the *Turkes*, conteding to remove this impedimēt, *Cuiq; coloniæ duos bubulos ac sementem dedit*. *So*: Now you have at large discoursed of a reformation of declined common-weales, declare vnto vs what you intende by the subsequent words which followe in your generall and first description, where you tearme it an happie restitution vnto his first perfection. *Ep*: I have tearmed it an happy restitution, when the same is effected without bloud-shed and spot of tyranny, or cruelty; but yet it must be confessed that where *sanandi medicina* may not prevaile, there *execandi*, is rightly vsed; neither is nature saide to hate those members and partes, which shee cutteth off for the preservation & safety of the whole body: and by this word perfection, I intend nothing but that good, which even from the first institution we did aime & shoote at, *Nam omne principium bonum aliquod spectabat*, and this is the ende and scope of al reformations: as for example, when *Athens* had first conquered *Salamina*, they labored nothing more, then to conteine the subiect in his obedience vnto the Cittie of *Athens* vnder good & profitable lawes, & that the people might more assuredly be drawen thereunto without any great grievance or offence, they strongly deducted colonies into all parts of *Salamina*, and established there many and profitable lawes, the which were truly and iustly observed by many ages, and so continued their obedience from time to time, vntil these colonies were by the iniquity of times exiled. Let then our second reformation be like vnto the first, for *Omne principium bonũ aliquod spectabat*:

ſo as I may ende like as I began this diſcourſe, ſaying, that a reformation of a declined common-weale is an happy reſtitution vnto his perfection. *Sol:* You have wiſely diſcourſed of all the partes of this general deſcription, and happily have made an ende thereof, for beholde my meſſenger haſteneth vnto me more then with an ordinary expedition. *Nuncius.* My Lord and generall *Solon*, the *Megarian* army approacheth neare at hand; for nowe ſtanding vpon the pinnacles of the temple of *Venus*, we did plainly diſcover their ſhips. *Solon* then turning himſelfe vnto *Epimenides* ſaide, I go armed againſt the *Megarians* with the wiſedome of *Epimenides*; in ſuch ſorte, as with *Numa* I may ſafely ſacrifice when as they remaine in armes, in requitall of which good counſell from henceforth I ſhall confeſſe to holde my life from *Epimenides*. *Epi:* Theſe meane lightes which I have given for the reformation of *Salamina*, with the wiſedome of *Solon* as with the beames of a bright ſunne, remaine extinguiſhed, ſo as there reſteth nothing but our former goodwill which may tie you to make acceptance thereof *Sol:* And the ſame may never die but with *Solon*; farevvell then *Epimenides*. *Epi:* And you *Solon* in like manner adue. Then with the great noiſe and clattering of the weapons, and armour of the ſouldiers, I ſodenly awaked, and remained for a ſmall time amazed with the event of ſo weighty and great matters, but at the laſt my drouſie ſence being newly refreſhed, I might beholde, all was ſodenly vaniſhed and nothing left in place but a viſion or dreame, the which according to my ſmall skill, and vnderſtanding, I have heere expreſſed in pelting proſe and not in heroicall verſe; wherewith *Solon* as then it ſeemed to me, did much commende and grace the matter, vvhich then he vttered vnto *Epimenides*.

FINIS.